Essays in financial integration, firm dynamics and risk sharing by Maslov, Egor








Essays in financial integration, firm dynamics and risk sharing
Maslov, Egor





Maslov, Egor. Essays in financial integration, firm dynamics and risk sharing. 2020, University of Zurich,
Faculty of Economics.
Essays in Financial Integration, Firm Dynamics and Risk Sharing
Dissertation
submitted to the
Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.




approved in October 2020 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Mathias Hoffmann
Prof. Dr. Per Östberg
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The title of this dissertation is “Essays in Financial Integration, Firm Dynamics and Risk Shar-
ing”. It is a cumulative work, both empirical and theoretical in nature, that studies macroe-
conomic aspects of financial integration with a particular focus on the role of the firm in the
transmission of real and financial shocks and risk sharing. To provide a better understanding of
how deeply interconnected these concepts are in my research, the following paragraphs briefly
focus on each of them individually.
“Financial integration”. Inspired by the observation that the first decade of the euro saw a
considerable drive toward deeper de jure and de facto financial integration within the eurozone,
this thesis studies two ways in which the European financial integration turned out less profound
than expected. It shows that while the cross-border bank lending had increased considerably
prior to 2008, it mainly took the form of cross-border lending to banks, while cross-border bank
lending to the non-bank sector had hardly increased. As a result, this lopsided nature of banking
integration led to an unbalanced transmission of global financial shocks to individual countries
and sectors, and sudden fragility of risk sharing mechanisms as the global financial and the
European sovereign debt crises hit.
“Firm Dynamics”. Building on these ideas, the current work emphasizes two different roles
that firms play in shaping aggregate macroeconomic responses to shocks: first, through their
function as an implicit insurance provider to households, and second, through the differences
between how large and small firms interact with banks and the financial sector in general.
Concerning the first point, it develops the idea that the general payout policy of the firm,
understood broadly to include the compensation of labor, determines how much of the firm-
level risk is borne by different economic agents, and concludes that risk sharing patterns on the
macroeconomic level are crucially shaped by how risk is shared within the firm. With respect
to the second point, it highlights the relative importance of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) for shock transmission within the economy. Due to their relative opaqueness, small
1
firms can only imperfectly substitute other sources of credit for bank loans, and so financial
shocks to the banking sector have larger effects on output and consumption in countries with a
high share of SMEs.
“Risk Sharing”. From the welfare perspective of individual countries and currency unions, it
is crucial to know how changes in aggregate production and income (e.g., GDP) affect aggregate
demand and consumption, and which institutions and policies help to reduce the macroeconomic
risk. Motivated by this notion, this thesis revisits the channels and mechanisms through which
risk sharing was achieved in the eurozone before and during the financial crises. It further
examines the role of labor income and dividends in shaping the aggregate risk sharing patterns as
well as to what extent the corporate sector and individual firms can shift risk between economic
agents and thus influence the aggregate pass-through of the risk within the economy. It concludes
with a short discussion of how different governments induced an external shift in corporate
payout policies during the current covid-19 pandemic in order to stabilize workers’ labor income
and reduce the total size of the risk passing through to consumption and aggregate demand.
Methodology-wise, this dissertation uses diverse econometric techniques applied to aggregate
macroeconomic data, national sectoral accounts data, and microeconomic country-firm data. It
proposes several frameworks to study risk sharing on different levels of interaction between
economic agents, and investigates how economic outcomes can be shaped by different types
of shocks: productivity and financial, aggregate and idiosyncratic, permanent and transitory.
Furthermore, it complements some of its empirical findings from a theoretical perspective by
constructing and calibrating two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. These
models make precise the interpretations of the risk sharing channels and the transmission of real
and financial shocks within the economy in general, and through the firm sector in particular.
Finally, through the use of simulated data under various shock scenarios, this approach addi-
tionally facilitates the distinction between alternative explanations of the empirical findings.
The dissertation consists of four chapters. The present “Dissertation Overview” is followed
by Chapter 2, titled “Small Firms and Domestic Bank Dependence in Europe’s Great Reces-
sion”, which is co-authored with Mathias Hoffmann (my PhD supervisor) and Bent E. Sørensen
(University of Houston), continues with Chapter 3, titled “Channels of Risk Sharing in the Eu-
rozone: What Can Banking and Capital Market Union Achieve?”, joint with Mathias Hoffmann,
Bent E. Sørensen and Iryna Stewen (University of Mainz), and finishes with the single-authored
Chapter 4, titled “Risk Sharing within the Firm and Beyond: The Role of the Firm in the
Transmission of Shocks to Households”. The main findings from these chapters are summarized
below.
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In Chapter 2, titled “Small Firms and Domestic Bank Dependence in Europe’s Great Reces-
sion”, my co-authors and I show that the severity of the eurozone crisis was worse in countries
where firms borrowed more from domestic banks than in countries where firms borrowed more
from international banks. Eurozone banking integration in the years 2000–2008 mainly involved
cross-border lending between banks while foreign banks’ lending to the real sector stayed flat.
Hence, SMEs remained dependent on domestic banks and were vulnerable to global banking
shocks. We confirm, using a calibrated quantitative model, that domestic bank dependence
makes sectors and countries with many SMEs vulnerable to global banking shocks.
In Chapter 3, titled “Channels of Risk Sharing in the Eurozone: What Can Banking and
Capital Market Union Achieve?”, my co-authors and I study channels of risk sharing in the
EMU before and after 2008, when the Great Recession started. Empirically, higher cross-border
equity holdings and more direct bank-to-nonbank lending are associated with more risk sharing
while interbank integration is not. Equity market integration in the EMU remains limited
while banking integration is dominated by interbank integration. Further, interbank integration
proved to be highly procyclical, which contributed to a freeze in risk sharing after 2008. Based on
this evidence, and results from simulations of a stylized DSGE model, we discuss implications for
banking union. Our results show that direct banking integration and capital market integration
are complements and that robust risk sharing in the EMU requires integration on both fronts.
This chapter is based on the paper that has been been prepared for the IMFER-Central
Bank of Ireland conference “The Euro at 20” and subsequently published in the IMF Economic
Review as Hoffmann et al. (2019). For copyright reasons the text of this chapter is relegated to
the Appendix.
Finally, in Chapter 4, titled “Risk Sharing within the Firm and Beyond: The Role of the
Firm in the Transmission of Shocks to Households”, I study the role of the firm in international
consumption risk sharing by analyzing the patterns of shock transmission from firm output and
value-added to household income and consumption. I show that fluctuations in consumption are
primarily driven by shocks to household labor income and shielded from shocks to household
dividend income. While the former are entirely driven by the dynamics of firm-sector labor
compensation, there is little evidence that household dividend income follows firm sector div-
idend payout. Thus, firms have a potentially pivotal role in providing consumption insurance
to households by shifting risk from workers to shareholders. I show that there is indeed a high
degree of such within-firm risk sharing, since firms considerably insure workers from transitory
and permanent shocks to their output and value-added, while shareholders are only insured from
temporal but not from persistent shocks.
3
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2.1 Introduction
Since the inception of the Euro until 2008, cross-border bank lending in the Eurozone increased
considerably but mainly took the form of cross-border lending to banks, while cross-border bank
lending to the non-bank sector hardly increased. Thus, the real economy in most member coun-
tries remained dependent on the provision of credit by domestic banks. This pattern—which we
refer to as “domestic bank dependence”—implied that the growth in domestic credit to the real
sector in the years before the crisis was financed mainly by domestic banks, which in turn funded
themselves through cross-border interbank borrowing. During the Eurozone crisis cross-border
interbank lending declined sharply, while cross-border bank lending to the real sector remained
relatively stable. This left economies and sectors that were reliant on domestic banks for finance
particularly exposed to the global retrenchment in cross-border interbank lending. In this pa-
per we provide empirical evidence consistent with this mechanism and propose a model which
explains how the global retrenchment in cross-border interbank flows disproportionately affects
countries with a high share of domestic banks and sectors with many small and medium-sized
firms (SMEs). We show that our model produces predictions that qualitatively and quanti-
tatively match the documented empirical patterns and that no other alternative scenarios we
consider can by themselves replicate these findings.
We expect that sectors and countries with many SMEs would be particularly dependent on
domestic banks for the provision of credit because SMEs are generally too small and too opaque
to borrow from banks in other countries or from the bond market. Domestic banks generally
have better information about local small firms and often engage in long-term relationships
with their borrowers. This allows SMEs to satisfy their demand for finance that is not easily
available from big foreign banks that mainly lend at arms-length. On the other hand, domestic
bank dependence makes small firms particularly vulnerable to shocks that affect the domestic
banking sector. Due to their relative opaqueness, SMEs can only imperfectly substitute other
sources of credit for their domestic (often local) bank loans. Consistent with this firm-borrowing
channel, we find empirically that the decline in cross-border interbank lending had larger negative
real effects on output in countries with high domestic bank dependence, in particular in sectors
with many SMEs.
In order to provide a fully articulated interpretation of our findings, we build a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model allows for both global and domestic
(“local”) banks and includes two sectors: a sector populated by “small” firms, which are reliant
on borrowing from local banks, and a sector populated by “large” firms, which can satisfy a larger
portion of their borrowing needs from global banks. Global banks, in contrast to local banks,
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do not satisfy the funding needs of firms (especially, small firms) completely and, as a result,
firms have to borrow some funds from local banks, giving rise to “domestic bank dependence” in
our model. Local banks collect deposits from their home country, but can also fund themselves
in the European cross-border interbank market by borrowing from global banks, which in turn
refinance themselves through wholesale funding in the global interbank market (the U.S.).
The baseline simulations of our model posit that the global financial crisis corresponds to
a period of a large contraction of cross-border funding available to banks while TFP or local
credit supply did not decline. The central assumption of our model is that banks actively
adjust their risk-weighted leverage ratio as documented by Adrian and Shin (2014). Under
this assumption, cross-border lending to banks contracts more than cross-border lending to the
real sector following a global deleveraging shock. This is because profit-maximizing banks shift
lending to high-return activities that have high regulatory risk weights, in particular lending
to firms. This benefits larger firms, but as the contraction in cross-border interbank lending
reduces local banks’ lending capacity, it disproportionately hurts SMEs which are particularly
dependent on local banks. The model is able to replicate these patterns in the data and therefore
provides a structural interpretation.
We examine if our central interpretation is robust to a number of other features of the model.
We consider alternative specifications for shocks in the crisis period, where we mute the global
bank shocks and instead allow for either a concomitant drop in TFP in all countries, a syn-
chronized drop in TFP in (model countries designed to match) the southern European countries
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (GIIPS), or a synchronized rise in a refinancing cost
for local banks in the GIIPS countries during the crisis. Results from simulations with TFP
shocks, synchronized regionally or globally, do not explain the patterns in the data, as the model
delivers coefficients of interest that are either zero or of the wrong sign.1 We interpret this as
evidence that a synchronized drop in demand for loans from local banks does not provide an
alternative explanation in conjunction with active leverage adjustment. Finally, results from
simulations with synchronized local banking shocks also have a hard time matching the data,
as the main coefficient of interest under this scenario is noisily estimated, albeit close in magni-
tude to the coefficient we get in the baseline case. This suggests that local credit supply shocks
transmit to the real sector through a mechanism similar to that of global banking shocks, but
1Brunnermeier and Reis (2019) explain how liquidity dried up in the Great Recession and its aftermath. They
also point out that banks have migrated their liabilities from traditional deposit taking to a mixture of deposits,
repos, and wholesale funds while assets have shifted from government bonds, loans, and mortgages to include a
sizable fraction of tradeable assets. Many banks held domestic tradeable assets and in crisis-hit countries these
assets lost value, causing banks to lose equity. This loss of equity would reinforce the contraction in lending
that we model and our model permutation that allows for synchronized shocks in GIIPS countries is designed to
capture such effects in reduced form.
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that the degree of synchronization of these shocks needs go well beyond the GIIPS countries,
effectively needing to be pan-European in order to match the data. Thus, although we find
more support for the global nature of the retrenchment in cross-border interbank lending than
local crises, the exact source of the bank credit supply shocks is irrelevant for our key finding
that interbank integration leaves countries more exposed to banking sector shocks than direct
banking integration, with sectors with many SMEs being particularly exposed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a first look at the
data and some initial stylized facts. Section 2.3 places our analysis in the context of the literature.
Section 2.4 uses a stylized theoretical framework to motivate our empirical specifications that
allow us to study the transmission of the financial crisis across countries on real data. Our
DSGE model is laid out and brought to the data in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 summarizes
the quantitative results obtained from model simulations. Section 2.7 offers conclusions.
2.2 A look at the data
It is commonly observed that the European Monetary Union has given a boost to banking inte-
gration in Europe. Figure 2.1, which is based on locational banking statistics from the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), displays lending by foreign banks for a range of EMU countries,
separately and combined (EMU-11). Flows of bank loans surged in the first decade of the EMU,
but most of this growth was due to increased foreign bank lending to domestic banks—foreign
bank lending to the domestic non-bank sector (which here includes the domestic private sector
and government) increased less and has remained relatively flat. We argue that foreign lending
to domestic banks versus lending to the non-bank sector are not simple substitutes, and, in-
deed, foreign lending to the non-bank sector generally proved resilient during the financial and
sovereign debt crisis while bank-to-bank lending virtually imploded. The synchronization of the
collapse in cross-border bank-to-bank lending is noteworthy in this context. Even though coun-
tries’ post-2008 experiences varied considerably in terms of the severity of banking and sovereign
crisis and in their real effects, the initial trigger (the U.S. subprime crisis spilling over to Europe
and leading to a worldwide crisis in interbanking markets) can be seen as a common factor which
had differential impacts across countries, depending on their pre-existing vulnerabilities.
Figure 2.1 sets the scene for our empirical analysis. Banking sector integration in Europe
was lopsided in the sense that there was too little real banking integration: the real sector
was unable to diversify its sources of finance away from domestic banks. Domestic real-sector
lending continued to be financed by domestic banks, which fund themselves by borrowing from
foreign banks. This led to the pattern we observe in the data, with the growth in cross-border
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lending driven by bank-to-bank lending.2 We illustrate these two different concepts of banking
integration in Figure 2.2. There are two countries, one referred to as the core country, and the
other as the periphery country. The thick red arrow indicates the large cross-border banking
flows in the data, whereas the thin grey arrows indicate the small flows of foreign bank lending
from each country’s banks to the other country’s real sector. As was the case in the EMU before
the crisis, net bank-to-bank flows were largely in the direction of the periphery country. The
graph illustrates that, in the absence of direct cross-border real sector lending (thin or absent
grey arrows), and in spite of high levels of bank-to-bank integration (thick red arrows between
the two countries’ banking sectors), the periphery remains vulnerable to both international
liquidity shocks and domestic real shocks.3 This happens for two reasons: first, domestic banks
have domestically concentrated asset portfolios, which make them vulnerable to any real-sector
shocks in the home economy. Second, an international world-wide funding shock to banks in
the periphery country may cut off bank credit supply to the domestic real sector.4
Figure 2.2 suggests that the impact of a domestic banking sector shock on the domestic
economy will depend on the extent to which real sector credit is provided by domestic banks.
As a measure of domestic bank dependence in country c—abbreviated as DBDc—we propose the
share of total real sector credit that is provided by domestic banks:
DBD
c =
Domestic bank lending to the real private sector in country c
Total credit to the real private sector in country c
.
We construct DBDc using data from the Private Sector Credit Database (PSCD) compiled
by the BIS. This database contains detailed information by country on the borrowing sector
and the source of credit (domestic banks and foreign banks as well as debt securities). In the
PSCD, the private sector comprises private non-financial corporations, households, and non-
profit institutions serving households. The database rests on multiple data sources (national
accounts, monetary surveys, and the BIS banking statistics) and has some gaps in its country
coverage, which generally limits our European sample in the remainder of the paper to 11
Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). The data is quarterly and starts in the first quarter of 1997.
We therefore limit all of our data to the time period 1997Q1–2013Q4 in order to focus on the
2Specifically, banks in the EMU periphery countries mainly borrowed from banks located in core economies
which in turn borrowed in the U.S. money market (Hale and Obstfeld (2016)).
3As pointed out by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), financial integration provides insurance against local
liquidity shocks, because international lending quickly can replace local lending as long as the return to local
investment remains high.
4For example, this could be the case in a global banking crisis when cross-border bank lending—which is
arguably much more short-term than cross-border bank-to-real sector lending—dries up.
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period of the Eurozone crisis and the preceding years. We obtain a time-invariant (pre-crisis)
measure for DBDc by taking pre-2008 averages for each country.
Because we construct DBDc as a pre-crisis average, it is an ex ante measure of how exposed
aggregate credit supply in a country was to domestic banking sector shocks at the beginning
of the Great Recession. The real effects in terms of output, consumption, or employment of
any given drop in credit supply will depend on how elastic the private sector is in its choice of
financing source. Figure 2.3 provides data from the 2011 edition of the European Central Bank’s
and EU Commission’s Survey of Access to Finance by Enterprises (SAFE) on sources of external
finance of SMEs (defined as firms with fewer than 250 employees). The figure illustrates that
bank loans are by far the most important source of external finance for SMEs in most countries.
We would therefore expect that SMEs during the crises were strongly affected in countries
with high domestic bank dependence. Figure 2.4 provides prima facie evidence that this is the
case. The first panel plots the share of SMEs that reported problems with obtaining external
finance against country-level banking dependence (DBDc). The second panel plots the share of
firms reporting increased interest expenses minus the share of firms reporting decreased expenses
against DBDc. The two plots deliver the same message: in countries with high levels of domestic
bank dependence, the impact of the crisis on the financial situation of SMEs was worse.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine in more detail the patterns outlined in this section.
In particular, we estimate how cross-country variation in domestic bank dependence interacted
with cross-country and cross-sectoral variation in SME shares in the international transmission
of the common shock presented by the financial crisis.
2.3 Related literature
Our analysis draws on several strands of the literature. The first strand concerns the role of
banking integration in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Here, we also connect to the
literature on the global financial cycle, which examines how changes in global financial conditions
lead to heterogeneous, but highly synchronized, real outcomes across countries. The second
strand encompasses recent empirical work that emphasizes the particular financing constraints
faced by small firms during the European financial and sovereign debt crisis.
Regarding the empirical literature on the international transmission of banking sector shocks,
we build on Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), who show how the burst of Japan’s property
bubble in the 1990s was reflected in Japanese banks contracting lending in the United States.
Imai and Takarabe (2011) use a similar approach to study how the same shock spread across
Japan’s prefectures. Our paper is also related to work by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a,b) in its
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emphasis on the role of global banks’ internal capital markets in international transmission and
to Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri
(2013), who show that the impact of banking integration on business cycle synchronization differs
between crisis and tranquil periods. By illustrating how the international financing structure of
an economy affects the transmission of global financial shocks, we also make contact with the
literature on the global financial cycle (Rey (2015); Bruno and Shin (2015a))
Recent papers that have recognized the role of the particular financing constraints faced
by SMEs during the Eurozone crisis include Ferrando and Mulier (2015) and Ferrando, Popov
and Udell (2018). Ferrando and Mulier (2015) match SMEs’ survey responses to balance sheet
information to check whether reported financial constraints line up with balance sheet facts. Our
analysis is also close to Ferrando, Popov and Udell (2018), who use firm-level data to document
that SME-financing constraints are exacerbated in countries which were under macroeconomic
and sovereign risk “stress” during the financial crisis.
Different from the studies discussed so far, our analysis of international transmission focuses
on the interaction of SME prevalence and the nature of banking integration in the Eurozone,
with its focus on bank-to-bank integration as a key factor in the transmission of the crisis across
countries, regions, and sectors.5 A starting point for our analysis is the observation by Hale
and Obstfeld (2016) that the inception of the Euro changed the geography of international
banking flows. Global European banks head-quartered in the northern core countries started
to intermediate funds from the global (dollar) interbank market to the European periphery.
We focus on the fact that this lending boom mainly took the form of bank-to-bank lending
while direct (bank-to-nonbank) lending from northern European core countries to the periphery
increased much less.
Our emphasis on the differential impact of international and domestic bank lending on sector-
level growth during the Eurozone crisis closely connects our work to that of Schnabel and
Seckinger (2015). While Schnabel and Seckinger (2015) focus on external finance dependence
in the sense of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we draw attention to firm size and the particular
dependence of small firms on the local provision of credit as a key friction. The empirical
framework for our analysis heavily draws on earlier work by one of us: Hoffmann and Okubo
(2017) find that mechanisms, similar to the ones we document for Europe, were at work during
Japan’s lost decade.
5We do not evaluate the benefits from integrated cross-border lending to banks relative to the more fragmented
markets that existed before the introduction of the euro. See the survey of Sørensen and Villegas-Sanchez (2015)
for the benefits of financial integration in the absence of market imperfections.
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Our paper also relates closely to work at the International Monetary Fund (2015), which
emphasizes the different impacts that cross-border and direct local lending by foreign banks
have on financial stability. We add to this by focusing on how international lending has affected
real outcomes during the crisis in the Eurozone and by highlighting that it is important to
distinguish between international bank-to-bank and bank-to-real sector lending. In this context,
we also connect to a paper by Martinez (2015), who documents the role of cross-border bank-
to-bank lending in fueling boom and bust cycles.
Our empirical findings are rationalized and evaluated within a DSGE model. This model
builds on Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013) and extends it along several dimensions.
First, we introduce an interbanking market to allow for a distinction between cross-border
lending to banks and the real sector. Second, we introduce a non-tradeable sector populated
by SMEs that borrow from global banks and local domestic banks. The latter, in turn, fund
themselves from global banks in the interbank market. We use this model to replicate the
stylized facts that we document in our empirical analysis.
Our model also relates to Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011), Kollmann (2013), Bruno
and Shin (2015b) and Kerl and Niepmann (2015). Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011) and
Kollmann (2013) examine the role of global banks in global business cycle transmission. Our
framework differs from theirs by allowing for different modalities of international bank lend-
ing—direct lending to firms by global banks vs. interbank lending—and by allowing for two
sectors which differ in their financing needs. Bruno and Shin (2015b) formulate a model of
“double-decker” banking integration by allowing global banks to interact with local banks, while
Kerl and Niepmann (2015) explain the choice between direct and interbank cross-border lending
as a function of barriers to entry into foreign banking markets. In our model, entry barriers
take the form of frictions which give local banks an advantage in lending to SMEs and, because
we embed direct and interbank cross-border bank lending into a fully dynamic model, we can
study how the modality of cross-border bank lending affects the dynamics and transmission of
macroeconomic shocks.
The idea that small firms rely on relationship lending and therefore require local access to
credit is well-established in the banking literature. Starting with Berger and Udell (1995) a
large literature shows that small firms are more likely to borrow from small, local banks which
have a comparative advantage in relationship lending. Degryse and Ongena (2005) emphasize
the role of distance for the intensity of banking relationships and for the intensity of banking
competition. Mian (2006) provides empirical evidence on the role of foreign vs domestic banks
in lending to small firms in the context of a developing economy. While long-standing banking
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relationships may help a firm to obtain credit more easily when facing adverse firm-specific
shocks (Petersen and Rajan (1994)), relationship lending also creates a hold-up problem if a
negative shock affects the lender. In this situation it may be difficult to turn to alternative
sources of finance (Sharpe (1990)). Giannetti and Ongena (2007) show that the presence of
foreign banks improves small firm access to credit. Our macroeconomic model captures these
mechanisms in reduced form.
Starting with Khwaja and Mian (2008), the micro-banking literature has begun to explore
the real effects of banking shocks in matched bank-firm-level data. In this paper, our interest
is in understanding the macroeconomic relevance of the above mechanisms for the EMU as a
whole. In particular, we are interested in how the structure of cross-border lending (interbank
vs. direct lending to firms) affects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. We are not aware
of matched bank-firm level data sets that would allow us to study this nexus, i.e. that would be
(a) representative at the level of individual countries (and in particular, would also cover small
firms); (b) would allow us to distinguish between direct and indirect (via the impact of the
interbank market on domestic banks) exposures of firms; and (c) at the same time would cover
sufficiently many EMU countries.6 We therefore conduct our empirical analysis at the sector-
country level, discussing identification assumption and potential challenges in detail. Then,
building on the approach in Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013), we use our DSGE
model to target the empirical specifications and as a laboratory in which we simulate the impact
of confounding factors on our empirical results. This allows us to strike a balance between the
high levels of internal validity achieved by the micro-banking literature and the external validity
of a more macroeconomic approach.
2.4 Domestic bank dependence and the transmission
of the financial crisis across the Eurozone
Econometric specifications
As starting point for our empirical analysis, we posit the following reduced-form link between
fluctuations in domestic real sector credit and output growth:
∆ logGDPc,st = γ
c,s ×∆ log CREDITct + η
c,s
t , (2.1)
6To our knowledge, Hale, Kapan and Minoiu (forthcoming) is the first paper to examine the role of cross-border
interbank exposures for firm-level lending, but their evidence is based on syndicated loan data and thus on big
firms.
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where ∆ log GDPc,st is the growth rate of gross valued added in country c, in sector s,∆ log CREDIT
c
t
is the growth of domestic credit to the real sector in country c, and ηc,st is a productivity
shock. This specification acknowledges that firms are heterogeneous in their ability to substitute
fluctuations in the availability of bank credit for other forms of funding.7 We can think of the
coefficient γc,s as capturing this ability, which is likely to vary by sector and/or country. For
instance, if γc,s = 0, firms can fully offset variations in bank loan supply by turning to internal
or non-bank finance (e.g., by issuing bonds). If γc,s > 0, fluctuations in bank finance cannot
be fully offset and will have real effects. Based on our earlier discussion, we conjecture that
country-sectors with higher SME shares will be more sensitive to variation in lending growth,
so that
γc,s = γ0 + γ1 × SME
c,s, (2.2)
where SMEc,s stands for the share of SMEs with less than 250 employees in value added in country
c, sector s in 2008, and where we expect that γ1 > 0.
We next link domestic credit supply to shocks to cross-border bank lending. We interpret
the financial crisis as a global shock to banks’ lending capacity that, in principle, was common
to all Eurozone countries, but that affected countries differently according to their dependence




c ×∆GBSt + ξ
c
t , (2.3)
where DBDc is our measure of domestic bank dependence, ∆GBSt is an indicator of the shock to
the global banking sector, and ξc,st is a country-sector specific credit demand shock.
Our hypothesis is that the global banking sector shock mainly manifested itself in a break-
down of cross-border lending between banks, whereas, as we have seen in Figure 2.1, direct
cross-border bank lending to the real sector was much less affected. We therefore construct a
measure ∆GBSt,that captures bank-to-bank lending net of bank-to-nonbank lending, as
∆GBSt = − [∆ log B2Bt −∆ log B2Nt] ,
where B2Bt and B2Nt denote the total (in sample) cross-country volume of indirect (bank-to-
bank) and direct (bank-to-nonbank) cross-border lending, respectively. We construct ∆GBSt as
the relative growth rates of bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank lending because our focus in
this paper is on how the shift in the composition of cross-border lending asymetrically affected
7This is in the spirit of the literature on the firm-borrowing channel (e.g. Khwaja and Mian (2008)). However,
unlike in most of that literature, for the reasons discussed in the previous section our focus here is on the country-
sector rather than the bank-firm level.
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SMEs in economies dependent on domestic banks. Also, the drop in cross-border lending during
the global financial crisis could have a large common component due to global drop in credit
demand. To the extent that this drop affected foreign and domestic banks equally, relative
growth rates of direct and indirect lending would eliminate this common demand component.
We discuss this point more formally below.
Putting equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) together, we obtain
∆ logGDPc,st = ∆GBSt×[α1DBD




which is our main empirical specification. The coefficient of interest is α1 and we expect α1 < 0:
the global banking sector shock should have particularly adverse effects in countries and sectors
that are particularly dependent on domestic banks for credit provision, because they have a high
share of SMEs.
To see how our approach achieves identification of α1, we note first that ∆GBSt is an aggregate
(“world”-wide) variable and is therefore uncorrelated with purely local (country- and/or sector-
specific) credit demand shocks. As is easy to verify, the residual term can be written as εc,st =
γc,s×ξc,st +η
c,s
t . This term absorbs country-sector specific components of credit demand that are
orthogonal to ∆GBSt, while the effects of ∆GBSt that are common to all country-sectors (as well
as any other common factor with homogeneous effects across country-sectors) will be absorbed
by the time effect, τt.
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One remaining challenge to identification is that we are neglecting unobserved common
factors that may be correlated with ∆GBSt and that also differ in their impact across countries
and sectors in a way that is correlated with the country-sector variation in DBDc×SMEc,s. To see
this, let ft be a potential un-modelled factor which loads on output in country-sector c, s with
loading δc,s. Then, whenever Cov(ft, ∆GBSt) ̸= 0, we need to assume that the cross-sectional
covariance Cov(δc,s, DBDc × SMEc,s) equals zero.9
The assumption Cov(δc,s, DBDc×SMEc,s) = 0 might be violated if, during the global financial
crisis, there was also an aggregate (EU-wide or global) decline in the demand for loans. This
decline plausibly could have been strongest in countries with high local bank dependence and
in sectors that have many SMEs that mainly serve local markets. Our measure of the global
banking-sector shock addresses this concern by focusing on the difference in growth rates between
cross-border bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank lending. To the extent that a global credit-
8Because SMEc,s and DBDc are time-invariant in our estimation, their respective first-order effects will be
absorbed by the country-sector fixed effects, µc,s. In addition, several versions of the main regression that we
present below will also control for country-time and sector-time effects.
9See Hoffmann and Okubo (2017) for a detailed discussion.
15
demand shock affects the two forms of lending symmetrically, their difference is left to capture
shocks that are specific to the global banking sector and thus mainly to the credit supply-side.
Our theoretical model below will allow us to quantitatively explore whether this identifying
assumption is justified.
Data
To implement the above regressions, we measure output growth using quarterly data on gross
value added at the sectoral level from Eurostat.10 For all output measures, we obtain real per
capita values by deflating with the respective sectoral deflators and using population data from
the same source. Because quarterly data can be noisy, we study annual growth rates of all
variables (notably real per capita GVA) by taking differences between quarter t and t − 4, so




t−4 throughout the paper.
While DBDc is constructed in the way already described in Section 2.2, our data on SME
importance is from the 2018 issue of the annual database accompanying the European Commis-
sions’ SME performance review.11 Specifically, we construct our measure SMEc,s as the share
in value added at factor costs (million euros at current prices) at the country-sector level of
firms with fewer than 250 employees. While the values for DBDc are constructed as pre-2008,
within-country averages, data on the value added of small businesses is not generally available
before 2008. We therefore use the 2008 values to construct SMEc,s.
Main empirical results
The results of the baseline country-sector level specifications (2.4) are summarized in Table 2.1.
Consistent with our theoretical interpretation, the main coefficient of interest, α1, is negative
and significant throughout. The first column of the table shows the results for all countries. The
following columns examine the sensitivity of our results to the exact sample of countries. Specif-
ically, we augment the baseline specification to include a dummy for the EMU core economies
(Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) or a dummy for Greece in the interactions
with the crisis indicator.
In all specifications, the coefficient α1 stays negative, significant and quite stable relative
to the baseline estimate in the first column. The results suggest that dependence on domestic
10Sectoral gross value added is obtained from Eurostat’s Gross value added and income A*10 industry break-
downs (namq 10 a10). We drop agriculture, finance and insurance, and public administration and limit our sample
to six sectors (1-digit NACE rev 2 codes in parentheses) for which we also have data on the corresponding SME
shares: industry except construction (BCDE), construction (F), wholesale and retail + transport and storage
+ accomodation and food services (GHI), information and communication (J), real estate (L), and professional
activities + administrative and support services (MN).
11https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/performance-review en
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banks for finance was detrimental mainly for country-sectors with many SMEs. The standalone
terms for SMEc,s and DBDc are insignificant across almost all specifications. This suggests that
for the average country-sector an increase (decrease) in the SME share or a lower dependence
on domestic banks does not unambiguously lead to higher or lower growth. Rather, it seems
that the real effects of the global banking shock are robustly modulated through the interaction
between these two variables.
In Table 2.2, we subject our country-sector level regressions to further robustness checks.
In the first two columns, we add, in turn, sector-time and country-time effects, in addition to
the country-sector and time effects that were already included in the previous specifications.
Our estimate of α1 stays negative in both specifications and remains significant. This is also
true for a fully saturated specification in which we include both country-time and sector-time
effects. We also run a version of our regression, in which we split the sample of country-sectors
into high (above-median) and low (below-median) shares of SMEs. Again, our results hold up.
This regression, reported in column (4), will be our main reference point when comparing the
DSGE model that we present in the next section to the regressions results based on actual data.
In the DSGE model, within each country, there are two sectors: one populated only by SMEs
and one populated only by large firms. This setup directly maps into the specification reported
in column (4) of Table 2.2, where sectors are coded as being SME-intensive (or not) using a
dummy. The economic magnitude of the results is large. A one standard deviation shock to
∆GBSt (0.09) in a country with a domestic bank dependence one standard deviation (0.13) above
the sample average results in a 0.5 percentage points larger drop in gross value added in high
SME sectors compared with low SME sectors (0.005 ≈ 0.43× 0.09× 0.13).
The last two columns of Table 2.2 show that our findings hold up even in the cross-section:
column (5) presents a cross-sectional regression of the post-2008 drop in sectoral GVA growth
on 2008 SME shares and the interaction of SME with local bank dependence, while column (6)
repeats the before-after regression, but now coding the SME share as high or low, as in the
panel regression in column (4). The result with high-low SME dummy remains significant and
economically large: the decline in average growth rate in gross value added in the crisis period
for a country with a domestic bank dependence one standard deviation (0.13) above the sample
average is 1.3 percentage points stronger in high SME sectors compared with low SME sectors
(0.013 ≈ 0.009× 0.13).12
12As pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), panel diff-in-diff regressions such as our baseline
specifications can be spuriously significant if there is essentially only one common treatment (in our case: the
crisis). They therefore recommend a “before-after” cross-sectional regression such as the one presented here as a
robustness check.
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Figure 2.5 visualizes the results from the before-after regression in column (6). For each
country, it plots the difference between post-2008 and pre-2008 sectoral growth rates against
the pre-2008 levels of domestic bank dependence. Sectors with above-median shares of SMEs
appear as red dots and those with below-median shares of SMEs appear as blue diamonds.
Across the whole sample, the link between growth and SME shares seems weak; however, once
we distinguish between high and low levels of SME shares, we find that there is a clear negative
link between growth and domestic bank dependence in country-sectors with high SME shares.
This negative link is much weaker for low-SME sectors.
We also study the dynamic response of real activity to the global banking sector shock.
To this end, we split the sample in two groups: country-sectors with above-median shares of
SMEs and country-sectors with low SME shares. For each group, we then estimate local linear
projections of the form:
logGDPc,st+h − logGDP
c,s
t−1 = αh × DBD
c ×∆GBSt + τt + µ
c,s + εc,st+h, (2.5)
at horizons of h = 0, 1, ..., 4 years. Local linear projections (LLP) were first proposed by Jordà
(2005) and capture the dynamics of the dependent variable in a very general way. While concep-
tually similar to impulse responses, LLP do not require the underlying data generating process
to be linear.
Figure 2.6 plots the coefficients αh up to horizon of 4 years for our country-sector data
set (reflecting the effects on cumulative GVA growth) separately for high (red lines) and low
(blue lines) SME country-sectors. Shaded areas indicate corresponding 90% confidence bands,
constructed with standard errors clustered by country and time. For the high-SME sectors,
the effect of high domestic bank dependence is highly persistent and statistically significant,
accumulating to an output loss of around 1.5 percent over five years to a one standard deviation
shock to ∆GBSt (0.09) for a country with a domestic bank dependence one standard deviation
(0.13) above the sample average (0.015 ≈ 1.25× 0.09× 0.13). For the low-SME sectors, there is
virtually no effect.
2.5 A theoretical model
We propose a tractable DSGE model with local and global banks and two production sectors,
which we use to interpret the empirical results. Specifically, the model formalizes the idea
that bank-to-bank lending exposes local bank sectors to global banking sector shocks without
reducing the exposure of the economy to idiosyncratic shocks.
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Agents and markets
There are two open economies in our model, each populated by a representative household, a
big firm producing tradeable goods, a small firm producing non-tradeable goods, and a local
bank.13 The (small) home country represents one of the 11 EMU countries in our sample, while
the (large) foreign one represents the “rest of the EMU.” Additionally, there is a global bank,
which operates in the two countries (EMU) and has access to wholesale funding in the rest of
the world (e.g., the U.S. money market).
Firms Firms in sector s = {BF, SME} (BF refers to big firms and SME to SMEs) have the
production function:














s denote output, total factor productivity, capital (at
the end of the previous period), labor, and capital intensity, respectively. Firms in both sectors
are owned by households, operate in a perfectly competitive environment, and maximize the





































where P st denotes price of output in sector s, Pt is the price of the final good, Wt is wages, and I
s
t
is investment in sector s.14 Furthermore, Lst denotes total sector s borrowing and r
l,s
t is the net





t , and both capital and investment are produced out of the final good subject










Firms need to borrow in order to finance their operating expenses; i.e., the wage bill and
investment. This setup follows Neumeyer and Perri (2005), who rationalize the wage bill pre-
financing need of firms through within-period loans by the timing structure of wage contracts
13The assumption that SMEs are all in the non-tradeable sector is inessential for our results and made here for
convenience. However, it is consistent with the observation in the trade literature that smaller, less productive,
firms are less likely to engage in international trade (Melitz (2003)). It is additionally supported by the results in
the Survey of Access to Finance by Enterprises (SAFE), according to which ca. 60% of the participating SMEs
did not export any goods or services in 2014, and 22% of the SMEs generate less than 25% of their turnover in
foreign markets.
14We normalize the price of tradeable goods to unity in both countries.
19
and firm production. We extend their argument along two dimensions. First, firms need to
pre-finance investment outlays, and second, loans need to be repaid after dividends have been
distributed. This makes firm loans intertemporal, which matches the timing of deposits and






Firms in both sectors have to bundle loans from global and local banks to satisfy their















where Ls,GBt and L
s,LB
t are sector s borrowing from global and local banks, respectively, and τ
s
captures the degree to which firms in sector s depend on local bank credit (lower τ s translating
into higher dependence). Firms decide how much to borrow from global and local banks by













subject to the borrowing technology.15
This setup implies that loans from local and global banks are imperfect substitutes, with
an elasticity of substitution being captured by the parameter ν. This is meant to reflect that
global and local banks have different business models. Large international banks engage mainly
in arm’s-length lending, while local banks engage mainly in relationship-lending. During a long-
term relationship local banks acquire information about the small firm. This leads to the well-
known hold-up problem (Sharpe (1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1994)) and makes it difficult
for the borrowing firm to move away from the local bank. Therefore, loans from global and local
banks are imperfect substitutes from the point of view of the borrowing firm and compared to
large firms, SMEs are more dependent on local banks (τSME < τBF). The borrowing technology
above captures these features in a reduced form.
Banks In each country, there is a local (domestic) bank. Additionally, local households own
a constant fraction of the global bank. Local banks fund themselves by borrowing from global
banks and through deposits, while global banks have access to funds in a global money market
(which we do not model). This setup is meant to reflect the structure of the “double-decker”
15A similar approach to modeling the demand for loans is used by Gerali et al. (2010). However, they do not
distinguish between different firm- or bank-types, which is one of the main distinct features of our model. Note
also, that under the CES assumption, effective funds available to firms for productive purposes (Lst ) are less than
or equal to the sum of loans extended to them by local and global banks (Ls,GBt + L
s,LB
t ). We interpret this
discrepancy as an implicit borrowing cost.
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banking integration that was characteristic for the Eurozone in the years before the crisis, as
documented by Bruno and Shin (2015b) and Hale and Obstfeld (2016). In particular, big French,
German, and Dutch banks borrowed in the U.S. money market, while Southern European local
banks borrowed short-term from the global northern European banks.
The local bank extends loans to small and large firms, LSME,LBt and L
BF,LB
t , and raises funds
in the European interbank market (Mt) and in the form of domestic deposits (Dt). Its balance




The local bank is owned by domestic households and maximizes expected discounted profits.
Because the bank’s problem is effectively intratemporal, this amounts to maximizing (and fully
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t denote interest rates on local bank loans to small and large firms, the interbank
lending rate, and the deposit rate, respectively. The last term, φLBt , is a quadratic “adjustment
cost” in deposits, modeled as a function of the relative deviation of deposits from their long-run








. This term reflects the difficulty for banks to undergo
short-term changes in their funding structure and prevents unit-root dynamics in deposits and
interbank loans, known to be otherwise a feature of this type of models (Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003)).
The global bank provides funds to small and large firms in both countries (LSME,GBt and
LBF,GBt ) and additionally lends an amount Mt in the interbank market. It refinances itself











where an asterisk (*) indicates the foreign country. Its objective is to maximize total expected
discounted profits. The global bank’s problem is again intratemporal—as for the local bank—this






































and where rl,SME,GBt and r
l,BF,GB
t denote interest rates on global bank loans to small and large
firms, respectively, rmt is the interbank lending rate, and r
b
t is the cost of financing in the global
interbank market. Because the global bank is owned in constant proportions by the home and
foreign households, total profits ΠGBt are disbursed to households in both countries based on
ownership shares µGB and µGB∗ = 1− µGB.16
The global bank is exposed to lending conditions in the rest of the world through exogenous
fluctuations in the supply of funds offered in the global money markets. In particular, a drop
in Bt raises the global interest rate r
b
t , which transmits to lending conditions to firms and
households in both countries. Adrian and Shin (2014) show that, at least in the years before
the crisis, global banks adjusted leverage mainly via changes in risk-weighted assets (RWA).
We introduce this concept into our model via the adjustment cost in the bank’s risk-weighted


















+ γM (Mt +M
∗
t ), where γ
L and γM
are the risk weightings associated with real-sector and bank-to-bank loans, respectively, and
where RWA denotes risk-weighted assets in the steady-state. Given differences in risk weightings
on different assets, and in particular γL > γM , the global shock does not affect the interbank
and real sector lending rates symmetrically, but causes a positive spread between them as the
global bank rebalances its asset side away from (notionally) low-risk interbank loans towards
(notionally) high-risk real sector loans.
The risk weights, γL and γM play a key role for the transmission of the global banking
shock in our model. Under Basel II regulation, real sector financing is considered to be riskier
than interbank loans or investments into highly-rated “risk-less” assets (among which mortgage-
backed securities or southern European sovereign bonds used to be counted before the crisis).
This implies that γL > γMand the bank will have a higher shadow cost of real sector-loans and
16These ownership shares are calculated as long-run shares of revenues that the global bank earns in a respective





demand a higher interest rate. Assume that a global banking shock lets Bt shrink to zero. As
the bank’s balance sheet shrinks, it can shift lending to higher interest-rate real loans while still
maintaining the level of risk-weighted assets—cross-border lending to banks declines relative to
real sector lending, very much as we observe in the data.
Both global and local banks possess market power, as credit is extended to firms in a mo-
nopolistic competition environment. We do not explicitly model the microeconomic mechanism
behind it and refer the reader to any model in which a Dixit–Stiglitz framework is applied to
the bank loan market; e.g., Gerali et al. (2010). The implication of market power is that banks
set mark-ups on their cost of funds when they extend credit to large and small firms.
The optimal supply of credit, arising from local and global bank optimization problems given










































where MUSME and MUBF denote mark-ups applied to loans to SMEs and large firms, respec-
tively, and lbst is the exogenous local banking shock. We incorporate local banking shocks
directly into the optimality condition by imposing a country-specific wedge on the equilibrium
interbank loan rates demanded by the global bank. These shocks are mean-zero and potentially
correlated across countries and shift the respective loan supply schedules up. In particular, a
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positive local banking shock would result in local bank demanding higher interest rates from its
borrowers, as its own cost of funds rises. Due to mark-ups, the effective spread for the firms
rises and they cut on production, employment, investment and credit. The real effects of the
local banking shocks are most pronounced among firms that are particularly dependent on credit
from local banks, namely SMEs.
Households Households consume a bundle of tradeable and local non-tradeable goods, supply
labor to firms, and receive dividends (profits) from the firms and banks they own. They maximize

















where β is the discount factor, σ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ψ is the inverse Frisch elasticity,
and Ψ is the weight of labor disutility. Total labor, supplied by the household, is denoted by Nt
and is immobile across country borders, while Ct represents a CES aggregate of consumption of
















where ω expresses the household’s preference towards tradeable goods and therefore determines
relative sizes of the two sectors, and ϵ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two
goods.
The household’s flow budget constraint is given by










where Pt is the aggregate consumer-price index, Dt is the holding of household deposits earning
net interest rdt , and WtNt is the total wage received by the household.
An optimizing household responds to shocks to discount factor by adjusting its labor supply,
with associated equilibrium impacts on employment, output, and wages. In order to dampen
these effects such that the reactions to interest shocks matches the data, we introduce real wage











+ (1− γ) logMRSt,
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where MRSt is the implied marginal rate of substitution, arising from optimal choice of labor




t , and γ is the persistence parameter, which can be
interpreted as an index of real rigidities. This rigidity in real wages prevents an over-reaction
of wages and employment and achieves an empirically consistent negative response of labor and
output to an interest rate shock for a wide range of parameters.
Market clearing Local markets for non-tradeable (SME-produced) goods clear according to:





Ct + It + Γt
)
,
where Γt is total net real costs present in the model, which therefore can be thought of as part
of gross real investment.17
The tradeable goods market clears according to:











Total net exports to rest of the world (from both home and foreign countries) are given by
NXt +NX
∗
t = Bt−1(1 + r
b
t )−Bt.
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with SME ≈ 1− ω in the steady-state.
Domestic bank dependence is defined as the ratio of locally originated loans to total loans

























, and all (second-order) adjustment costs.
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Mapping the model to the data
Calibration We normalize the size of GDP for each “home” economy to 1 and calibrate the
baseline model at the quarterly frequency using parameter values displayed in Table 2.3. And
because the “foreign” country represents “the rest of the EMU,” we normalize its GDP to 10;
i.e., the number of countries in the sample minus one. We additionally calibrate steady-state
SME shares and domestic bank dependence for 11 countries in our sample as shown in Table 2.4.
The model is then solved by log-linearizing around the deterministic steady-state.
The model counterpart of the global banking shock in our regressions, ∆GBSt, is constructed
as follows. We first simulate the model for all 11 countries in our sample to obtain artificial data
on cross-border bank-to-bank lending Mt and cross-border real sector lending L
GB
t (both for the
“home” country). Given this data, we proceed in the same fashion as in the empirical section
by calculating (the negative of) the difference between growth rates of aggregate cross-border
















Some of the parameters have been calibrated to standard values common in the literature.
Households’ discount factor β is set to 0.99, to match the steady-state quarterly net deposit rate
of 1%. The household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is one, such that its instantaneous
utility function is logarithmic with respect to the consumption bundle. The inverse of the Frisch
elasticity ψ in the utility function is set to 2, while the scale parameter Ψ is determined by
the steady-state restrictions. We assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the consumption
aggregate by setting the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods in
consumption (ϵ) to 1. The household preference parameter ω is then implicitly pinned down by
the share of SMEs in a given economy.
The production functions of large and small firms are Cobb-Douglas with the capital intensity
parameter αs equal to 0.35 for each firm, which corresponds to a long-term share of capital in
production in advanced economies. We set the capital depreciation parameter δ to 0.025, and
the investment adjustment cost parameter φI to 2. The index of real wage rigidities, γ, is set
to 0.85 in order to match the business cycle moments for hours worked and is consistent with
Blanchard and Gaĺı (2007). We choose mark-ups of 3.5 and 2.5 for the loans extended to small
and large firms, respectively. These values are in line with the calibration in Gerali et al. (2010),
who use the value of 3.12, while we choose a larger mark-up for loans to small firms than for
loans to large firms.
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As to the risk-weights of the global bank, we assume that the regulator chooses higher risk
weights for credit extended to the real sector than for interbank loans. Because claims on
corporations are associated with risk weights ranging from 20% for firms with AAA to AA-
ratings to 100% for unrated firms or those with low rating (BBB+ to BB-), to 150% for firms
with ratings below BB-, and depend on a range of additional criteria, including the quality of
collateral, we assume that an average loan to a big firm receives the same weight attached to
it as a loan to a small firm, equal to 75%. This value is applied to loans to small businesses
within regulatory retail portfolios in Basel II rules, and at the same time lies in the middle
field within range of applied weights to rated and unrated corporations as described above. For
bank-to-bank credit, we choose the weight 35%, which is a simple average of weights applied to
loans to banks with AAA to AA- ratings (20%) and those with A+ to A- ratings (50%), and
at the same time is used to weight claims secured by residential property, which was a common
way of obtaining interbank liquidity through repo agreements prior to the crisis.
The next step in our calibration is choosing values for adjustment cost parameters for local
and global banks. The first (φLB) is set to 0.01, which allows us to match the consumption
moments to the data. It also prevents perfect substitutability of interbank loans for deposits,
especially in times of global downturns. As the cost is proportional to the percentage deviation
of deposits from the steady-state, we choose the same steady-state value for deposits (relative
to GDP) for all countries, at the value of 0.2. We set the second adjustment cost parameter
(φGB) to the value of 2, such that the degree of substitutability between global bank real sector
and interbank loans is high enough to manifest itself in a significantly higher contemporaneous
drop of interbank loans in the crisis as a consequence of a negative banking shock.
We set the value for the elasticity of substitution between loans from local and global banks
of firms (ν) to 0.5, implying that firms treat these loans as complements, but still allow for
imperfect correlation between them. This choice is consistent with our interpretation of firms
borrowing technology as arising from hold-up problems due to relationship lending.
The corresponding CES preference parameters τSME and τBF are chosen to exactly match
the model-implied DBD parameter to that obtained from the data, given the country-specific








.18 Because we lack sectoral data allowing us to calibrate
sectoral parameters τ directly, we assume that the domestic bank dependence of high-SME



































, allows us to calibrate
sectoral local bank dependencies for every country in the range of (0, 1).19
Forcing variables There are three major sources of shocks in our setup: shocks to total factor
productivity (both high and low SME sectors), shocks to local banks, and shocks to the global
bank. The TFP processes for any country c (one for each sector s) are given by the following
equations. For a home country (representing the simulation country c):
log θst = ρ
















and for a foreign country (representing “rest-of-EMU”):
log θs∗t = ρ
θ log θs∗t−1 − α
†σsηs,†t .
Similarly, the local banking shocks for both countries are as follows. For a home country






















The stochastic process for the global banking shock has the same realization for every country
and is given by
logBt = (1− ρ
gbs) logB + ρgbs logBt−1 − σ
gbsηgbst .










∼ N (0, 1), and correspond, respectively,
to idiosyncratic home-country sectoral TFP shocks, rest-of-the-EMU sectoral TFP shocks, id-
iosyncratic home-country local banking shocks, rest-of-the-EMU local banking shocks, and global
19A potential alternative calibration assuming a constant value of domestic bank dependence for one of the
sectors across all countries would need infeasible values outside the range of (0, 1) for at least one country in
order to match the data.
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(EMU-wide) banking shocks. All exogenous processes follow autoregressive dynamics with per-
sistence parameters ρθ and ρgbs equal to 0.95, and ρlbs equal to 0.80. The cross-country cor-
relation between shocks is ρ† = 0.25. Given this correlation structure, the variance of the
rest-of-the-EMU shocks are scaled by a parameter α†, which also enters the stochastic pro-
cesses of the home country. This parameter is defined for each simulation country c as follows:
α†c = (ω′cΩωc)
1












ρ† · · · 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦.
The standard deviation of the global banking shock (σgbs) is then set to 0.02 to match the
volatility of the simulated ∆GBSt measure for a series of the standard normal shocks that allows
to reconstruct the empirically observed series in the model, given the rest of the calibrated
parameters. The volatility of the local banking shocks (σlbs) is set to 0.0025. It provides a
comparable magnitude of the real effects of the local banking shocks, but at the same time does
not bias the business cycle moments from the model-simulated data, that we briefly discuss
below. Given these values and in order to match the standard deviation of the real GDP that
we find in the data, the standard deviation of the TFP shocks σθ is set to 0.0125.
Business cycle properties The business cycle properties of the calibrated model are given
in Table 2.5. The first two columns present statistics for model simulations calibrated for
Austria, which is typical for the countries in our sample in terms of SME and DBD, while
the last two columns contain the respective data-counterparts, calculated for EMU-11 countries
using data from Eurostat. For each variable in the table, we present the standard deviations
relative to the standard deviation of GDP (except for net exports, which is a standard deviation
of net exports-to-lagged-GDP ratio in percentage points) and correlation with domestic GDP
of consumption, investment, employment, net exports and GDP (absolute standard deviation
in percentage points). All model statistics are obtained from 1000 simulations with all shocks
switched on and over 250 quarters, with the first 50 quarters dropped. All real data statistics are
obtained from applying the HP-filter to variables in logarithms for the sample 1996Q1–2017Q4.
To avoid that the HP-filter induces extreme values at either end of the sample and in order
to focus on the pre-crisis period, we use the sample 1999Q1–2007Q4 to calculate the empirical
moments.
The model matches almost all the data-statistics well in terms of standard deviations and
correlations with GDP. The exceptions are investment and net exports-GDP ratio volatility,
which are somewhat too high in the model for the Austria calibration.
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2.6 Quantitative results
2.6.1 Matching the empirical regressions
We evaluate the ability of the model to fit the data by asking whether it can replicate the
empirical findings in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, which motivated this study. To this end, we generate
artificial data from the model and run the same regressions that we performed before, now on
the simulated data. Because our actual data set comprises 11 countries, we calibrate the model
for 11 countries, matching the pre-2008 average domestic bank dependence and 2008 SME share
(see Table 2.4). We simulate the data for 60 quarters by calibrating global bank shocks (ηgbst )
to closely match the observed dynamics of our empirical ∆GBS measure prior to and during the
crisis. As with the real data, we calculate annual growth rates of real per capita sectoral GVA





Table 2.6 presents two sets of regression results corresponding to our main empirical speci-
fication (2.4) (summarized in Table 2.2), and obtained from 10000 realizations of the scenarios
described above. The output of the panel transmission regression on country-sector level, in
which the dependent variable corresponds to sectoral value added growth, are presented in col-
umn (1). Further, column (2) replicates the before-after (cross-sectional) analysis, in which the
dependent variable is the change of average sectoral output growth between the pre-2008 and
the post-2008 periods. We demean all variables cross-sectionally (except for the sector indicator
variable SMEc,s) and include country-sector and time-sector fixed effects in the regression in col-
umn (1), and sector fixed effects in the regression in column (2). For each simulation we run the
regressions, save the estimated coefficients, and use their distribution to construct the reported
regression coefficients and t-statistics. In each simulation run, we draw new local banking shocks
and global, country and sector-specific TFP shocks.
In Table 2.6, the interaction term ∆GBSt × SME
c,s × DBDc, which captures any interaction
between SME-share and domestic banking dependence, is negative and highly significant in the
country-sector transmission regression in column (1). Moreover, we find a clear negative link
between growth and domestic bank dependence in SME sectors across countries as supported
by the results in column (2). The evidence from the before-after country-sector regression in
column (2) is visualized in Figure 2.8 (cf. Figure 2.5): the slope is negative for SME firms and
is much weaker for the sectors populated by large firms.
Quantitatively, our model-implied results from sectoral regressions of crisis transmission
come close to the empirical findings in Table 2.2 (see column (4), which utilizes a dummy for
high/low SME dependence). The interaction term (α1) are highly significant and compare as
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−0.47 (model) against −0.43 (data). The same is true with regard to the before-after cross-
sectional regression results. Although the coefficient on the interaction term in the empirical
specifications in Table 2.2 (column (6) with high/low SME coding) (–0.10) is larger in absolute
value than the coefficient implied by the model-simulated data (−0.03), they compare well and
consistently point in the same direction.
We complement our findings with results from local linear projection regressions (2.5) using
model-simulated data and standardized ∆GBSt measure, separately for SME and non-SME sec-
tors. These results are summarized in Figure 2.9. They closely mimic the local linear projections
estimated from the data that we reported in Figure 2.6.
2.6.2 Using the model to assess challenges to identification
Our model simulations allow us to match the empirical regressions in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Our
setup so far assumed that the decline in cross-border bank-to-bank lending is driven by a shock
to the balance sheet of global banks, which fits a narrative of the banking crises emanating
from the United States. This raises the question to what extent other shock constellations could
generate patterns similar to what we observe in the data.
For example, our interpretation of the banking shock as capturing credit supply to SMEs
could be questioned, if there was a common (across countries) reduction in demand for loans
that particularly affected countries with high domestic bank dependence and sectors with many
SMEs. If that were the case, Cov(δc,s, DBDc×SMEc,s) might be non-zero. Because such a negative
credit demand shock would also be correlated with ∆GBSt, our identification assumption would
be violated. In the same vein, one might conjecture that shocks to local banks that occurred
simultaneously in the crisis countries could be driving our results.
To address this possibility, we simulate data from the model under three scenarios: first, a
scenario with a global (i.e., common across countries) TFP shock in the SME sector. Second,
a scenario with local correlated TFP shocks to the SME sectors in crisis countries and, third, a
scenario with local correlated banking sector shocks in the crisis countries. In all three scenarios,
the global banking sector shock is switched off and all other shocks for the non-crisis countries
are assumed to be uncorrelated. Using the simulated data, we re-run our main regression (2.4)
to assess how our coefficient of interest, α1, would be affected.
20 Table 2.6 presents the results.
None of the counterfactuals delivers a negative significant coefficient to the interaction term
∆GBSt × SME
c,s × DBDc. If all countries experience simultaneous declines in the productivity of
20In order for the local shocks in the second and third scenario to cause the estimate of α1 to be significant,
the shocks need to be correlated across crisis countries. Uncorrelated local shocks in all countries by construction
are uncorrelated with ∆GBSt and will not affect our results.
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the high-SME sectors (counterfactual in column 1), the coefficient of interest is in fact positive.
This result is due to the fact that while SME sectors are slightly more affected in high DBD
countries (see row 1, column (3) in Figure 2.7, which plots the theoretical impulse responses to
the shocks we discuss; see below), the B2B-over-B2N loans ratio increases. This effect seems to
weaken (and even reverse) if instead, see column (2), only the set of crisis countries—Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—are hit by TFP shocks. The coefficient of the interaction
term is negative, but close to zero and imprecisely estimated. Synchronized shocks to the local
banking sector in the crisis countries, as shown in column (3) of Figure 2.7, induce a negative
coefficient of a magnitude comparable to our baseline findings. This is consistent with the fact
that the transmission of the global banking shock is similar to the transmission of the local
banking shock in the model (confer columns (1) and (2) in Figure 2.7). However, because
only a set of all countries is hit by the shocks and because the measure of the shock that we
construct—∆GBSt— is based on the growth rate of the average of bank flows of all countries
in the sample, the global crisis proxy gets very noisy and leads to a high dispersion of the
distribution of the simulated coefficients. In an empirical sample, this would lead us to reject
the hypothesis that the global shock affects high SME sectors disproportionately in high DBD
countries.
We conclude that, although all scenarios that we describe above could lead to a bias in the
effect that we study, none of them delivers an alternative that fits the data. Only when we
include a shock to the global banking sector do we find a large significant differential effect of
the variable ∆GBSt on growth of sectoral value added.
Impulse responses: shock transmission To shed more light on the economic mechanisms
that drive the results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, Figure 2.7 displays impulse responses for small firm
production, large firm production, bank-to-bank lending, and bank-to-bank over bank-to-non-
bank lending. The impulse responses are plotted for the model calibrated to the domestic bank
dependence and small-firm share of Austria and Greece, respectively, as well as a counterfactual
calibration for “Greece,” where domestic banking dependence has been adjusted to the low level
of Belgium.
The effect of a one standard deviation (2 percent) global banking shock—shock to interbank
funds—is quite severe for a country with domestic banking dependence and small-firm share at
the level of Greece, for which it causes more than a 1.5 percent drop in the production of small
firms on impact. The effect is smaller for a country like Austria and not very large for Greece if
the domestic bank dependence had been similar to that of Belgium. Large firms, in the second
row of figures, increase production but with little difference between the parametrizations. The
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third row shows the decline in bank-to-bank lending and the fourth row the decline in bank-
to-bank lending over bank-to-real-sector lending. Both plummet on impact and remain low for
many quarters ahead, with the magnitude of the decline between 5 and 8 percent.
The mechanics of the model is that a reduction in the size of the balance sheet of the global
bank leads the bank to adjust its portfolio by investing relatively more in the real sector by
providing more funds to firms and relatively less funds to local banks. This is because the latter
carry a lower regulatory risk weight. Consequently, cross-border bank-to-bank credit falls more
than bank-to-real sector credit, and local banks experience a shock to their liabilities making
them reduce real sector lending. As a result, firms experience a more-than-proportional decrease
in loan supply from local banks compared to global banks. Because SMEs are more dependent
on local credit than big firms are, they adjust their production plans by reducing labor input and
investment more than big firms. Large firms produce tradeable goods and the global banking
shock induces a rise in domestic net exports and they benefit from the global bank shocks.
A local banking shock hurts small firms and this effect is larger if the country is dependent
on domestic banks as seen for the Greece calibration in the middle column of figures. Large
firms initially benefit, but after four quarter their production declines. Bank-to-bank lending
declines and only slowly recovers. The impulse responses for a global TFP shock in SME sectors
are plotted in column (3) of Figure 2.7, while the last column shows the transmission of the
local TFP shocks in SME sectors. TFP shocks affect both large and small firms and “Austrian”
and “Greek” large firms are similarly affected. However, small firms are hit slightly harder when
the country is dependent on local banks even if bank-to-bank (over bank-to-non-bank) lending
actually increases.
Overall, the impulse response functions clearly point to the mechanism that we want to draw
attention to: the combination of domestic banking dependence and a large SME-sector leaves a
country vulnerable to banking shocks, whether local or in the form of global liquidity shocks.
2.7 Conclusion
Small and medium-sized businesses have little access to outside capital, making their production
vulnerable to banking shocks. The results in this paper show that sectors (and economies) with
many small firms were less exposed to the recent crisis in the Eurozone in countries where they
had access to credit from foreign banks rather than from purely domestic banks. We argue that
banking integration in the Eurozone in the years before 2008 was of the “wrong” kind in the sense
that it was driven by lending from international banks to domestic banks, rather than by lending
from international banks to the real economy. As we have shown empirically (using reduced-
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form regressions) and theoretically (in a DSGE model), this left local SMEs highly dependent
on the domestic banking sector which in turn (due to short-term bank-to-bank lending) was
vulnerable to the global banking sector shock.
Our findings have some interesting policy implications. Banking integration in Europe may
require a “reset” that involves cross-border mergers between banks and consolidation of branch
networks by retail banks across country-borders in the Eurozone, as happened in the United
States after the state liberalization of state-level banking in the 1980s. In this way, international
banks could operate genuine internal capital markets across national borders, allocating funds
to bank-dependent SMEs in a recession.
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Jordà, Òscar. 2005. “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections.”
American Economic Review, 95(1): 161–182.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and Fabrizio Perri. 2013. “Global banks
and crisis transmission.” Journal of International Economics, 89(2): 495 – 510.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou, and José-Luis Peydro. 2013. “Financial
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Table 2.1. Domestic Bank Dependence, SME shares and crisis transmission
Sector-country level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth in sectoral value added
∆GBSt × SMEs × DBD −1.32
∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗ −0.97∗∗
(−3.23) (−3.04) (−2.13) (−2.08)
∆GBSt × SMEs 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
(1.24) (1.37) (1.26) (1.39)
∆GBSt × DBD −0.25 −0.11 0.02 0.15
∗∗
(−1.04) (−0.53) (0.16) (2.51)
∆GBSt × CORE 0.10
∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(3.02) (3.51)
∆GBSt × GREECE −0.24
∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(−4.88) (−4.92)
Observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28
NOTES: The table presents estimates of our baseline specification:
∆ logGDPc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2SME
c,s + α3DBD
c] + CONTROLS + τt + µ
c,s + εc,st .
Regressions include time and country-sector effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and time,
t-statistics are in parentheses. Columns 2-4 include an interaction of the ∆GBSt indicator with a dummy
for the core economies and/or for Greece. The sample includes 66 country-sectors, six in each of the
11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. The core economies are Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The
sample period is 1997Q1-2013Q4.
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Table 2.2. Domestic Bank Dependence, SMEs and crisis transmission: Robustness of country-sector results
Sector-time Country-time Fully saturated Fully saturated Before-after Before-after
High-low SME High-low SME
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth in sectoral value added Pre-/post 2008 change in avg. growth rate
∆GBSt × SMEs × DBD −1.17
∗∗ −0.99∗∗ −0.97∗ −0.43∗∗
(−2.12) (−2.03) (−1.82) (−2.01)
∆GBSt × SMEs −0.07 0.13 0.13 0.01
(−0.28) (1.27) (0.48) (0.47)
∆GBSt × DBD −0.21
(−0.89)






Observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224 66 66
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.17 0.19
NOTES: The table presents estimates of the sector-level regressions. Columns 1-4 are based on interaction regressions:
∆ logGDPct = ∆GBSt × [α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2SME
c,s + α3DBD
c] + CONTROLS + εct .
Regressions in columns 1-4 include time and country-sector effects. Columns 1 and 2 report the panel country-sector transmisson regression, including sector-time
or country-time effects, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report saturated regressions that additionally contain both country-year and sector-year dummies. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by country and year.
Columns 5-6 are based on “before-after” cross-sectional regressions:
∆ logGDPc,scrisis −∆ logGDP
c,s
pre−crisis = α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2SME
c,s + α3DBD
c + εc,s.
Regressions in columns 5-6 include sector fixed effects. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by country.
The sample includes 66 country-sectors, six in each of the 11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. The sample period is 1997Q1-2013Q4.
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Table 2.3. Model calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Households’ discount factor 0.99
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity 2
σ Households’ risk aversion 1
ϵ Elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods 1
γ Index of real wage rigidities 0.80
αBF Capital intensity in BFs’ production function 0.35
αSME Capital intensity in SMEs’ production function 0.35
φI Investment adjustment cost parameter 2
δ Capital depreciation 0.025
ν Firms’ elasticity of substitution between GB and LB loans 0.5
MUBF Mark-up on BF’s credit rates 2.5
MUSME Mark-up on SME’s credit rates 3.5
φLB Local bank adjustment cost in deposits 0.01
φGB Global bank adjustment cost in risk-weighted assets 2
D/GDP Steady state ratio of deposits to GDP 0.2
γL Risk weight on credit to real sector 0.75
γM Risk weight on interbank credit 0.35
ρθ TFP shocks autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρgbs Global banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρlbs Local banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.80
σθ Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0125
σgbs Standard deviation of global banking shock 0.02
σlbs Standard deviation of local banking shock 0.0025
ρ† International correlation of TFP shocks 0.25
NOTES: Additionally, we calibrate home and foreign nominal SME share and DBD parameters (see
Table 2.4). These parameters implicitly determine the values of other model parameters ω, τ , and Ψ.
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NOTES: The values for DBD are constructed as pre-2008 within-country averages, while the 2008 data
are used to construct the values for SME.
Table 2.5. Business cycle properties of the model
Austria Data
St.Dev. Corr. St.Dev. Corr.
GDP 1.60∗ 1.59∗
Consumption 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.74
Investment 4.96 0.65 2.85 0.82
Employment 0.58 0.79 0.62 0.75
Net exports 2.35 –0.09 1.09 –0.26
NOTES: The table reports theoretical and empirical standard deviations (“St.Dev.”) and correlations
(“Corr.”) of the variables. The theoretical moments are shown for Austria, which is the “representative”
country in our sample. The empirical moments are averages across 11 countries in our sample: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. All statis-
tics are obtained from applying the HP-filter to variables in logarithms for the sample 1996Q1–2017Q4.
To avoid HP-filter induced beginning-of-sample extreme values and to focus on the pre-crisis period, we
use the sample 1999Q1–2007Q4 to calculate the empirical moments. Standard deviations are the ratio of
the standard deviation to the standard deviation of GDP (except for net exports, which is the standard
deviation of net exports-to-GDP ratio in percentage points). All model statistics are obtained from 1000
simulations with all shocks switched on, over 250 quarters, with the first 50 quarters dropped.
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Table 2.6. Domestic bank dependence, SME-sectors, and crisis transmission: Baseline
model simulation results
(1) (2)
Growth in sectoral value added Pre-/post crisis change in avg. growth rate













NOTES: The table presents estimates of our baseline specification in column (1) and the cross-sectional
before-after analysis in column (2).
In column (1), we estimate the following specification:
∆ logGDPc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2DBD
c] + µt,s + µc,s + εc,st .
This regression includes time-sector and country-sector fixed effects. The term ∆GBSt×SME
c,s is absorbed
by time-sector fixed effects, since in the model SMEc,s only varies across sectors, but not across countries.
In column (2), we estimate the following specification:
∆ logGDPc,scrisis −∆ logGDP
c,s
pre−crisis = α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2DBD
c + µs + εc,s.
This regression includes sector fixed effects. The term SMEc,s is absorbed by sector fixed effects, since in
the model SMEc,s only varies across sectors, but not across countries.
Estimated coefficients and t-stats (in parentheses) are derived from sample means and standard devia-
tions of the simulated regression coefficients. In particular, for every of 10000 simulations, we run the
regressions, save the estimated coefficients, and use their distribution to construct the reported values.
The model has been calibrated for 11 EMU countries. We obtained time series over 60 quarters for each
of the simulated variables. All variables have been cross-sectionally demeaned. Statistical significance at
1/5/10 percent level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
43
Table 2.7. Domestic bank dependence, SME-sectors, and crisis transmission: Model simulation results under the counterfactuals
(1) (2) (3)
Sync global SME TFP shocks Sync local SME TFP shocks Sync local banking shocks






N 1408 1408 1408
NOTES: The table presents estimates of our baseline specification under three counterfactual scenarios. The counterfactual in column (1) assumes that all
countries experience a syncronized negative global TFP shock in SME sectors. The counterfactual in column (2) assumes that only crisis countries—Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—experience a syncronized negative TFP shock in SME sector. The counterfactual in column (3) assumes that the crisis
countries—Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—experience a syncronized negative local banking shock. In all three scenarios, the global banking sector
shock is switched off and all other shocks for the non-crisis countries are assumed to be uncorrelated.
The empirical specification for all counterfactuals is our baseline regression model:
∆ logGDPc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBD
c × SMEc,s + α2DBD
c] + µt,s + µc,s + εc,st .
This regression includes time-sector and country-sector fixed effects. The term ∆GBSt × SME
c,s is absorbed by time-sector fixed effects, since in the model SMEc,s
only varies across sectors, but not across countries.
Estimated coefficients and t-stats (in parentheses) are derived from sample means and standard deviations of the simulated regression coefficients. In particular,
for every of 10000 simulations, we run the regressions, save the estimated coefficients, and use their distribution to construct the reported values. The model has
been calibrated for 11 EMU countries. We obtained time series over 60 quarters for each of the simulated variables. All variables have been cross-sectionally
demeaned. Statistical significance at 1/5/10 percent level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
44




















































































































Cross−border flows: Total Bank−to−bank Bank−to−non−bank
NOTES: The figure plots cross-border lending by foreign banks to each country. The last panel
plots aggregate EMU-11 cross-border flows. The black solid line shows total lending, the red
dashed line shows lending by foreign banks to domestic banks, and the blue dotted line shows
lending by foreign banks to the domestic non-bank sector (including governments). The source
is BIS locational banking statistics database.
45
Figure 2.2. Bank-to-bank integration vs. bank-to-real sector integration
BANKS
Private Sector / SME
BANKS
Private Sector / SME
Core Periphery
Cross-border, bank-to-bank
NOTES: The figure conceptualizes the structure of banking integration in the Eurozone in the years before the financial crisis.
Cross-border integration mainly took place between banks (bank-to-bank integration) with net flows largely in the direction of the
periphery country (big red arrow in the middle). Cross-border flows from banks to the real sector remained very limited (thin grey
arrows). This left periphery economies vulnerable to sudden stops in banking flows (due to the global crisis), while keeping the
domestic banking sector exposed to country-specific shocks due to its domestically concentrated loan portfolio.
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Figure 2.3. Bank dependence of SMEs in the Eurozone















NOTES: The figure reports the fraction of SMEs (firms with fewer than 250 employees) reporting to have used or to be currently
using the respective source of external finance. The data source is the European Central Bank’s and EU Commission’s Survey of
Access to Finance by Enterprises (SAFE) 2011 for 11 Eurozone countries.
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Reported any obstacles Reported increased net interest expenses





























NOTES: The left panel plots the fraction of firms that reported any obstacles in obtaining finance in the ECB-EU Commission’s
Survey of Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) 2011 against our measure of domestic bank dependence, DBD. The right panel
plots the difference of the percentage of firms reporting increased interest expenses minus the percentage of firms reporting decreased
interest rate expenses as reported in SAFE 2011 against DBD. For the two regression lines, the slope (robust t-stat) [R2] in the left
panel is 69.93 (1.72) [0.22], and in the right panel is 48.32 (1.79) [0.20].
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Figure 2.5. Post-2008 sector-level growth and domestic bank dependence: Sectors with


































































SME (sector): ●Low High
NOTES: The graph plots the change in output from pre-2008 to post-2008 average growth rates
at the country-sector level against the average pre-2008 level of domestic bank dependence in
each country. Blue (red) diamonds (circles) indicate country-sectors with below (above) median
SME shares. The blue, dashed (red, solid) lines indicate the regression relationship between
growth and domestic bank dependence for the sample of blue (red) diamonds (circles). The
observation period is 1997Q1-2013Q4 for the 11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
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Figure 2.6. Global banking shock and domestic bank dependence in sectors with low vs.









































SME (sector): Low High
NOTES: The graph plots the cumulative effect of the interaction terms CRISISt × DBD
c from
local linear projection regressions, separately for high-SME sectors (red) and low-SME sectors
(blue). Different horizons (zero to four years) are on the x-axis, and the coefficients αh is on
the y-axis.. Colored shaded areas correspond to the respective 90% confidence bands. The
observation period is 1997Q1-2013Q4 for the 11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
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Figure 2.7. Model impulse responses to a global banking shock, a local banking shock, a
global SME TFP shock and a local SME TFP shock



























Global SME TFP shock




Local SME TFP shock































































































Greece Austria Greece (Counterfactual)
NOTES: The graph plots the model impulse response functions of SME production, big firms
production, bank-to-bank loans and B2B-to-B2N ratio (rows) for “Greece” (red solid lines),
“Austria” (blue dashed lines) and “Greece (Counterfactual)” (green dot-dashed lines) to a one
standard deviation global banking shock, local banking shock, global SME TFP shock and local
SME TFP shock (columns). “Greece” and “Austria” impulse responses are generated from
models simulated using parameter values from Table 2.4. “Greece (Counterfactual)” illustrates
the counterfactual scenario for Greece, in which we calibrate the model for Greece (e.g., the
SME share), but set the DBD parameter to its value for Belgium. All impulse responses are
percentage deviations from steady state. Number of quarters following the shock is on the x-axis.
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Figure 2.8. Post-2008 sector-level growth and domestic bank dependence in sectors with
low vs. high SME shares: Model simulation results













































NOTES: The graph plots the change in output from “pre-crisis” to “crisis” average growth rates
at the country-sector level against the steady-state level of domestic bank dependence in each
country. Blue (red) diamonds (circles) indicate BF (SME) sectors. The blue, dashed (red, solid)
lines indicate the regression relationship between growth and domestic bank dependence for the
sample of blue (red) diamonds (circles). Data and line slopes are obtained from 1000 model
simulations, calibrated for 11 EMU countries and run over 60 quarters, including 20 quarters of
the “crisis” period.
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Figure 2.9. Global banking shock and domestic bank dependence in sectors with low vs.
high SME shares: Model simulation results using local linear projections







































D Low SME sectors
High SME sectors
NOTES: The graph plots the cumulative effect of the interaction terms ∆GBSt×DBD
c from local
linear projection regressions on model-simulated data, separately for SME sectors (red) and non-
SME sectors (blue). Different horizons (zero to four years) are on the x-axis, and the coefficients
αh is on the y-axis. Colored shaded areas correspond to the respective 90% confidence bands,
calculated from the distribution of the estimated coefficients across model simulations. The
impulse responses are obtained from 1000 model simulations, calibrated for 11 EMU countries





















(s.t.) Intertemporal budget constraint




















































































Cost minimization w.r.t. CSMEt :



































































Capital law of motion:


































FOC w.r.t. It (Tobin’s Q):
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FOC w.r.t. Lst :
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Cost minimization w.r.t. Ls,LBt :

























t , Dt, Mt
ΠLBt
Balance sheet:
LLBt =Mt +Dt (2A.19)























FOC w.r.t. Dt (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Mt ):
rdt = r
m














Composition of loans to firms:
LLBt = L





















t = Bt (2A.25)




























































































































t ) +O(2) (2A.33)
Price normalization:
PBFt = 1 (2A.34)
Current account:




















Current account to ROW:
CAt = −∆Bt (2A.37)
Net exports to ROW:
































Tradable good (Follows from Walras Law):













Sectoral TFP shocks (home):
log θst = ρ
















Sectoral TFP (foreign, i.e. “rest-of-EMU”):
log θs∗t = ρ
θ log θs∗t−1 − α
†σsηs,†t , (2A.44)
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∼ N (0, 1).


































, and Ω =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

















∼ N (0, 1).
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Chapter 3
Channels of Risk Sharing in the Eurozone:
What Can Banking and Capital Market Union Achieve?
Joint with Mathias Hoffmann, Bent E. Sørensen and Iryna Stewen
Abstract: We study channels of risk sharing in the EMU before and after 2008, when the Great
Recession started. Empirically, higher cross-border equity holdings and more direct bank-to-
nonbank lending are associated with more risk sharing while interbank integration is not. Eq-
uity market integration in the EMU remains limited while banking integration is dominated
by interbank integration. Further, interbank integration proved to be highly procyclical, which
contributed to a freeze in risk sharing after 2008. Based on this evidence, and results from
simulations of a stylized DSGE model, we discuss implications for banking union. Our results
show that direct banking integration and capital market integration are complements and that
robust risk sharing in the EMU requires integration on both fronts.
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Chapter 4
Risk Sharing within the Firm and Beyond:
The Role of the Firm in the Transmission of Shocks to Households
Abstract: This paper studies the role of the firm in international consumption risk sharing
by analyzing the patterns of shock transmission from firm output and value-added to house-
hold income and consumption. I show that fluctuations in consumption are primarily driven
by shocks to household labor income and shielded from shocks to household dividend income.
While the former are entirely driven by the dynamics of firm-sector labor compensation, there is
little evidence that household dividend income follows firm sector dividend payout. Thus, firms
have a potentially pivotal role in providing consumption insurance to households by shifting
risk from workers to shareholders. I show that there is indeed a high degree of such within-firm
risk sharing, since firms considerably insure workers from transitory and permanent shocks to
their output and value-added, while shareholders are only insured from temporal but not from
persistent shocks.
Keywords: Consumption, Dividends, Firm shocks, Labor compensation, Payout policy, Risk
Sharing, Sectoral accounts.
JEL classification: D2, E2, F3, G3, G35, J3.
Citation: Egor Maslov (2020). Risk Sharing within the Firm and Beyond: The Role of the Firm in the Trans-
mission of Shocks to Households.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my supervisor Mathias Hoffmann for his continuing support during
my PhD studies and during the work on this paper, in particular. I am particularly grateful to him as well as
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4.1 Introduction
What is the role played by the firm in the transmission of output and value-added shocks to
household income and consumption? By combining two approaches prevalent in the literature—
the first one focusing on individual firm-worker-shareholder nexus and insurance within the firm
and the second one studying aggregate patterns of shock transmission on the level of individual
countries and regions—I show that firms play a pivotal role in providing consumption insurance
to households by shifting risk from workers to shareholders, and examine the channels through
which this outcome is achieved.
The main argument in this paper is built upon the idea that the general payout policy of
the firm (understood broadly to include the compensation of labor) determines the type and
the amount of income risk borne by different economic agents (workers and shareholders), and
consequently the diversification and the consumption smoothing potential for the total risk.
The first part of this logic is inspired by the literature starting with Knight (1921), who
traced the very existence of the firm to the provision of insurance by risky entrepreneurs to
risk-averse workers.1 Overall, this literature is primarily concerned with the role of the firm in
reducing the workers’ wage and employment risk, but it does not emphasize the implications of
general firm payout policy for the rest of the macroeconomy.
However, from the welfare perspective of individual countries and regions, it is crucial to know
how changes in aggregate production and income affect aggregate demand and consumption.
While the existing literature has provided many useful insights—it identified channels through
which these typed of shocks get smoothed, discussed the role played by various institutions, such
as the general government, public and private insurance, or capital, credit and labor markets,
and examined the scope for risk sharing across national and regional borders—it has traditionally
focused on patterns relating to aggregate macroeconomic quantities and prices without much
attention to within- and between-sector interactions.2
In this paper, I embrace both perspectives and develop the thesis that the way firms share
income between workers and shareholders is of first-order importance for the overall patterns
of risk sharing in the economy as a whole. This claim is further motivated by the patterns in
Figure 4.1, namely that labor income and dividends are the two most important components of
the aggregate household primary income originating outside their own balance sheets.3
1See, for example, Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005), Fagereng, Guiso and Pistaferri (2017), Ellul, Pagano
and Schivardi (2017), and Pagano (2020).
2See, among others, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Hoffmann et al.
(2019).
3Note that “entrepreneurial” income—the sum of operating and mixed income of unincorporated entities—
makes a substantial part of the total households’ income in some countries, e.g., Greece and Italy. However, by
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To illustrate this point, consider two extreme cases, where a negative shock to firms’ sales is
either entirely reflected in (i) a reduction of total payoff to equity holders, or (ii) in one-to-one
cut in labor payout. From the aggregate national accounting perspective, there is no difference
in the measured reduction in total domestic income. However, the implications are different for
who gets affected and how: in the first case the shock affects domestic and potentially foreign
shareholders; in the second one, it is almost entirely transmitted to domestic workers, since labor
risk is local in nature and is hard to insure against. In the aggregate, one is likely to see a smaller
response of the aggregate consumption in the first case. Firstly, because at least a portion of
the shareholder risk can be insured ex ante through capital markets and thus diversified away;
and secondly, because households exposed to this type of risk are likely to be overall wealthier
and have better access to other means of consumption smoothing: savings, financial assets and
bank credit. For economies and regions, which differ only along the stated dimension but have
otherwise identical institutions, aggregate consumption is therefore expected to respond very
differently. In other words, this example shows that countries with similar institutions, capital
and credit markets, government policies, and so on, but different firm payout policies can have
very different consumption elasticities. From a policy-maker’s perspective, such differential
responses are crucial to understand.
I am not aware of any other study that explores the role played by the general corporate
payout policy of individual firms for shock transmission between economic sectors and different
levels of risk sharing within the economy. The current paper does so in three steps, with the
main procedures and findings summarized as follows.
First, using the firm-level data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global for a
panel of advanced economies from 1999 to 2019, I study the general firm payout policy patterns
by pinning down the degree of pass-through of idiosyncratic shocks to firm productivity, as
proxied by sales and value-added, to various firm-level outcomes, e.g., employees’ compensation,
wages, employment, operating income, dividends, total equity payout, and capital expenditures.
Importantly, given the fact that the permanent and transitory shocks can lead to potentially
very different reactions, I adapt the econometric procedure in Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi
(2005), which allows me to describe the firm payout policy not only as a mixed reaction to long-
and short-lived productivity shocks, but also distinguish between the two.
Starting with the reaction of labor compensation, I largely confirm the conclusions from
the previous literature (see, e.g., Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005), Fagereng, Guiso and
Pistaferri (2017), and Ellul, Pagano and Schivardi (2017)) that workers are well insured against
definition the risk from this type of income originates on the balance sheets of the households themselves and
thus constitutes background risk not stemming from the rest of the economy.
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transitory idiosyncratic shocks to firm-level productivity and less so against persistent shocks.
In particular, the estimates of the current study imply the combined pass-through rate to labor
expenses of between 25−40% (depending on a particular specification and shock definition), with
the effect being smaller for transitory shocks, at between 0−25%, and larger for persistent shocks,
at between 40 − 50%. By decomposing labor expenses into wages and number of employees—I
conclude that firms largely adjust the former in response to transitory shocks and the latter in
response to permanent shocks.
Consistent with the findings above, operating income reacts strongly to both types of shocks,
with the pass-through coefficient of around 2. However, this strong reaction is not resembled
one-to-one in the dynamics of dividends and total equity payout.4 While dividends and total
equity payout are strongly pro-cyclical in general, as evidenced from the combined pass-through
coefficient of 60−75%, this positive effect is entirely driven by the reaction to permanent shocks
(80 − 120%), with the elasticity to transitory shocks being either small and insignificant, or
negative.
While the previous result is consistent with the view that firms usually adopt conservative
dividend payout policies and thus adapt dividends mostly in response to persistent changes in
firm operations only (see, e.g., Lintner (1956) and Leary and Michaely (2011)), the findings
in this paper uncover an additional pattern. Across most specifications, firms tend to adjust
dividends in the opposite direction of the shock impact. While this might be surprising at first
glance, this observation is consistent with standard business cycle models, which predict counter-
cyclical firm dividends due to the fact that firms pursue the interest of their shareholders who
want to maintain a steady consumption profile across booms and recessions. I am not aware of
any empirical study that finds support for this theory with firm-level data. It should be noted,
though, that such reaction is not observable for total equity payout, which is consistent with
the “substitution” hypothesis between dividends and share repurchases (Jagannathan, Stephens
and Weisbach (2000)) and evidence that firms prefer share repurchases as a means of passing
large transitory shocks to their shareholders (Brav et al. (2005)).5
Finally, I find that firms adjust investment in a pro-cyclical manner, but that this result is
entirely driven by the response to permanent productivity shocks. Overall, the results above
suggest that firms play an important role in insuring workers against transitory and permanent
shocks to firm performance, and firm owners against transitory shocks.
4The distinction between dividends and total equity payout is due to the impact of share repurchases and
is particularly important for come individual countries like the United States but almost irrelevant for most
European countries.
5In some of their specifications Covas and Den Haan (2011) reach similar conclusions.
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In the second step, I use the sectoral accounts data from Eurostat to explore and extend the
above patterns at the level of individual countries and sectors within countries. In particular, I
repeat the preceding analysis to study the aggregate firm reaction to country-wide productivity
shocks and see if there are substantial differences in this reaction compared to the patterns
shaped by the dynamics of idiosyncratic firm shocks. I also ask to what extent households in
the aggregate are exposed to firm-sector shocks to value added, labor expenses and dividends,
and how the transmission mechanism works.
This analysis is similar in nature to the international risk sharing literature, but differs from
it in two important ways. First, the units of analysis are not countries as a whole, but country-
sectors (non-financial firms and households). And second, I consider how firm productivity
shocks affect household consumption through two different income channels: labor payout and
dividends.
Starting with estimates of an analogue to the classical consumption risk-sharing coefficient, I
show that aggregate household consumption is shielded from ca. 40% of the shocks to aggregate
firm value-added, which, despite differences in methodology, is in line with the existing literature
(see, e.g., Hoffmann et al. (2019)). What drives this aggregate sensitivity of consumption is a
composite influence of three forces: how aggregate productivity shocks affect various firm-sector
income components, how, conditional on these patterns, the respective household income com-
ponents react to changes in their firm-level counterparts (extensive margin), and how household
consumption reacts to shocks to different components of their income (intensive margin).
Within the firm sector I find that a much higher share of aggregate firm productivity shocks
is transmitted to wages, at ca. 75%, compared to idiosyncratic firm productivity shocks, where
this share is in the range 25 − 40%. This finding is not surprising, since the analysis with
the firm-level data is conceived to measure the impact of idiosyncratic firm shocks, while the
aggregate dynamics is driven by common shocks. Clearly, aggregate shocks are harder to insure
against both from an individual firm’s perspective, and the economy as a whole. Furthermore,
consistent with firm-level results above, I find that the response of aggregate dividends is large
(above one) but still entirely driven by the influence of permanent shocks.
Concerning the role of the labor income in the process of shock transmission of the residual
risk from firms to households, empirical evidence suggests that 70% of this risk is transmitted
to household consumption. Lack of insurance on the between-sector dimension amounts to
ca. 90% of the transmission (extensive margin), while the on-balance sheet lack of insurance
within the household sector amounts to ca. 80% of the transmission (intensive margin). For
dividends, the overall picture is different: the combined effect of firm-sector dividend risk for
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household consumption is almost negligible at 2%, with about 50% of the risk being diversified
away (extensive margin).
These findings show that labor income risk is harder than the dividend risk to diversify
away ex ante (e.g., through capital markets) and smoothen ex post (e.g., through credit markets
or via saving). Consequently, the patterns of risk sharing within the firm, i.e., whether the
risk is primarily passed on through labor or equity payout, determine the ultimate response of
household consumption to firm-level output and value-added shocks.6
In the last step, I combine firm-level microeconomic data with the sectoral accounts macroe-
conomic data and use the former to construct an instrument for aggregated firm value-added,
output, labor expenses and dividends. One issue with the procedure in step two, common to
much of the macroeconomic literature in general, is that it measures the reduced form com-
bined effect of all shocks causing firm productivity, labor income, dividends, and consumption
to co-move. Such results are instructive but must be interpreted with caution, especially in
countries and times dominated by alternative (non-productivity) shocks (see also discussion and
simulation results in (Hoffmann et al., 2019)). A properly defined instrument allows to poten-
tially circumvent this problem, and provide a robust way of gauging the impact of aggregate
firm-sector outcomes on the household sector balance sheets and consumption.
For this purpose, I apply a simple version of the approach developed by Gabaix and Koijen
(2019). These authors develop a framework which allows one to identify the causal effects of
one macroeconomic variable on another by exploiting the granular nature of the underlying
microeconomic data in a particular instrumental-variables (IV) setting.
While the implementation of the granular residual approach with the data used in the current
study does not lead to universally useful results (weak first stage and insufficient instrument
power in some cases), the results with instrumenting firm-sector labor expenses with a granular
residual from Compustat data are relatively strong and interpretable.
Particularly, I find that fluctuations in the uninsured portion of firm labor payments have
a very strong impact on household wages (extensive margin), with a pass-through coefficient of
97%, total primary income (86%), and nominal and real consumption (98 − 99%). All these
coefficients are strongly statistically different from zero and not different from one, with their
magnitudes roughly doubling if the responses to persistent shocks are considered. Overall, these
findings confirm the previous result that the uninsured component of firm labor compensation
is entirely passed on to households’ income and consumption.
6The patterns of the aggregate household income are also substantially shaped by the dynamics of en-
trepreneurial income. However, this income type by definition cannot be smoothed within the firm or the corporate
sector. The results using macro-level data show that a significant fraction (54%) of the shocks to entrepreneurial
income find their way to the household consumption.
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Taken together, the findings in this paper provide a comprehensive picture of how shocks
are transmitted from firm output and value-added to household income and consumption. It
shows that fluctuations in consumption are primarily driven by shocks to household labor in-
come and shielded from shocks to household dividend income. While the former are entirely
driven by the dynamics of firm-sector labor compensation, there is little evidence that house-
hold dividend income follows firm sector dividend payout. Thus, firms play a pivotal role in
providing consumption insurance to households by shifting risk from workers to shareholders,
as they insure workers from transitory and permanent shocks to their output and value-added,
while shareholders are only insured from temporal but not from persistent shocks.
I conclude that risk sharing patterns on the macroeconomic level are crucially shaped by
the risk sharing within the firm. The main policy implication of this thesis therefore implies
the need to target firm-related outcomes and general firm payout policy directly, if households
are to be effectively insulated from the fluctuations in idiosyncratic and economy-wide shocks
to firm output, e.g., during the current covid-19 pandemic.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a survey of related literature and
highlights the main contributions of the current approach. The sources of firm- and country-level
data used in the subsequent analysis and data preparation steps are described in Section 4.3.
The next three sections describe the empirical methodology and perform data analysis: a study
of risk sharing within the firm is conducted in Section 4.4, an investigation of shock transmission
from non-financial firm sector to households within countries in Section 4.5, and an alternative
identification from firm-level data in Section 4.6. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.7.
4.2 Literature Review
The academic literature has concerned itself with the trade-off at the firm level regarding the dis-
tribution of income between workers and shareholders at least since the work by Knight (1921),
who traced the very existence of the firm to the provision of insurance by risky entrepreneurs
to risk-averse workers. The first rigorous formalization of this intuition was done in Azariadis
(1975) and Baily (1974). Pagano (2020) offers an excellent recent account of the theory of risk
sharing within the firm, followed by an observation that risk sharing within firms has declined
steadily in the last three decades.
Empirically, the idea that firms provide implicit insurance to workers was first studied by
Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) (see also an overview in Guiso and Pistaferri (2020)).
Using matched firm-worker data for Italy, they show that firms fully insure workers from tran-
sitory shocks to their value added and partially so from permanent shocks. Fagereng, Guiso
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and Pistaferri (2017) build on this idea and explore the effects of uninsurable wage shocks on
household portfolio choice. Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2013) show that workers provide
implicit credit to firms via the shape of their wage profile. Similar to the approach adopted in
this paper, Ellul, Pagano and Schivardi (2017) adapted the empirical methodology from Guiso,
Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) for a cross-country firm data from Worldscope and Osiris (and for
U.S. firms from Compustat) to show that unemployment insurance offered by the government
and by firms are substitutes.
Additionally, and close related, Hartman-Glaser, Lustig and Xiaolan (2019) develop a model
of firm wage insurance and show empirically that the aggregate capital share dynamics is driven
by individual dynamics of very large firms; Favilukis and Lin (2016) show that the riskiness
of equity increases if wages are (exogenously) sticky; and Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005)
develop an idea that international rent sharing in multinational firms can provide an implicit
risk-sharing mechanism through its effect on wages.
Compared to this literature, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I explicitly
study not only labor-related firm outcomes, but, among others, also dividends and total equity
payout. Second, I study risk transmission beyond firm boundaries, all the way to aggregate
household sector income and consumption. And third, I combine firm-level and country-sector
data for a robust identification of the effects of the labour income shocks.
The next strand of related work embraces studies on optimal firm payout policy. While the
seminal work by Miller and Modigliani (1961) shows that under certain conditions the payout
policy is irrelevant, the vast existing empirical evidence points at the opposite. For example,
firms are known to be aiming to provide shareholders with a stable stream of predictable divi-
dends (see Lintner (1956) and more recent studies by Leary and Michaely (2011) and Javakhadze,
Ferris and Sen (2014)). Besides, the relation between earnings, dividends, and stock repurchases
has been evolving over time, with the latter having gained an increasingly prominent role (Fama
and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Skinner (2008)). This role is often framed
in context of the so-called flexibility hypothesis (Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000)),
according to which dividends are paid by firms with higher permanent operating cash flows,
while repurchases are used by firms with higher temporary cash flows (see also empirical evi-
dence in Andres et al. (2015)). Furthermore, Brav et al. (2005) provide evidence that dividends
are shielded from (temporary) firm-level shocks, while the “residual cash flow” risk is commonly
passed on to shareholders though share repurchases. For these reasons, where possible, I study
the role of dividends separately from the dynamics of total equity payout.
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The value added of the current paper is in studying the systematic response to firm-level
shocks not only of dividends and total equity payout, but also other firm outcomes, notably
labor compensation. Furthermore, I emphasize the role played by the firm in the transmission
of productivity risk between the economic agents within countries. Additionally, I particularly
highlight the role of dividends in insuring shareholders from transitory shocks to firm output.
Related to the last point, it should be noted that the main conclusion of the corporate finance
literature regarding the cyclical nature of dividends and total equity payout is at odds with
typical macroeconomic models, which predict that equity payout must be highly counter-cyclical
and volatile. Following a discussion in Huang-Meier and Freeman (2015), if negative (positive)
shocks are not too short-lived, than it is optimal for the firm to cut (increase) investment in
expectation of low (high) future return, while at the same time shareholders should demand
higher (lower) compensation in order to maintain a stable path of consumption.
Such models consequently predict home bias in international portfolios, since they produce
a negative correlation between the (uninsurable) labor income and dividends (see, for example,
Heathcote and Perri (2004, 2013) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)). But although the home
bias is indeed a long-lived feature of international capital markets (Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)),
empirically the equity payout has been shown to be highly pro-cyclical at the aggregate level
(see, for example, Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Huang-Meier, Freeman and Mazouz (2015)).
The results in this paper offer a rare evidence supporting the predictions of such models (some
specifications in Covas and Den Haan (2011) point to the same conclusion). These patterns are
clear-cut using firm-level data and also show up in the macroeconomic data, if one estimates the
elasticities separately for transitory and persistent shocks.
At this point, it should be noted that I do not study the transmission of output risk to
households’ consumption via capital gains. While one might object that from shareholders’
perspective there is not necessarily a huge difference between dividends and capital gains and
that both contribute to total return on their portfolios, the focus in the current paper lies
in income risk transmission via transactions, as defined in the European system of accounts.
Studying the role of capital gains and valuation effects is beyond the scope of this paper but is
an interesting avenue for future research.
Conversely, the focus of the current paper is on tracing the effect of the innovations to firm
output on household consumption via income flows, and in this regard it closely connects to
a large body of research on international (interregional) consumption risk sharing. In early
contributions, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) identified
channels, through which shocks to productivity (GDP) get smoothed before finally affecting
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consumption: the income channel (through capital markets), the fiscal channel (through gov-
ernmental taxes and subsidies) and the consumption smoothing channel (through self-insurance
and credit markets). A recent application for the euro are can be found in Hoffmann et al.
(2019).7
The current study extends the methodology from the papers above to study channels of
risk sharing within countries, between sectors and within the firm. It also considers separate
roles played by labor income and dividend income and the distinction between the reactions to
permanent and transitory shocks (via instrumental-variables approach).
Given the last point, I also closely relate to Becker and Hoffmann (2006) and Artis and Hoff-
mann (2008), who also show that it is essential to distinguish between permanent and transitory
shocks to output (income), since consumption reacts mainly to the permanent component. This
distinction is related to Artis and Hoffmann (2011) who show that portfolio diversification is
particularly important for smoothing permanent shocks.
The analysis in this paper confirms the importance of distinguishing between the two types of
shocks primarily because labor income and dividends react very differently to both components.
This study is therefore highly complementary to the above-mentioned papers.
To my knowledge the current study is the first one to use firm-level data to study the
relationship between output, value-added, labor earnings, dividends and consumption within
a risk sharing framework, by using insights from Gabaix and Koijen (2019). These authors
developed the methodology for extracting idiosyncratic shocks from the disaggregated data in
order to identify macroeconomic relationships of interest. This connects the current paper to
the “granularity hypothesis” literature. This hypothesis was developed in Gabaix (2011) who
trace the origins of the aggregate fluctuations to the dynamics of large (“granular”) individual
units (here, firms). Among others, di Giovanni, Levchenko and Mejean (2014) extend this idea
to quantify the contribution of firm-level sales shocks to the aggregate variation of sales and
the importance of various channels. More applications can be found in Carvalho and Gabaix
(2013), di Giovanni, Levchenko and Mejean (2018), and Carvalho and Grassi (2019). Leary
and Roberts (2014) explore a similar idea in context of firm peer effects. Relevant elements of
this approach can also be found in Covas and Den Haan (2011) and Hartman-Glaser, Lustig
and Xiaolan (2019), who show that the aggregate dynamics of equity payout and capital share
is driven by large firms and that it differs significantly from that of the median firm. Finally,
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Volosovych (2014) emphasize the role of the granularity of the
7See also Obstfeld (1993), Canova and Ravn (1996), Lewis (1996), Sørensen et al. (2007), Demyanyk, Os-
tergaard and Sørensen (2007), Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2008), Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009),
Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011), Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini and Sørensen (2014).
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firm size distribution for their findings on the relation between foreign direct ownership of firms
and their output volatility, and between aggregate volatility and foreign investment.
4.3 Data
There are two main sources of data that are used in this study: Compustat for the firm-level data
and Eurostat for the country-sector-level data. Below I describe the two sources and document
the steps made in the process of data preparation.
4.3.1 Data Compustat
First, I merge annual Compustat North America and Compustat Global databases (tables
company, funda, g company, and g funda from library comp).8
From the former I extract data for firms located in the United States and Canada (using
the firm location identifier loc) and from the latter data for the following 26 European coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Switzerland.
The time sample starts in 1999 and ends in 2019 with annual frequency. I use firms’ fiscal
years (fyear) as a time identifier.9
To have a data panel with entries uniquely identified by the firm id (gvkey) and fiscal year
(fyear), I apply the following screens: consol = C (consolidated accounts only), indfmt = INDL
(industry format only), datafmt = STD|HIST STD (data format: standard for Compustat NA and
historical standard for Compustat Global), and popsrc = D|I (population source: domestic for
Compustat NA and international for Compustat Global).10
Besides data identifiers, the following variables are used in the subsequent analysis: sic
(SIC – SIC code and industry identifier), at (Asset – total assets), dlc (ShortDebt – debt
in current liabilities), dltt (LongDebt – long-term debt), ppent (TangAsset – property plant
and equipment), sale (Sale – sales or output), xopr (OpExp – total operating expenses), xsga
(SGAExp – selling, general and administrative expense), oibdp (OpInc – operating income before
depreciation), xlr (LabPay – labor expense), capx (Invest – fixed capital expenditure), dvc
(DivPay – common dividends), prstkc (ShareRep – purchase of common and preferred stock),
8From here on I will refer to database identifiers and variable names in teletype font.
9I choose annual and not quarterly frequency since most firms announce dividends in a particular quarter every
year, meaning that there is no meaningful variation in the size of dividends across firm-quarters. This observation
is also confirmed in national accounts data. Also, quarterly data is of lower quality as companies report some
quantities only on an annual frequency.
10As I describe below, to this end I also deal with fiscal year changes which result in non-unique firm-year
observations for a small sub-sample of data.
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and emp (Emp – number of employees). I additionally define value-added as ValAdd = LabPay+
OpInc, wages as Wage = LabPay/Emp, leverage as Leverage = (ShortDebt+ LongDebt) /Asset,
and tangibility as Tangibility = TangAsset/Asset. I also set negative values of DivPay
and ShareRep to zero, and set missing observations of ShareRep to zero for firm-years, in
which there is information on DivPay. Total equity payout is then defnined as TotEqPay =
DivPay+ ShareRep.
Initial data after restricting the sample and applying the screens above consists of 330’087
firm-country-sector-year observations. In a first step of the data cleaning process, I filter out
companies with non-missing entries for status alert identifier (stalt), thus dropping companies
in bankruptcy or liquidation and those that have undergone a leveraged buyout – 0.26% of the
sample11; non-missing values for comparability status identifier (compst) (excluding DB – fiscal
year change status), thus dropping companies with data affected by mergers and acquisitions,
accounting changes, discontinued operations, short-lived operations and IPOs – 14.05%; missing
values for fiscal year (fyear) – 0.03%, fiscal year end (fyr) – 0.03%, and period duration (pddur)
– 0.01%, as well as values of period duration (pddur) below 9 and above 15 – 0.59%. I do the
latter in particular, because of the need to re-scale observations for which the period duration
(pddur) is not equal to 12 months (by a factor 12/pddur). This filtering step results in 281’792
remaining observations, or 85.37% of the initial sample.
Next, I drop observations with missing entries for Asset – 14.39%, Sale – 14.40%, and SIC
– 0.09%; drop data with non-positive values for Sale – 7.44%, Emp – 1.46%, Asset – 0.39%,
LabPay – 0.62%, SGAExp – 6.39%, and ValAdd – 5.69%; drop data with negative values for
ShortDebt – 0.00% (13 firms), LongDebt – 0.00% (5 firms), and TangAsset – 0% (0 firms);
and drop financial firms (SIC between 6000 and 6799) – 23.43%. The resulting sample contains
163’213 (57.92%) observations. Of these, I drop 1.50% of firms with less than 2 observations,
yielding 160’759 observations.
In the following step I trim data based on the values of the log-differences of Sale, Asset,
Emp, at 2% and observations based on log-differences of LabPay and ValAdd, at 5%. In a process,
10.07% of the observations are dropped, with the sample reducing to 144’565 observations.12 I
use a higher threshold for staff expense and value-added (its derivative), because these data are
of particularly bad quality. By inspecting the dataset, it is easy to find observations with wrong
placement of the decimal separator producing errors of magnitude of up to 1000. Using the
indicated threshold results in a subsample with minimal growth rates of LabPay of ca. −60%.
11From here on the percentage of filtered data refers to individual filter impact, not conditional on other filters
within the filtering step, and can therefore potentially sum to over 100%.
12Technically, I trim less observations than indicated because remaining missing values count to the indicated
threshold.
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Finally, because identifying the effects of permanent shocks requires computing leads and lags
of the log-differences, I only keep firms with at least 4 observations, or 91.73% of the sample –
down to 132’616.
Since some companies in the data change the end of their fiscal years (fyr), the gvkey-
fyear keys do not uniquely identify observations in the resulting sample. Therefore, for such
companies I first apply all needed variable transformations (such as yearly growth rates), using
information from both old and new fiscal year accounts and then drop the new one for the fiscal
years with both observations. The resulting panel is then uniquely identified by the gvkey-fyear
pair. 0.04% of observations (55 firms) are affected, yielding the final sample of 132’561 firm-year
observations, or 40.16% of the very first sample.
Finally, I convert all data from reporting currency (curcd) to euros using the Compustat
monthly exchange rate table exrt mth. The flow data are converted using the exchange rates
for the last n months, where n corresponds to period duration (pddur); stock data are converted
using the end of month exchange rates.
The summary statistics of the resulting data can be found in Table 4.1. Given a relatively
large number of countries in the sample, I pool all observations. To get a sense of how observa-
tions are distributed among individual countries, Figure 4.2 plots the evolution of the number
of firms by country, sorted by the number of firms in 2019. One can see, that many firms were
added to the data in 2005, with there being no observations for some countries before. Because
of this, I also repeated the firm-level empirical analysis using 2005 as a starting year. All results
remain both qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
4.3.2 Data Eurostat
For the country-level analysis I extract data from annual Eurostat non-financial transactions sec-
toral accounts (nasa 10 nf tr) and, for some background checks, financial transactions sectoral
accounts (nasa 10 f tr). Monthly price data comes from table prc hicp midx and population
data from table nama 10 pe.
The data for non-financial transactions are only available for the European countries listed
above less Switzerland, which I use as a primary country sample in the subsequent empirical
analysis (henceforth, Europe-25).
Since the majority of data starts in 1999, I use this date as a starting point for the main
sample.13
13While for some countries data is available from 1996 and before, I prefer 1999 also because it marks the
introduction of the euro in core eurozone countries.
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The sectoral accounts data are defined for the following aggregate country-sectors: total
economy (S1), non-financial corporations, or simply “firms” (S11), financial corporations (S12),
general government (S13), households and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs),
or simply “households” (S14 S15), and rest-of-the-world (S2).
In the empirical analysis, the following variables are used: p1 (Output – output), p4 (Cons –
actual final consumption), p51g (Invest – gross fixed capital formation), d1 (LabPay – compen-
sation of employees), d41 (Int – interest), d42 (DivPay – distributed income of corporations),
d43 (Reinvest – reinvested earnings on foreign direct investment), b1g (ValAdd – gross value
added or GDP), b2a3g (OpInc – gross operating surplus and gross mixed income), b5g (Inc –
gross balance of primary incomes or GNI), b7g (DispInc – adjusted gross disposable income),
b8 (Saving – gross saving). These definitions imply that Cons ≈ DispInc − Saving, with the
approximation coming from a small influence of adjustment for the change in pension entitle-
ments (d8 – PensionAdj). In some non-reported variations of the baseline, I also use f5 (Equity
– transactions in equity and investment fund shares) from financial transactions accounts.
All data are in million euros (unit = CP MEUR|MIO EUR for non-financial and financial trans-
actions, respectively), and is consolidated (co nco = CO) where appropriate (e.g., for financial
transactions data). Since in the European system of accounts (ESA2010) the distributed income
of corporations (d42) is defined to include reinvested earnings on foreign direct investment (d43),




Note also, that all variables are reported on both sides of the balance sheets, as either “paid”
(paid) or “received” (recv). Thus, for example, when referring to compensation of employees,
I implicitly mean LabPaypaid as paid by firms and LabPayrecv as received by households.
In some regressions I also study the response of real consumption to various shocks. For this
purpose, I take monthly price indices, cp00 (HICP, all-items HICP) with base year 2015, average
them up to the annual frequency and normalize to one in 2015. The real consumption is then
defined as a ratio of nominal consumption to this price index.
There are 500 non-missing observations in total, with no particular filters are applied to
these data. The summary statistics of the Eurostat data can be found in Table 4.2.
Finally, for the analysis in section 4.6, I link the firm-level Compustat data to the country-
level Eurostat by fyear-year and loc-geo keys.
4.4 Risk Sharing within the Firm
The main research question of the current study asks about the role of the firm in the trans-
mission of productivity shocks to household consumption with a particular emphasis on labor
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and equity payout risk. In this section I explore how labor expenses and equity payout react
to firm-level idiosyncratic output and value-added shocks and thus explore how risk is shared
between workers and shareholders within the firm.
As described in the Data section above (see Section 4.3.1), the main baseline sample used in
the firm-level analysis below consists of over 130’000 firm-year observations across 28 advanced
economies in Europe and North America between 1999 and 2019.
4.4.1 Econometric Model
The empirical methodology below is largely adapted from Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005),
who study the relationship between the residual component of individual wage growth and
idiosyncratic shocks to firm performance (see also Fagereng, Guiso and Pistaferri (2017)). In
particular these two papers show how one can identify permanent and transitory effects of
firm-level productivity shocks on labor compensation without using data-expensive techniques
of permanent-transitory decomposition common in time series analysis. Although the original
papers work with matched employer-employee data, the general procedure can be extended to
a typical firm panel, as shown below (see also Ellul, Pagano and Schivardi (2017)).14
I start by assuming the following process for the log of productivity for firm i in sector s,
country c and year t, which I denote by lnZit and which can be proxied by sales or value-added:
lnZit = X
′
itφ+ µi + µc(s)t + fit, (4.1)
where Xit is a vector of controls affecting firm performance, µi is a firm fixed effect and µc(s)t
is a country-time or a country-sector-time fixed effect15. The residual from this equation, fit,
is further assumed to be a sum of a transitory shock component, fTit , and a random walk




fit = Qit + f
T
it . (4.2)
Qit = Qit−1 + f
P
it . (4.3)
14The main drawback of working with non-matched data is that idiosyncratic shocks are less robustly identified,
since one cannot project out firm-time fixed effects. However, the benefits of the matched data do not extend to
additional firm outcomes, such as dividends, equity payout, investment, etc.
15In regressions below I will use firm and country-time fixed effects as a baseline and firm and country-sector-
time fixed effects in robustness checks. The problem with the latter is that in many countries there is only one
sector-time observation such that up to 50% of the effective data sample gets lost.
16Following Ellul, Pagano and Schivardi (2017) and Fagereng, Guiso and Pistaferri (2017), the setup above is a
simplification of the original methodology, since it does not consider AR(1) and MA(1) components in the process
specifications above (but is simpler to interpret).
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A firm outcome, yit, (e.g., staff expense, dividends, or investment) is assumed to respond to
persistent and transitory shocks with different sensitivities, βP and βP , respectively:
yit = β
P fPit + β
T fTit + X
′
itγ + µi + µc(s)t + ψit, (4.4)
where, as before, Xit is a vector of controls (potentially different from but, practically, equal to
the controls in equation 4.1), µi is a firm fixed effect and µc(s)t is a country-time or country-




The ultimate goal of the whole procedure is to estimate the pass-through coefficients βP and
βT . This can be done in two steps.17
First, one estimates the following regression, based on taking first-difference of equation 4.1:
∆ lnZit = ∆X
′
itφ+ (µi) + ∆µc(s)t + git, (4.5)
where the residual git denotes the unexplained growth in firm performance and is to be saved for
re-use in the next step. The firm fixed effects are surrounded by parentheses, because the existing
approach in the literature seemingly prefers to estimate the equation 4.5 without them, and thus
takes the differencing step literally. I find that dropping firm fixed effects in equation 4.5 leads
to a non-robust specification in a sense that the calculated residuals contain the influence of
firm-specific characteristics affecting the growth rates of firm outcomes (as opposed to levels).
In non-reported results, I repeated the whole analysis without using firm fixed effects at this
stage and found that the results get noisier and less consistent across different samples, primarily
because the first stage of the IV regressions described below becomes weaker.
Second, one estimates the following regression using the residual git from the first step by
applying two different IV specifications:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + (µi) + µc(s)t + εit, (4.6)
where yit is (the log of) an outcome variable; Xit, µi and µc(s)t are defined as before; and β is
(one of) the pass-through coefficient.
If equation 4.6 is estimated with simple OLS, the resulting elasticity measures the combined
effect of permanent and transitory components, defined in equations 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The
17The original framework consists of three steps. But, because we deal with firm-level (as opposed to matched
firm-employee) data in the current setup, the second and the third steps can be merged: one does not have to
separately calculate the unexplained growth of firm outcomes (e.g., wages) since this can be done by including
relevant controls and fixed effects into the IV regressions.
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insight of Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) is to prove that the elasticity with respect to the
permanent shock can be obtained by instrumenting git in equation 4.6 with (git−1 + git + git+1),
and the elasticity with respect to the transitory shock by instrumenting git with git+1 (and the
respective powers).
4.4.2 Results
The results of the baseline application of this procedure on a full country sample defined above
between 1999 and 2019 can be found in Table 4.3. This specification uses firm value-added
as a proxy for firm performance and traces the effect of combined, permanent and transitory
shocks on (1) labor compensation, (2) wages, (3) number of employees, (4) operating income,
(5) dividends, (6) equity payout and (7) fixed capital expenditure. The regressions use firm and
country-time fixed effects, with standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country.18
Consistent with the findings in the existing literature, I find that employee labor income is
well but not perfectly insured against transitory idiosyncratic shocks to firm value-added (with a
pass-through rate of 22%), and worse but still substantially insured against the permanent shocks
(with a pass-through rate of 42%); the total effect amounts to 27%. By further decomposing
labor expenses into the intensive and extensive margin—wages and employment—I conclude
that firms mostly adjust wages in response to transitory shocks (37%/7%), and the number of
employees in response to permanent shocks (36%/− 9%).
Operating income reacts strongly to both transitory and permanent shocks, with a pass-
through coefficient of 2.22. However, this strong reaction is not resembled one-to-one in the
dynamics of dividends and total equity payout. While dividends and total payout are strongly
pro-cyclical in general (combined pass-through coefficient of 72% and 75% respectively), this
positive effect is entirely driven by the reaction to permanent shocks (113% and 116%, re-
spectively), with the elasticity to transitory shocks being small, negative and insignificant. As
mentioned before, this finding is in line with main conclusions from the literature on corporate
payout policy.
For reference, I also report the response of firm investment in fixed assets in the last column,
where one can see that the overall positive elasticity of 42% is driven entirely by firms adjusting
their capital expenditures in response to permanent shocks only (97%).
18I also experimented with other clustering specifications, for example, two-way clustering by country and year.
Most results remain significant, but in some samples this technique results in non-positive variance-covariance
residual matrix. While restricting negative eigenvalues to zero solves the problem (but leads to very high standard
errors), I take this issue as a sign that this way of error clustering should be done with caution using the current
dataset. On the other hand, clustering by industry is problematic for the same reason I am not using sector-time
fixed effects in this type of analysis: many sectors consist of only one or a few firms in most countries in the
sample.
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Note that since the responses of dividends, total equity payout and investment to transitory
shocks are all negligible, while that of the total operating income are large and significant, there
must be some other margin of adjustment on firm balance sheets that they utilize to deal with
the transitory shocks (probably debt or retained earnings). While it is interesting to pursue
this line of investigation further, the focus of the current paper lies in uncovering the impact
of firm-level shocks on the components of income directly relevant to households, and is thus
delegated to future research.
All results presented in this section are extremely robust concerning the relevance of the
instrument for both instrumented variables. The relevant F-statistics from the first stage re-
gressions relating to the identification of permanent effects are all in the range of 500 − 1300,
while those relating to identification of transitory effects are in the range of 70 − 240.
Finally, regressions using sales as a proxy for firm productivity deliver qualitatively and
quantitatively similar results, see Table 4.4. All results from the prior estimations go through
and even get more pronounced, not least because there are less observations lost due to bad
data coverage of staff expenses as a component of value-added. In particular, compensation
of employees only reacts to the permanent changes in sales (with a pass-through coefficient
of 53%) and insignificantly so to the transitory component, suggesting perfect insurance of
labor income to idiosyncratic firm sales shocks. Wages still react strongly but only to the
transitory component, while employment reacts strongly positively to the permanent component
and negatively to the transitory one.19 Operating income does no longer significantly react to
transitory shocks, while dividends and investment react significantly negatively to them, and
total payout positively but insignificantly.
While the latter finding might be surprising at first glance, it is consistent with standard
business cycle models, which predict counter-cyclical firm dividends due to the fact that firms
pursue the interest of their shareholders who want to maintain a steady consumption pro-
file across booms and recessions. The no-reaction of total payout, on the other hand, signals
positive reaction of share repurchases, which is consistent with the “substitution” hypothesis
(Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000)) and evidence that firms prefer share repurchases
as a means of passing large transitory shocks to their shareholders (Brav et al. (2005)).
Overall, the findings above suggest that firms play an important role in insuring workers
against both transitory and permanent shocks to firm value-added and sales and that firm
owners are substantially insured against transitory shocks via dividends payments.
19This result is not immediately intuitive to me and will be explored further in the future.
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Robustness
Results for four alternative samples—Europe-25, Europe-10, Europe-14, and Europe-14-plus—
are documented in the Appendix, Tables 4A.1–4A.8. Specifications utilizing country-sector-time
instead of country-time fixed effects can be found in Tables 4A.9–4A.10. Given the fact that year
2005 marks a huge increase in the number of firms in the sample for many European countries
(see Figure 4.2), results for an alternative time sample 2005–2019 are provided in Tables 4A.11–
4A.12. Qualitatively similar conclusions are reached throughout all alternative specifications.
Other combinations of the alternative specifications above as well as some other unreported
findings are available on request.
4.5 Risk Sharing within the Country and between
Sectors
In this section I move the focus of the analysis from individual firms to individual countries
and study how shocks to the aggregate firm sector transmit to households’ balance sheets. As
outlined above (see Section 4.3.2), I do so by examining the patterns in the sectoral accounts
data from Eurostat. This analysis is similar in nature to the international risk sharing literature,
but differs from it in two important ways. First, the units of the analysis are not countries in
general but country-sectors: non-financial firms and households; and second, I consider how
firm productivity shocks affect household consumption through two different income channels:
employees’ compensation and dividends.
4.5.1 Econometric Model
To this aim, I reapply the methodology used in the firm-level analysis for country-sectors. In
particular, I trace combined, permanent and transitory effects of shocks to aggregate firm sector
performance and income components on various firm-sector and household-sector outcomes. The
baseline regression model then looks as follows:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct, (4.7)
where c indexes countries and t denotes years; µc is a country fixed effect and µt is a year fixed
effect; yct is (the log of) the outcome variables defined below; and the residual gct measures the
unexplained growth in one of the aggregate firm-sector performance and income indicators. The
regression parameter β is interpreted as a shock pass-through coefficient. Then, following the
reasoning from the previous section, the combined effect of all shocks can be estimated with
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simple OLS, permanent effects by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1), and transitory
effects by instrumenting gct with gct+1.
While I stick to the methodology from the previous exercise, it should be noted, that
permanent-transitory distinction is harder to make with a relatively small country-year panel
data that is used in the current analysis.20 One should therefore consider simple OLS results re-
ferring to the estimates of the combined pass-through coefficients as a baseline, while the results
for the elasticities due too permanent and transitory shocks as useful points of reference.
4.5.2 Results
Table 4.5 reports the first set of results obtained from applying model 4.7 to shocks to the
log of the firm sector value-added, in a sample of Europe-25 countries between 1999 and 2019.
Standard errors are clustered by countries and reported in parentheses.
Starting with the estimates of the analogue to the classical consumption risk-sharing coeffi-
cient in Table 4.5, column (7), one can see that the aggregate household consumption is shielded
from 41% of the shocks to the aggregate firm value-added, which is in line with findings in
the existing literature (see, for example, Hoffmann et al. (2019)). Column (8) shows that the
distinction between nominal and real consumption is not of large importance, as the reaction in
consumer prices contributes to smoothing only ca. 2% of the original shock.
What drives this aggregate sensitivity of consumption is a composite influence of three
forces: how aggregate productivity shocks affect various firm-sector income components, how,
conditional on these patterns, the respective household income components react to changes
in their firm-level counterparts (extensive margin), and how household consumption reacts to
shocks to different components of their income (intensive margin).
To get a sense of magnitude for the size of the firm risk remaining uninsured through various
income types within the firm sector itself, consider the results in Table 4.5, columns (1)–(3).
With the pass-through coefficient of 73%, there is evidence of only minor labor income insurance
taking place at this level. On the other hand, one can see that operating income and dividends
react very strongly to firm-sector value-added shocks, as both estimates exceed one. This finding
is not surprising, since the analysis with the firm-level data is conceived to measure the impact
of idiosyncratic firm shocks, while the aggregate dynamics is driven by common shocks. Clearly,
aggregate shocks are harder to insure against both from an individual firm’s perspective, and
economy as a whole. Note also, that the reaction of aggregate dividends is still entirely driven
20One can also see that the estimates of the combined effect no longer lay between the estimates of the responses
to permanent and transitory shocks, emphasizing large effects of sample reduction on parameter estimates.
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by the influence of permanent shocks. This is probably the most robust and important finding
from permanent-transitory distinction in this exercise.
Results in Table 4.5, columns (4)–(6), provide tentative evidence that firm performance
shocks affect the response of households labor income with the same or even larger magnitudes
as the respective firm-sector outcomes, while there is a substantially lower effect on household
dividend income. The total primary household income reacts to 65% of the original firm-value
added shock, while between 6% and 16% of the firm-sector value-added risk is smoothed through
state taxation and subsidies, household saving and bank credit (cf. columns (6) and (7)).
To further shed light onto the separate role played by the labor income risk, Tables 4.6
and 4.7 study how household labor income reacts to shocks to firm labor expenses (extensive
margin) and how household saving and consumption react to changes in household labor income
(intensive margin), respectively.
The results in Table 4.6 confirm the findings from the previous sub-section: a 1% shock
to firm-sector labor expense leads to an adjustment of the household labor income by 0.90%,
primary income by 0.78%, disposable income by 0.71%, and consumption by 0.69%. Thus,
approximately 7% of this risk is insured through taxes and governmental transfer schemes and
2% through household saving. The large elasticity of saving (1.57) can be attributed to the fact
that saving make only a small share in total disposable household income (see Figure 4.1).
The findings in Table 4.7 make the picture complete, as they show how household saving and
consumption react to that portion of labor income risk originating within the firm sector, that
reaches their balance sheets—the internal margin of adjustment. In particular, as witnessed
from column (4), consumption reacts by 0.78% to every 1% change in household labor income,
only 0.1% less than the reaction of the total primary household income, see column (1). As
before, due to the low saving rate, the coefficient in column (3) is large at 2.
Taken together, the results above highlight the importance of the wage insurance taking
place within the firm, as 70% of the risk left uninsured on the level of individual firms and the
firm sector is transmitted to household consumption. Lack of insurance on the between-sector
dimension amounts to ca. 90% of the transmission (extensive margin), while the on-balance
sheet lack of insurance within the household sector amounts to ca. 80% of the transmission
(intensive margin).
For dividends, the overall picture is different. As seen in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the combined
effect of firm-sector dividend risk for household consumption is almost negligible at 2%, see
Table 4.8, column (5). This number can be decomposed into the approximate contribution of
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the extensive margin, at ca. 50%, see Table 4.8, column (1), and the intensive margin, at ca.
2%, see Table 4.9, column (4).
Thus, not only is the shock to firm dividends largely diversified away on the way to household
balance sheets, it is easier than shocks to labor income to smoothen through saving and credit.
While two crucial components of household income—compensation of employees and dividends—
originate on the balance sheets of the firm sector, its other component—“entrepreneurial”
income—also contributes significantly to total fluctuations of primary household income, es-
pecially in some countries, e.g. Greece and Italy (see Figure 4.1). While there is no way to
study the role of the entrepreneurial income in the complete framework of the current paper,
since by definition this type of risk originates in the non-corporate sector, using the data from
aggregate household accounts allows me to at least quantify the importance of this background
risk for aggregate household consumption.
Table 4.10 reports the results of this exercise. As expected, a significant fraction of the
shocks to entrepreneurial income (54%) is passed on to household consumption, see column (4).
Robustness
Table 4A.13 in the Appendix reports the results for the case, where a firm performance shock
is measured by total firm output rather than value-added. The findings are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to the baseline findings. Coefficients in Table 4A.13 and generally larger
than for in the baseline, consistent with the explanation that, other things equal, a larger value
of the shock variable leads to higher measure pass-through coefficient. A number of additional
results for alternative country samples (e.g., Europe-10 and Europe-14) and time samples (e.g.,
2005–2019), are available upon request. All baseline results go through, but one can observe a
reduction in the precision of the estimates due to sample reduction, particularly for the Europe-
10 sample.
4.6 Risk Sharing within the Country and between
Sectors: Firm-Level Identification
The results so far shed light onto micro and macro-patterns of the shock transmission from
firms to labor income and dividends, all the way to household consumption. One issue with
the procedure in step two, common to much of the macroeconomic literature in general, is that
it measures the reduced form combined effect of all shocks causing firm productivity, labor
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income, dividends, and consumption to co-move. Such results must be interpreted with caution,
especially in countries and times dominated by alternative (non-productivity) shocks.21
The procedure adopted in the current section allows to partially deal with this issue. In
particular, it requires a combination of firm-level microeconomic data and sectoral accounts
macroeconomic data in order to construct an instrument for the shock variables used in the
prior analysis. For this purpose, I apply a simple version of the approach developed by Gabaix
and Koijen (2019), summarized below.
4.6.1 Econometric Model
Gabaix and Koijen (2019) develop a framework which allows one to identify the causal effects
of one macroeconomic variable on another by exploiting the granular nature of the underlying
microeconomic data in a particular instrumental-variables (IV) setting. A simple variant of their
approach can be re-formulated as follows.
Assume a data generating process for an aggregate macroeconomic outcome (e.g., household
income or consumption), as in equation 4.7 (repeated below for convenience):
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct.
If gct and εct are still correlated with each other after factoring out country- and time-
invariant disturbances, than the coefficient β, estimated with OLS or with Guiso, Pistaferri and
Schivardi (2005) methodology (permanent and transitory effect identification) would be biased.
Suppose that this is in fact true and that there is ηct such that E [ηctgct] ̸= 0 and E [ηctεct] ̸= 0.
Since gct is a country-wide measure of output, value-added, or another aggregate variable, we
can write it as gct := gSct ≡
∑
i Sict−1gict, where Sict−1 are properly defined weights, e.g., if
gict = ∆ log ValAddict, than Sict−1 = ValAddict−1 (all summations should be understood as on
the by-country-time basis). Then, a simple process for gict can be written follows (ignoring fixed
effects for the moment):
gict = ηct + uict, (4.8)
where uict denote idiosyncratic firm-level shocks. When aggregating this equation up on a by-
country basis, we have:
gSct = ηct + uSct, (4.9)
21See also discussion and simulation results in (Hoffmann et al., 2019).
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where the residual is a weighted sum of firm-level residuals: uSct :=
∑
i Sict−1uict. Define










gict, respectively. The two can be easily shown to be related as
follows:
gEct = ηct + uEct, (4.10)
Then, as proved by Gabaix and Koijen (2019), zct := gSct − gEct = uSct − uEct is a valid
instrument for gct in equation 4.7, as it satisfies E [zctεct] = 0 (exogeneity) and E [zctgct] ̸= 0
(relevance).
Practically, the procedure can be performed in three steps.
First, estimate the idiosyncratic firm disturbances gict using a model in equation 4.5, i.e.
project out controls (e.g., changes in lagged firm size, leverage, and tangibility) and fixed effects
(firm and country-sector-time) from the log-differences of the shock variable (sales, value-added,
labor expense and dividends).
Second, construct granular residuals zct := gSct − gEct, using weights defined above. Note,
that at this stage the microeconomic dataset gets collapsed onto the country-year level.
Finally, estimate the coefficient β in equation 4.7 using zct as an instrument for gct. Note,
that technically, one can also estimate the effects of transitory and permanent shocks on yct, since
if zct as a valid instrument for gct, than zct+1 as a valid instrument for gct+1 and zct−1+zct+zct+1
as a valid instrument for gct−1 + gct + gct+1. Consequently, the pass-through coefficients with
respect to the two types of shocks of different persistence nature can be estimated in a two-step
IV procedure as before. The results below contain estimates for all types of shocks described
above, with the procedure measuring the combined effect of all shocks as a baseline.
4.6.2 Results
The procedure above is used to provide alternative estimates for regressions in Tables 4.5, 4.6,
4.8, and 4A.13. To this end, I use firm-level data on value-added to construct an instrument
for firm sector data on value-added, firm-level data on sales for firm sector data on output,
firm-level data on staff expense for firm sector data on labor expenditures, and firm-level data
on dividends for firm sector data on (adjusted) dividends.
The analysis is performed on the baseline sample of countries used with the macroeconomic
data (Europe-25) for the time period 1999–2019.
Having run some preliminary models, I have found out that using firm and country-sector -
time fixed effects yields the best first stage (despite reducing the sample due to relatively many
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single-firm-sectors in the data). As controls, I use log of firm size, as proxied by the book value of
assets, leverage (sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt over assets) and tangibility
(ration of property plant and equipment to assets).
Admittedly, the results for the first stage regressions turn out to be rather weak, as witnessed
by the estimates of the standard errors in column (1) in respective tables. Out of four shock-
instrument pairs, only labor payout regressions yield a mildly strong first stage (although still
with an F-statistic at only around 4). Given this fact, I only focus on the results from this
model in the main text, see Table 4.11. The other three sets of result (value-added, output, and
dividends) can be found in the Appendix, see Tables 4A.14–4A.16.
As seen in Table 4.11, fluctuations in the uninsured portion of firm labor payments have a very
strong impact on aggregate household wages (extensive margin), with a pass-through coefficient
of 97%, see column (2), total primary income (86%), see column (3), and consumption (98%),
see columns (6) and (7). All these coefficients are strongly statistically different from zero but
not different from one. Overall, these findings confirm the previous result throughout the paper
that the uninsured component of firm labor compensation is entirely transmitted to households
income and consumption. Moreover, one can observe the doubling of elasticities in reaction to
permanent shocks only, which, as opposed to transitory shocks, are well identified (first stage
F-statistics of above 30).
Regarding the non-significance of other results, a plausible explanation relates to the follow-
ing two factors. First, the firm-level dataset is based on fiscal years, while the national accounts
data uses calendar years. While one could use quarterly data from both sources to alleviate the
timing mismatch, higher frequency data have lower quality and, as mentioned before, introduces
timing problems for dividends. This observation can potentially explain an overall weak first
stage, i.e., also for wage regressions. A potentially more important concern is the mismatch be-
tween the boundaries of the firm and the national economies. Firms in the Compustat dataset
are all large and usually report their financial results on a consolidated basis. Thus, a globally
active firm located in one country reports sales, operating income, dividends and other financial
statistics based on its operations in all countries. In such case, while the procedure above can
still lead to correct results, the power of the instrument can decrease dramatically. Interestingly,
this explanation is consistent with the fact that the first stage of the labor expense-related regres-
sions is the strongest. While internationally active firms can generate sales and income abroad
easily, employees usually work and earn wages within the national boundaries. An interesting
avenue for future research would be to address these two explanations using supplementary data
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and strengthen the validity of the instruments to pin down the transmission of shocks to firm
value-added, sales and dividends.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a thesis that the way firms share income between workers and share-
holders is of first-order importance for the overall patterns of risk sharing in the economy. I did
so by using a combination of firm-level data from Compustat and sectoral accounts data from
Eurostat on a panel of advanced economies from 1999 to 2019.
I found that fluctuations in consumption are primarily driven by shocks to household labor
income and shielded from shocks to household dividend income. While the former are entirely
driven by the dynamics of firm-sector labor compensation, there is little evidence that household
dividend income follows firm sector dividend payout. Thus, firms play a pivotal role in providing
consumption insurance to households by shifting risk from workers to shareholders, as they
insure workers from transitory and permanent shocks to their output and value-added, while
shareholders are only insured from temporal but not from persistent shocks.
I conclude that risk sharing patterns on the macroeconomic level are crucially shaped by
the risk sharing within the firm. The main policy implication of this thesis therefore implies
the need to target firm-related outcomes and general firm payout policy directly, if households
are to be effectively insulated from the fluctuations in idiosyncratic and economy-wide shocks
to firm output. An example of such policies implemented recently has been the introduction of
furlough and other related schemes in many countries around the globe, including the United
States and Europe, as a response to the covid-19 pandemic. While time and future research will
show how effective these policies have been, the preliminary evidence does point to significant
positive effects concerning the response of the unemployment rate. Interestingly, countries often
supplement furlough policies with covenants that forbid affected firms and banks to pay out
dividend to their shareholders or implement share repurchase plans. Again, as the current
analysis shows, such an external shift in corporate payout policies on the level of individual
firms is probably the right thing to do as it stabilizes the channel through which risk affects
household income and consumption the most.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1. Compustat Data Summary Statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Asset 132,561 2.493 12.789 0.00000 0.030 0.884 728.695
Invest 128,604 0.140 0.790 −0.289 0.001 0.040 34.272
DivPay 91,019 0.063 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.012 33.870
Emp 99,992 9.195 41.072 0.001 0.200 4.702 2,300.000
Leverage 132,220 0.361 12.240 0.000 0.038 0.355 3,770.000
OpInc 132,358 0.292 1.557 −14.319 0.001 0.102 103.205
ShareRep 94,637 0.046 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.00004 63.270
Sale 132,561 1.862 9.643 0.00000 0.025 0.770 466.834
Tangibility 132,512 0.283 0.252 0.000 0.073 0.436 2.413
TotEqPay 91,019 0.111 0.796 0.000 0.000 0.022 74.816
ValAdd 50,376 0.642 10.947 0.00000 0.010 0.227 2,389.178
Wage 33,614 50.842 157.671 0.00005 28.347 62.433 17,935.710
LabPay 50,435 0.358 10.759 0.00000 0.005 0.112 2,389.177
OpExp 132,485 1.571 8.409 −0.078 0.025 0.642 439.850
∆ ln Asset 102,769 0.049 0.219 −0.684 −0.063 0.143 1.039
∆ ln Invest 97,962 0.011 0.871 −9.173 −0.352 0.391 10.258
∆ ln DivPay 31,313 0.056 0.585 −9.231 −0.027 0.192 7.218
∆ ln Emp 73,672 0.022 0.145 −0.571 −0.041 0.086 0.565
∆ ln OpInc 81,266 0.064 0.636 −7.762 −0.118 0.261 8.513
∆ ln ShareRep 13,988 0.001 1.794 −12.351 −0.746 0.827 11.171
∆ ln Sale 102,769 0.060 0.228 −0.858 −0.048 0.158 1.182
∆ ln TotEqPay 38,910 0.042 1.078 −11.300 −0.143 0.301 11.573
∆ ln ValAdd 36,978 0.055 0.233 −0.759 −0.056 0.167 0.883
∆ ln Wage 23,412 0.021 0.154 −0.956 −0.044 0.084 1.152
∆ ln LabPay 37,024 0.054 0.178 −0.603 −0.031 0.132 0.812
∆ ln OpExp 102,680 0.053 0.231 −4.775 −0.048 0.150 4.598
NOTES: This table presents summary statistics for the following sample of filtered Compustat data between
1999 and 2019: North America: United States and Canada; Global: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdomm and Switzer-
land. All variables in levels are in billion euros, except Emp (thousands), Wage (thousand euros), Leverage (ratio),
and tangibility (ratio). See main text Section 4.3.1 for details concerning variables definition. Source: Compu-
stat.
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Table 4.2. Eurostat Data Summary Statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
ValAddnf 500 266.050 385.259 3.154 24.826 258.763 1,935.517
OpIncnf 500 106.380 146.311 1.417 12.652 112.023 740.798
OpInchh 500 78.239 114.536 0.515 6.670 68.025 417.505
Inchh 500 359.954 540.110 3.254 27.948 292.541 2,521.100
DispInchh 500 382.152 563.890 3.889 30.357 321.683 2,508.702
Savinghh 500 39.560 69.697 −8.278 2.911 33.343 396.892
LabPaynf 500 156.388 237.845 1.727 14.334 148.066 1,209.830
LabPayhh 500 241.693 360.721 2.482 20.091 219.068 1,771.278
DivPaynfadj 500 42.052 68.083 −19.995 3.937 40.579 338.680
DivPaynf 500 45.510 71.655 0.140 4.207 44.288 334.962
DivPayhh 500 23.305 51.654 0.005 1.050 13.660 268.424
Outputnf 500 641.532 894.389 8.237 75.490 629.568 4,453.299
Conshh 500 350.077 509.949 3.690 28.708 297.910 2,171.482
Consreal,hh 500 388.730 562.157 6.587 29.750 295.660 2,098.753
Investnf 500 58.099 79.641 0.855 6.514 60.617 405.929
∆ ln ValAddnf 475 0.047 0.067 −0.222 0.021 0.077 0.429
∆ ln OpIncnf 475 0.047 0.089 −0.292 0.005 0.089 0.608
∆ ln OpInchh 475 0.035 0.067 −0.282 0.009 0.063 0.558
∆ ln Inchh 475 0.041 0.057 −0.258 0.017 0.064 0.274
∆ ln DispInchh 475 0.042 0.052 −0.208 0.018 0.062 0.234
∆ ln Savinghh 440 0.038 0.344 −2.280 −0.052 0.128 1.774
∆ ln LabPaynf 475 0.047 0.065 −0.318 0.019 0.076 0.345
∆ ln LabPayhh 475 0.044 0.059 −0.277 0.019 0.069 0.326
∆ ln DivPaynfadj 464 0.066 0.268 −1.696 −0.068 0.186 1.509
∆ ln DivPaynf 475 0.069 0.253 −1.591 −0.039 0.159 1.471
∆ ln DivPayhh 475 0.051 0.324 −3.859 −0.038 0.132 2.197
∆ ln Outputnf 475 0.049 0.074 −0.282 0.016 0.085 0.271
∆ ln Conshh 475 0.042 0.052 −0.219 0.021 0.062 0.263
∆ ln Consreal,hh 475 0.020 0.047 −0.251 0.004 0.039 0.199
∆ ln Investnf 475 0.038 0.132 −0.736 −0.011 0.099 0.585
∆ ln HICP 476 0.022 0.019 −0.027 0.011 0.030 0.131
NOTES: This table presents summary statistics for the following sample of variables in log-differences from
Eurostat sectoral accounts data between 1999 and 2019: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. All variables in levels are in
billion euros. Superscripts refer to non-financial firms (nf) and households (hh). See main text Section 4.3.2 or
Eurostat manual (ESA2010 ) for details concerning variables definition. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.3. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.27∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 31,347 20,596 20,596 27,895 11,010 11,468 29,984
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.42∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.16) (0.20) (0.12)
Observations 16,036 10,562 10,562 14,579 6,012 6,272 15,388
F-stat (1 st.) 956.6 1209.3 1209.3 577.2 790.4 744.7 937.6
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.22∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ −0.19 −0.36 0.09
ValAdd†
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.20) (0.45) (0.47) (0.23)
Observations 22,007 14,123 14,123 19,836 8,080 8,416 21,062
F-stat (1 st.) 233.4 187.8 187.8 70.4 88.2 88.5 194.1
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and Canada). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4.4. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.39∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
Observations 31,385 20,607 60,771 66,295 25,791 31,404 79,642
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.53∗∗∗ 0.02 0.43∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06)
Observations 18,807 12,355 34,828 40,051 16,522 19,414 46,210
F-stat (1 st.) 4881.6 2826.3 3803.2 18082.6 8837.4 12468.1 5747.0
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.07 0.75∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗ 0.60 −0.91∗ 0.29 −0.77∗∗
Sale†
(0.10) (0.20) (0.08) (0.50) (0.54) (0.82) (0.31)
Observations 24,326 15,610 45,030 51,248 20,530 24,450 60,259
F-stat (1 st.) 34.6 28.4 47.3 9.9 25.6 40.6 20.5
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; perma-
nent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with
git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and Canada). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4.5. Shock Transmission within the Country (Value-Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LabPaynf OpIncnf DivPaynfadj LabPay
hh DivPayhh Inchh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.73∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
ValAddnf
(0.10) (0.07) (0.23) (0.09) (0.26) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 475 475 464 475 475 475 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.90∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.47 0.75∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
ValAddnf,†
(0.10) (0.08) (0.31) (0.09) (0.45) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 425 425 416 425 425 425 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 754.7 754.7 1032.7 754.7 754.7 754.7 754.7 754.7
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.80∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.01 0.62∗∗∗ 1.38 0.65∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
ValAddnf,†
(0.19) (0.20) (0.99) (0.18) (1.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Observations 450 450 440 450 450 450 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 50.8 50.8 45.7 50.8 50.8 50.8 50.8 50.8
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate non-financial firm sector’s value-added using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggre-
gate firm-sector value-added (ValAddnf). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct with gct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various country-sector outcomes in (i) aggregate non-
financial firms sector: labor expense (LabPaynf), sum of operating and mixed income (OpIncnf), and adjusted
dividends paid (i.e., less reinvested earnings) (DivPaynfadj); and (ii) aggregate household sector: labor income
(LabPayhh), dividend income (DivPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and
total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019.
Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered by country and
are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage.
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.6. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households (Labor Payout)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LabPayhh Inchh DispInchh Savinghh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.90∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
LabPaynf
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.38) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 475 475 475 440 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.92∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
LabPaynf,†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.62) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 425 425 425 393 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 1307.8 1307.8 1307.8 877.7 1307.8 1307.8
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.86∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 2.00∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
LabPaynf,†
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (1.16) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 450 450 450 417 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 36.8 36.8 36.8 13.5 36.8 36.8
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate non-financial firm labor compensation using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector labor compensation (LabPaynf). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct with gct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
labor income (LabPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving
(Savinghh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items
HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom).
Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations
and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
98
Table 4.7. Shock Transmission within the Household (Labor Payout)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inchh DispInchh Savinghh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.88∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
LabPayhh
(0.02) (0.03) (0.41) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 475 475 440 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.85∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
LabPayhh,†
(0.03) (0.03) (0.63) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 425 425 393 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 1241.1 1241.1 687.8 1241.1 1241.1
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.83∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 1.70 0.86∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
LabPayhh,†
(0.06) (0.09) (1.19) (0.09) (0.15)
Observations 450 450 417 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 29.2 29.2 11.1 29.2 29.2
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate household labor income using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggre-
gate household labor income (LabPayhh). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct with gct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving (Savinghh), total actual
consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base year 2015.
Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clus-
tered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic
from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.8. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households (Dividend Payout)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DivPayhh Inchh DispInchh Savinghh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.49∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
DivPaynfadj
(0.20) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 464 464 464 429 464 464
Panel B: PERMANENT




(0.28) (0.04) (0.04) (0.35) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 412 412 412 380 412 412
F-stat (1 st.) 38.2 38.2 38.2 36.7 38.2 38.2
Panel C: TRANSITORY




(0.45) (0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 438 438 438 405 438 438
F-stat (1 st.) 72.6 72.6 72.6 24.9 72.6 72.6
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate non-financial firm dividend payments using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector adjusted dividend payments (DivPaynfadj). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct
with gct+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household
sector: dividend income (DivPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), ad-
justed saving (Savinghh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using
all-items HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United
Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number
of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.9. Shock Transmission within the Household (Dividend Payout)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inchh DispInchh Savinghh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
DivPayhh
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 475 475 440 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.09∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.75 0.06 0.07∗
DivPayhh,†
(0.04) (0.04) (0.46) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 425 425 393 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 41.0 41.0 9.1 41.0 41.0
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.03∗ 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.01
DivPayhh,†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 450 450 417 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 82.2 82.2 17.6 82.2 82.2
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate household dividend income using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
household dividend income (DivPayhh). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct with gct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving (Savinghh), total actual
consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base year 2015.
Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered
by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from
the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.10. Shock Transmission within the Household (Entrepreneurial Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inchh DispInchh Savinghh Conshh Consreal,hh
Panel A: COMBINED
0.63∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
OpInchh
(0.05) (0.05) (0.34) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 475 475 440 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.75∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
OpInchh,†
(0.05) (0.05) (0.54) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 425 425 393 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 597.3 597.3 1758.2 597.3 597.3
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.77∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.50 0.87∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
OpInchh,†
(0.14) (0.16) (1.59) (0.15) (0.16)
Observations 450 450 417 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 19.8 19.8 11.4 19.8 19.8
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate household entrepreneurial income using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggre-
gate household entrepreneurial income (OpInchh). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct
with gct+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is
used in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate house-
hold sector: total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving (Savinghh),
total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base
year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4.11. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households Using the Identification from the
Firm-Level Data (Labor Payout)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





0.97∗∗ 0.86∗ 0.63 −5.00 0.99∗∗ 0.98∗∗
LabPaynf,†
(0.48) (0.48) (0.41) (3.22) (0.43) (0.43)





1.79∗ 1.85∗ 1.16 −5.68 1.92∗∗ 1.87∗∗
LabPaynf,†
(1.05) (1.04) (1.03) (10.08) (0.92) (0.92)
Observations 246 246 246 246 235 246 246





9.30 8.00 6.98 80.96 3.89 3.64
LabPaynf,†
(15.92) (14.82) (13.41) (155.55) (9.44) (9.66)
Observations 312 277 277 277 264 277 277
F-stat (1 st.) − 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the instrumented-variables estimation of the effect of permanent, tran-
sitory and combined shocks to aggregate non-financial firm labor compensation using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector labor compensation (LabPaynf). I use an instrument for LabPaynf, denoted zct, constructed as
granular residual of LabPay from the firm-level dataset as follows: zct := gSct − gEct, where gict are idiosyncratic
shocks obtained by projecting out firm effects, country-sector-time effects and controls: growth rate of lagged firm
total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility (see main text for details). I denote the
fitted values from this stage as g̃ct = ˜LabPayct. The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with
(
g̃ct−1 + g̃ct + g̃ct+1
)
and transitory effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with g̃ct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
labor income (LabPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving
(Savinghh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items
HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom).
Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations
and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 4.1. Households Income and Consumption
































































NOTES: The figure plots main components of aggregate households’ income: primary income (Inc), adjusted dis-
posable income (DispInc), sum of operating and mixed income, or “entrepreneurial income” (OpInc), compensa-
tion of employees (LabPay), distributed income of corporations (DivPay), and net interest income (Intrecv−Intpaid);
and actual final consumption (Cons). Panels correspond to 12 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Years are on the
x -axis. All data are in billion euros. Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 4.2. Number of Firms in Compustat Sample by Country
Europe
North America





































NOTES: The figure plots the number of firms with non-missing observations for Sale for a sample of Compustat
North America and Compustat Global firms over time, with fiscal years (fyear) are on the x -axis. Countries in




Table 4A.1. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, Europe-25)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.27∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 26,913 16,800 16,800 23,897 9,238 9,247 25,631
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.42∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
Observations 13,537 8,389 8,389 12,268 4,945 4,945 12,920
F-stat (1 st.) 781.0 879.8 879.8 459.2 618.6 618.6 772.7
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.23∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ −0.07∗ 2.86∗∗∗ −0.73 −0.69 0.15
ValAdd†
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.22) (0.52) (0.46) (0.25)
Observations 18,729 11,318 11,318 16,845 6,728 6,730 17,837
F-stat (1 st.) 190.4 131.7 131.7 55.1 67.8 67.8 156.0
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay), total
equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sam-
ple: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clus-
tered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic
from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.2. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, Europe-25)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.38∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 26,948 16,811 25,942 38,259 13,722 13,732 42,224
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.52∗∗∗ 0.01 0.50∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 16,132 10,027 15,938 24,006 8,972 8,973 26,015
F-stat (1 st.) 4155.4 2441.6 3442.1 19601.0 3114.4 3114.4 17063.9
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.12 0.64∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ 0.17 −2.94∗∗ −2.86∗∗ −1.38∗
Sale†
(0.09) (0.19) (0.21) (0.68) (1.21) (1.18) (0.71)
Observations 20,930 12,701 19,707 30,242 11,163 11,166 32,928
F-stat (1 st.) 37.5 36.1 25.5 6.8 20.5 20.5 19.2
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with git+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay), wages
(Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay), total
equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sam-
ple: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clus-
tered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic
from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.3. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, Europe-10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.26∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 13,756 8,365 8,365 12,321 4,407 4,407 12,973
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.41∗∗∗ 0.05 0.37∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.25) (0.25) (0.17)
Observations 7,808 4,741 4,741 7,105 2,661 2,661 7,379
F-stat (1 st.) 612.3 315.2 315.2 391.3 617.0 617.0 642.4
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.17∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ −0.83 −0.86 0.48
ValAdd†
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.40) (0.62) (0.62) (0.34)
Observations 10,219 5,942 5,942 9,252 3,465 3,465 9,633
F-stat (1 st.) 154.1 191.1 191.1 24.3 80.6 80.6 109.3
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay), total
equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample:
Europe-10 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of
observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.4. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, Europe-10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 13,777 8,368 12,061 17,319 5,900 5,901 18,577
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.49∗∗∗ −0.01 0.53∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
Observations 8,762 5,392 7,847 11,309 4,034 4,035 12,038
F-stat (1 st.) 5739.4 1034.1 1379.5 4410.1 860.8 860.8 5916.0
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.31∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ 0.07 −5.50 −5.55 −0.88
Sale†
(0.12) (0.30) (0.31) (1.21) (3.58) (3.61) (0.83)
Observations 11,013 6,504 9,387 13,982 4,963 4,964 14,883
F-stat (1 st.) 17.7 13.7 18.2 8.4 4.1 4.1 45.2
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with git+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in
the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-10 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported
are number of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.5. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, Europe-14)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.27∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 23,443 15,792 15,792 20,771 8,795 8,802 22,335
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.43∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
Observations 12,024 7,941 7,941 10,886 4,712 4,712 11,460
F-stat (1 st.) 1437.0 750.5 750.5 820.3 636.2 636.2 1391.3
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.22∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ −0.06 3.05∗∗∗ −0.82 −0.79 0.31
ValAdd†
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.27) (0.54) (0.48) (0.27)
Observations 16,482 10,678 10,678 14,801 6,413 6,414 15,693
F-stat (1 st.) 319.0 114.6 114.6 57.4 63.7 63.7 201.7
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-14 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered by
country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from the
first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.6. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, Europe-14)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.40∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 23,467 15,796 23,972 31,371 12,918 12,926 34,890
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.53∗∗∗ 0.002 0.51∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 14,010 9,422 14,671 19,458 8,396 8,397 21,191
F-stat (1 st.) 6563.6 2792.7 3599.2 9512.0 3098.7 3098.7 19548.0
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.18∗ 0.66∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ 0.33 −3.28∗∗ −3.18∗∗ −1.15
Sale†
(0.11) (0.20) (0.24) (1.35) (1.37) (1.33) (0.88)
Observations 18,153 11,926 18,169 24,620 10,479 10,481 27,012
F-stat (1 st.) 37.5 31.4 24.5 4.3 17.6 17.6 12.1
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with git+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in
the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-14 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered by
country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from the
first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.7. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, Europe-14-plus)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.28∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 27,877 19,588 19,588 24,769 10,567 11,023 26,688
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.43∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.16) (0.20) (0.13)
Observations 14,523 10,114 10,114 13,197 5,779 6,039 13,928
F-stat (1 st.) 1694.7 1114.0 1114.0 994.8 800.2 749.6 1583.4
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.21∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ −0.25 −0.42 0.22
ValAdd†
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.46) (0.48) (0.25)
Observations 19,760 13,483 13,483 17,792 7,765 8,100 18,918
F-stat (1 st.) 408.1 169.3 169.3 77.4 83.5 83.7 263.2
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure
is used in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses
(LabPay), wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends
(DivPay), total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019.
Country sample: Europe-14-plus (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland,
United States, and Canada). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also
reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.8. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, Europe-14-plus)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.41∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
Observations 27,904 19,592 58,801 59,407 24,987 30,598 72,308
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.54∗∗∗ 0.01 0.43∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07)
Observations 16,685 11,750 33,561 35,503 15,946 18,838 41,386
F-stat (1 st.) 6956.5 3160.3 3401.9 11066.0 8193.6 12331.0 4011.8
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.10 0.78∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ 0.88 −0.96∗ 0.33 −0.62∗
Sale†
(0.12) (0.21) (0.08) (0.66) (0.56) (0.84) (0.32)
Observations 21,549 14,835 43,492 45,626 19,846 23,765 54,343
F-stat (1 st.) 31.4 24.6 42.9 5.5 22.3 35.7 17.0
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with git+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay), wages
(Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay), total eq-
uity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample:
Europe-14-plus (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States, and
Canada). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number
of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.9. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, Firm and Country-Sector-Year
Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.27∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.15) (0.17) (0.06)
Observations 17,121 11,549 11,549 15,073 5,864 6,170 16,412
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.47∗∗∗ 0.05 0.47∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 1.30∗ 1.82∗ 1.22∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.69) (1.03) (0.33)
Observations 7,565 5,169 5,169 6,825 2,761 2,927 7,264
F-stat (1 st.) 225.1 142.2 142.2 205.1 155.4 109.6 210.7
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.26∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ −0.12 3.03∗∗∗ −1.54 −1.77 0.15
ValAdd†
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.34) (1.30) (1.53) (0.36)
Observations 11,124 7,380 7,380 9,937 3,968 4,186 10,663
F-stat (1 st.) 123.8 111.7 111.7 107.4 9.6 12.5 107.4
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µcst + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µcst is a country-sector-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes
lagged growth rate of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the
residual git measures the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated
with simple OLS; permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by
instrumenting git with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation
procedure is used in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff
expenses (LabPay), wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc),
dividends (DivPay), total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample:
1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and
Canada). Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of
observations and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.10. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, Firm and Country-Sector-Year Fixed
Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.37∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
Sale
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.03)
Observations 19,967 13,410 48,553 48,966 19,178 24,456 60,948
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.59∗∗∗ −0.04 0.39∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.46 1.11∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.11) (0.27) (0.39) (0.11)
Observations 10,930 7,352 26,022 27,531 11,514 14,180 32,849
F-stat (1 st.) 1011.3 617.1 3956.0 8028.7 1806.5 2094.8 2366.9
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.22∗ 0.61∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 0.35 0.66 −0.51∗
Sale†
(0.12) (0.23) (0.07) (0.42) (0.63) (1.00) (0.31)
Observations 14,769 9,697 34,792 36,409 14,679 18,315 44,382
F-stat (1 st.) 44.7 23.3 328.7 25.4 61.5 112.1 72.7
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µcst + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µcst is a country-sector-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged
growth rate of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git
measures the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 1999–2019. Country
sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and Canada). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.11. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Value-Added, 2005–2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.27∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
ValAdd
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 28,559 18,250 18,250 25,415 9,701 10,072 27,333
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.41∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
ValAdd†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.16) (0.20) (0.13)
Observations 14,923 9,697 9,697 13,549 5,496 5,708 14,340
F-stat (1 st.) 876.3 987.6 987.6 548.2 912.0 963.4 866.8
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.22∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 2.74∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.35 0.16
ValAdd†
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.19) (0.39) (0.45) (0.23)
Observations 20,229 12,667 12,667 18,230 7,237 7,506 19,385
F-stat (1 st.) 253.3 176.9 176.9 86.2 88.5 90.9 212.5
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm value-added (ValAdd). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git
with git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure
is used in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses
(LabPay), wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends
(DivPay), total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 2014–
2019. Country sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and Canada).
Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations
and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.12. Shock Transmission within the Firm (Sales, 2005–2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LabPay Wage Emp OpInc DivPay TotEqPay Invest
Panel A: COMBINED
0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
Sale
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03)
Observations 28,590 18,258 50,943 57,075 22,278 26,741 67,709
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.52∗∗∗ 0.02 0.43∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
Sale†
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07)
Observations 17,449 11,298 29,600 34,550 14,368 16,659 39,471
F-stat (1 st.) 6129.5 2587.4 5655.8 18192.7 1619.8 3453.6 13294.7
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.12 0.63∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗ −1.12∗ −0.16 −0.80∗∗
Sale†
(0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.44) (0.58) (0.78) (0.31)
Observations 22,291 13,933 37,799 44,189 17,823 20,860 51,313
F-stat (1 st.) 45.0 39.6 44.2 19.1 33.1 44.0 28.5
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to firms’ value-added using the following specification:
∆yit = βgit + X
′
itγ + µi + µct + εit,
where µi is a firm fixed effect; µct is a country-year fixed effect; the vector of controls includes lagged growth rate
of firm total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility; and the residual git measures
the unexplained growth in firm sales (Sale). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; perma-
nent effects—by instrumenting git with (git−1 + git + git+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting git with
git+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used
in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to various firm outcomes in log-differences: staff expenses (LabPay),
wages (Wage), number of employees (Emp), operating income before depreciation (OpInc), dividends (DivPay),
total equity payout (TotEqPay), and fixed capital expenditures (Invest). Time sample: 2005–2019. Country
sample: Europe-25-plus (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom; plus Switzerland, United States and Canada). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Compustat.
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Table 4A.13. Shock Transmission within the Country (Output)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LabPaynf OpIncnf DivPaynfadj LabPay
hh DivPayhh Inchh Conshh Conshh,real
Panel A: COMBINED
0.82∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
Outputnf
(0.07) (0.12) (0.29) (0.07) (0.26) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 475 475 464 475 475 475 475 475
Panel B: PERMANENT
0.93∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.65 0.77∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
Outputnf,†
(0.08) (0.12) (0.39) (0.07) (0.45) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 425 425 416 425 425 425 425 425
F-stat (1 st.) 2184.2 2184.2 1576.1 2184.2 2184.2 2184.2 2184.2 2184.2
Panel C: TRANSITORY
0.61∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.16 0.44∗∗∗ 0.94 0.45∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
Outputnf,†
(0.17) (0.36) (1.05) (0.17) (1.30) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
Observations 450 450 440 450 450 450 450 450
F-stat (1 st.) 47.7 47.7 18.0 47.7 47.7 47.7 47.7 47.7
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the estimation of the effect of permanent, transitory and combined
shocks to aggregate non-financial firm sector’s output using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the unexplained
growth in aggregate firm-sector output (Outputnf). The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS;
permanent effects—by instrumenting gct with (gct−1 + gct + gct+1) and transitory effects—by instrumenting gct
with gct+1. The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure
is used in the corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various country-sector outcomes in (i)
aggregate non-financial firms sector: labor expense (LabPaynf), sum of operating and mixed income (OpIncnf),
and adjusted dividends paid (i.e., less reinvested earnings) (DivPaynfadj); and (ii) aggregate household sector: labor
income (LabPayhh), dividend income (DivPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), total actual consumption (Conshh),
and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–
2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard errors are clustered by country and
are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and the F-statistic from the first stage.
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4A.14. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households Using the Identification from the
Firm-Level Data (Value-Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ValAddnf LabPaynf OpIncnf DivPaynfadj LabPay





0.81 1.88 −12.08 0.08 6.61 −0.87 0.25 −0.45
ValAddnf,†
(3.90) (5.74) (16.47) (3.54) (9.96) (3.46) (3.37) (3.32)





−6.22 12.10 −16.54 −9.56 −19.73 −9.45 −5.28 −6.07
ValAddnf,†
(10.22) (14.36) (39.41) (9.77) (33.48) (9.51) (8.77) (9.34)
Observations 246 246 246 240 246 246 246 246 246





41.02 1.30 80.88 43.65 71.29 31.62 31.12 27.85
ValAddnf,†
(29.27) (22.91) (85.95) (30.44) (77.09) (26.90) (23.65) (22.40)
Observations 312 277 277 270 277 277 277 277 277
F-stat (1 st.) − 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the instrumented-variables estimation of the effect of permanent, tran-
sitory and combined shocks to aggregate non-financial firm-value added using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector value-added (ValAddnf). I use an instrument for ValAddnf, denoted zct, constructed as granular
residual of ValAdd from the firm-level dataset as follows: zct := ValAddSct−ValAddEct, where gict are idiosyncratic
shocks obtained by projecting out firm effects, country-sector-time effects and controls: growth rate of lagged firm
total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility (see main text for details). I denote the
fitted values from this stage as g̃ct = ˜ValAddct. The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with
(
g̃ct−1 + g̃ct + g̃ct+1
)
and transitory effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with g̃ct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
labor income (LabPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving
(Savinghh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items
HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom).
Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations
and the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4A.15. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households Using the Identification from the
Firm-Level Data (Sales / Output)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outputnf LabPaynf OpIncnf DivPaynfadj LabPay





1.06 1.38 −1.92 1.14∗ −2.58 1.40∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.13∗∗
Outputnf,†
(0.66) (1.00) (2.70) (0.61) (2.30) (0.61) (0.57) (0.56)





1.03 0.89 −1.12 1.25 1.71 1.67∗ 1.35 0.61
Outputnf,†
(1.16) (1.48) (5.27) (1.10) (4.60) (1.02) (0.90) (0.91)
Observations 306 306 306 300 306 306 306 306 306





−27.53 −5.98 −121.84 −28.83 −141.03 −33.93 −27.90 −18.69
Outputnf,†
(45.32) (20.85) (213.37) (47.30) (200.52) (53.59) (44.20) (31.50)
Observations 364 334 334 327 334 334 334 334 334
F-stat (1 st.) − 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the instrumented-variables estimation of the effect of permanent, tran-
sitory and combined shocks to aggregate non-financial firm output using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector output (Outputnf). I use an instrument for Outputnf, denoted zct, constructed as granular residual of
Sale from the firm-level dataset as follows: zct := SaleSct − SaleEct, where gict are idiosyncratic shocks obtained
by projecting out firm effects, country-sector-time effects and controls: growth rate of lagged firm total assets,
lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility (see main text for details). I denote the fitted values
from this stage as g̃ct = S̃alect. The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent effects—by
instrumenting g̃ct with
(
g̃ct−1 + g̃ct + g̃ct+1
)
and transitory effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with g̃ct+1. The “dagger”
in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the corresponding
panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector: labor income
(LabPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving (Savinghh),
total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items HICP with base
year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom). Standard
errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations and
the F-statistic from the first stage. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4A.16. Shock Transmission from Firms to Households Using the Identification from the
Firm-Level Data (Dividend Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DivPaynfadj DivPay









(2.92) (0.30) (0.30) (2.04) (0.28) (0.28)









(3.64) (0.77) (0.73) (4.14) (0.62) (0.66)
Observations 171 171 171 171 169 171 171









(9.97) (3.46) (3.20) (22.20) (3.57) (3.23)
Observations 222 192 192 192 190 192 192
F-stat (1 st.) − 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.5
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country clusters Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
NOTES: This table reports the results of the instrumented-variables estimation of the effect of permanent, tran-
sitory and combined shocks to aggregate non-financial firm dividends using the following specification:
∆yct = βgct + µc + µt + εct,
where µc is a country fixed effect; µt is a year fixed effect; and the residual gct measures the growth in aggregate
firm-sector dividends (DivPaynfadj). I use an instrument for DivPay
nf
adj , denoted zct, constructed as granular
residual of DivPay from the firm-level dataset as follows: zct := DivPaySct−DivPayEct, where gict are idiosyncratic
shocks obtained by projecting out firm effects, country-sector-time effects and controls: growth rate of lagged firm
total assets, lagged change in leverage, and lagged change in tangibility (see main text for details). I denote the
fitted values from this stage as g̃ct = ˜DivPayct. The combined effects are estimated with simple OLS; permanent
effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with
(
g̃ct−1 + g̃ct + g̃ct+1
)
and transitory effects—by instrumenting g̃ct with g̃ct+1.
The “dagger” in the “shock” variable refers to the fact that a two-step IV estimation procedure is used in the
corresponding panels. Columns refer to log-differences in various outcomes for the aggregate household sector:
labor income (LabPayhh), total primary income (Inchh), adjusted disposable income (DispInchh), adjusted saving
(Savinghh), total actual consumption (Conshh), and total actual real consumption (Consreal,hh) using all-items
HICP with base year 2015. Time sample: 1999–2019. Country sample: Europe-25 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom).
Standard errors are clustered by country and are reported in parentheses. Also reported are number of observations




Channels of Risk Sharing in the Eurozone:
What Can Banking and Capital Market Union Achieve?
A3.1 Introduction
The first decade of the euro saw a considerable drive towards deeper de jure and de facto
financial integration of the eurozone with concomitant increases in risk sharing. However, the
euro’s second decade revealed that risk sharing mechanisms were fragile when they were most
urgently needed. During the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis that
followed, risk sharing between eurozone countries all but dried up so that divergent output
growth led to divergent consumption growth. We revisit the channels and mechanisms through
which improved risk sharing was achieved in the years from 1999 to 2008, and we examine which
channels were fragile and which were resilient during the crisis. From the insights of this exercise,
as well as from the historical patterns of risk sharing between U.S. states and from a stylized
quantitative-theoretical DSGE model, we draw policy lessons for the euro’s third decade, in
particular with respect to banking and capital market union in Europe.
Following a large academic literature in macroeconomics, we define “risk sharing” as the
ability of a country to insulate its consumption from shocks to its own output, after controlling
for the component of output growth that is common across countries. Based on this definition,
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) were the first to provide an empirical taxonomy of how
different broad channels contribute to risk sharing among U.S. federal states. They showed
that income smoothing through cross-state income flows (such as dividends and interest) is the
dominant mechanism of risk sharing among U.S. states, more important than both consump-
tion smoothing through pro-cyclical saving (“consumption smoothing”) or fiscal transfers. We
organize our empirical analysis following this approach and we study the behavior of these risk
sharing channels in simulated data from a DSGE model, which has not been done previously in
the literature.
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The inception of the euro led to increased risk sharing between eurozone countries, but from
a low level and mainly through pro-cyclical saving. Income smoothing improved somewhat,
see Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2005), but remained low, mainly reflecting that cross-
border ownership of equity remained low. EU institutions provide little risk sharing because
there are almost no fiscal transfer mechanisms between eurozone members. The pattern of risk
sharing in the pre-crisis eurozone was very different from the pattern of risk sharing prevailing
in a long-established monetary, capital market, and banking union such as the United States,
where income smoothing plays a dominant role.
The main contributions of this paper are, first, to update previous work on risk sharing
in the eurozone to the first 20 years of the euro; second, to construct a DSGE model which
makes precise the interpretations of the risk sharing channels and; third, to demonstrate that
the nature of banking integration in the eurozone is important for understanding channels of
risk sharing in the EMU during our sample period; and, fourth, to study different scenarios for
equity and banking market integration using our model. Simulations of the model suggest that
equity (or capital market) union and banking union are complementary.
Figure A3.1 illustrates how the inception of the euro led to a boom in cross-border interbank
integration (which did not happen to the same extent in other parts of the world). However,
during the crisis the retrenchment in cross-border interbank flows in the eurozone was stronger
than the retrenchment found for other industrialized countries. By contrast, while the growth in
cross-border lending to the non-bank sector was more muted before 2008, it was stable through-
out the crisis. Our empirical results suggest that direct cross-border lending had risk sharing
benefits similar to the those resulting from cross-border ownership of equity, while interbank
lending had little impact on risk sharing.
While interbank lending appeared to be a partial substitute for direct lending before 2008,
it was much less robust than direct lending during the crisis. We find that the collapse in
interbank lending was associated with a collapse in consumption smoothing after 2008 and
that this explains why risk sharing virtually dried up during the sovereign debt crisis. Direct
banking integration, by contrast, is associated with better income risk sharing in the data.
Income smoothing also proved to be the more resilient risk sharing channel during the crisis.
We argue that the lack of direct banking integration (together with the absence of equity market
integration and the limited role of bond market integration for most European firms) explains
why risk sharing in the eurozone failed when it was most needed.
Our DSGE model assumes that firms and banks face financial frictions and profits of firms are
shared internationally in proportion to the degree of international equity market integration. We
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keep the model simple by assuming that, among others, equity market integration is exogenous,
because our focus is on the mapping of financial and banking integration to risk sharing. In
the model, firms have to pre-finance wage payments and investment using either long-term
bank loans or more expensive short-term finance from other sources. Importantly, the model
features two sources of bank finance for firms and consumers: direct cross-border loans from a
pan-European integrated bank and loans from local banks. Local banks refinance themselves
through the interbank market. In the model, there are three sources of uncertainty: shocks
to idiosyncratic total factor productivity (TFP), funding shocks for a global bank, and spread
shocks for local banks. This setup allows us to explain the patterns observed in the data. As
direct banking integration increases, consumers will be better shielded from idiosyncratic interest
rate fluctuations caused by (global or local) shocks hitting local banks. Because banking-sector
shocks likely were more important than TFP shocks during the crisis period, and because direct
banking integration was low, this can explain why consumption smoothing declined so sharply.
In our model, direct banking integration enables firms and consumers to by-pass local banks
and gives them access to the EMU-wide borrowing rate—in effect, firms and households take out
insurance against shocks to the local banking sector. By insulating the firm from country-specific
variation in lending rates, direct banking integration mitigates the real impact of local banking
sector shocks on output and thus on dividend and labor income. This contributes to smoothing
of consumers’ income and thus lowers the need for consumption smoothing ceteris paribus. This
corresponds to our empirical finding that direct bank-to-nonbank integration shifts risk sharing
patterns towards more income smoothing.Importantly, by insulating the economy from local
banking sector shocks, direct banking integration also provides more stable risk sharing than
interbank integration in times of crisis.
An important question for the future design of the European banking union is to what extent
the drop in risk sharing in Europe was caused by global banking sector shocks (that played out
in heterogeneous ways because countries had different degrees of exposure to them) or by local
banking sector shocks. Our model can provide insights on this issue. As discussed above,
the data suggest a general drop in consumption smoothing in the eurozone during the crisis.
However, among northern member countries, this drop in consumption smoothing is partially
offset by better income smoothing while income smoothing declines among southern members.
Our model can encompass these differential risk sharing patterns once we assume that banking
shocks in the north were predominantly of a global nature, whereas in the south there was an
important local component.
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The pattern of cross-country banking integration in the eurozone prior to the crisis is remi-
niscent of the nature of interstate banking integration in the United States prior to state-level
banking deregulation. In spite of there being a well-integrated interbank market among U.S. fed-
eral states, prior to deregulation banks were generally not allowed to enter markets outside the
state in which they were headquartered. The inception of the euro established a well-integrated
European interbank market: country spreads on bank credit default swaps were almost zero in
the years before the crisis and, as evidenced by Figure A3.1, cross-border interbank flows grew
very fast. But even though entry into other markets in the eurozone was formally allowed, few
banks entered retail markets in other member countries and the extent of cross-border lending to
the non-bank sector remained limited; see also the discussion in Hoffmann, Maslov and Sørensen
(2017).22 In the United States, banks consolidated across state borders following deregulation
and started to operate internal (within-bank) capital markets. Morgan, Rime and Strahan
(2004) show that this contributed to lower business cycle volatility across U.S. states because
local banking sector shocks could more easily be dampened by inter-state banking flows. De-
myanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) study
risk sharing following U.S. banking integration and show, using reduced form regressions, that
banking integration contributed to more income smoothing and made risk sharing more resilient
in recessions when it is most needed. We believe that the U.S. experience helps understand how
banking integration in Europe may have to proceed in order to provide robust risk sharing and,
in particular, to prevent future “freezes” in risk sharing during crises.
The accounting framework of Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) has been widely used,
starting with Sørensen and Yosha (1998), who study risk sharing among OECD and EU coun-
tries. These studies suggest that the main reason for the lack of international risk sharing is the
almost complete absence of cross-border income flows. The lack of international income smooth-
ing correlates closely with the home bias in cross-border asset holdings, see Sørensen et al. (2007),
in particular at longer horizons, see Artis and Hoffmann (2011). It also explains why U.S. states
are better at sharing permanent idiosyncratic shocks with each other, see Becker and Hoffmann
(2006).23 An important contribution of this paper is that it provides a quantitative-theoretical
22Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro (2010) document that de facto legal implementation of financial
integration was uneven after the inception of the euro.
23Empirical tests of full risk sharing were first designed for micro data by Townsend (1994), Mace (1991), and
Cochrane (1991), and for macro data by Canova and Ravn (1996), Obstfeld (1993), and Lewis (1996). Theoretical
benchmark models for macroeconomic data were developed by Baxter and Crucini (1995), who highlight the
difference between capital market integration (cross-ownership of assets) and credit-market integration (integrated
bond markets), where only the former provides insurance against permanent shocks, and Backus and Smith (1993)
and Kollmann (1995), who generalize the Arrow-Debreu benchmark model to include non-tradeables. A large
body of quantitative models attempt to explain risk sharing patterns, starting with Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1992); see for example Heathcote and Perri (2004), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008), Coeurdacier, Rey and
Winant (2015), and many others. This large body of work has delivered many theoretical insights.
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underpinning of the decomposition suggested by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) in the
form of a DSGE model.
To our knowledge, ours is also the first paper to draw attention to the role of banking inte-
gration (as opposed to equity and general credit or bond market integration) for consumption
risk sharing in the EMU. Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro (2010) study the determi-
nants of banking integration in the EU (and its impact on output synchronization) and find that
regulatory harmonization caused higher banking integration in the EU and that the stabilization
of exchange rates in itself was a main determinant of financial integration. Their results point to
the important role of banking integration in the eurozone but their focus is not on consumption
risk sharing.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013) study the role of banks in the transmission
of international business cycles, and they interpret their results by constructing a simple DSGE
model, much as we do. As in Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013), our model incorpo-
rates global and local banks but as in Hoffmann, Maslov and Sørensen (2017), we further allow
local banks to borrow from a global bank delivering a distinction between direct and interbank
cross-border lending. Using a version of the model, calibrated to eurozone data, we can replicate
the empirical observations that direct banking integration leads to more income smoothing and
that declines in interbank lending leads to a decline in consumption smoothing. An important
corollary insight from our model is that direct banking integration and equity market integra-
tion complement each other. This complementarity arises because bank lending allows firms
to finance labor and investment from loans rather than other expensive (intraperiod) funds.
Thus, banking integration partially breaks the negative correlation between dividend and labor
income that provides a fundamental rationale for home bias in models with capital, as pointed
out by Heathcote and Perri (2013). This decoupling also contributes to making labor income
less sensitive to country-specific shocks, thus improving risk sharing by alleviating the part of
income risk (associated with labor income) that is not internationally tradeable.
Our analysis also relates to Martin and Philippon (2017), who use a stylized model of the
eurozone to disentangle the relative contributions of credit cycles, excessive government spend-
ing, and sudden stops to the dynamics of eurozone economies before and after the financial
crisis. Like theirs, our model features local banking sector shocks as exogenous increases in
the borrowing costs of individual economies. Our model abstracts from the role of government
spending, but it has a more detailed financial market structure than their model. This allows us
to study the different mechanisms through which banking and equity market integration affect
risk sharing.
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While our results hold potentially important insights for the design of banking union and
suggest that banking union “done right” may at least partly substitute for equity market inte-
gration, we do not discuss details of the political economy of banking union. We also largely
abstract from the role of fiscal smoothing, fiscal integration, and its relation to sovereign debt.
The literature on the European sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the Great Recession has
been discussed by many others; for a survey, see Lane (2012).
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows: we first document how the patterns of
risk sharing evolved prior to and after the onset of the Great Recession. We then correlate these
patterns with measures of equity and banking market integration. In a separate subsection,
we zoom in on why risk sharing during the crisis collapsed and discuss the roles of fiscal aus-
terity, emergency liquidity assistance by the European Central Bank, and widening TARGET2
positions. A key innovation of this paper is that we focus on the role of international banking
flows for risk sharing; distinguishing, in particular, between the role of interbank and direct
(bank-to-nonbank) cross-border positions. To gain a better understanding of why the nature of
banking integration matters for risk sharing outcomes, we develop a stylized DSGE model of the
eurozone in which we can benchmark the impact of capital market integration (leading to more
cross-border ownership of equity) and the impact of various patterns of banking integration
(bank-to-bank lending via an interbank market or bank-to-real sector lending via cross-border
branching) on channels of risk sharing. Comparing our empirical results with the results from
simulated model data allows us to derive policy conclusions and implications for the design of
banking and capital market unions.
A3.2 Channels of Risk Sharing in the Eurozone
A3.2.1 Empirical framework
In the benchmark model with one tradeable good, the optimal “full risk sharing” allocation is
one where “idiosyncratic” (deviation from aggregate) consumption growth rates are not affected
by other idiosyncratic shocks such as changes in income or output (see, e.g., Cochrane (1991)).















run on a sample of representative agents (countries in our case), where Ckt is real per capita
consumption in country k in period t, GDP kt is “real country output” (deflated gross domestic
product) per head and the asterisk denotes the aggregate per capita value of the respective
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variable.24 The terms τUt, δ
k
U , and ε
k
Ut are time- and country-fixed effects and an error term,
respectively. Under full risk sharing, βU is zero, as consumption only covaries with aggregate
output. If βU is not zero, the value can be interpreted as the share of idiosyncratic output risk
that is “not shared” by the average country in our sample. In empirical data, the estimated
value of βU is regularly between 0 (“full risk sharing”) and unity (“no risk sharing”). 1 − βU
can then be interpreted as the share of the average country’s idiosyncratic output risk that gets
diversified away.
To better understand what drives departures from the full-risk sharing allocation, we want
to know through which channels risk sharing is achieved. Sørensen and Yosha (1998) have
adopted a framework proposed by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) that allows us to
explicitly identify several broad channels of international risk sharing. Here, we refer to these
channels as income smoothing, depreciation smoothing (of little interest because depreciation is
mainly imputed), international transfers smoothing, and consumption smoothing. The method
of Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) is based on a decomposition of the cross-sectional





































where g̃dp, g̃ni, ñni, and ñndi denote the logarithms of gross domestic product, gross national
income (GNI), net national income (NNI), and net national disposable income (NNDI) of each
country, divided by the aggregate value of the group of countries studied, respectively. We focus
on the idiosyncratic, country-specific component of all variables, because the countries in the
sample may face common shocks that cannot be insured by definition. Taking the covariance
with ∆g̃dp
k
t on both sides, dividing by the variance of ∆g̃dp
k
t , and rearranging, we get
βI + βD + βF + βC = 1− βU ,
24As a technical aside, we define “aggregate” to mean aggregated over the countries in our sample (so we do not
study if these countries share risk with, say, the United States). Time-fixed effect absorb any aggregate variation,
so the normalization with the starred variables is redundant in this regression, but it plays a role in regressions














































The five coefficients βI , βD, βF , βC , and βU are the coefficients from OLS regressions on
GDP growth and are interpreted as a decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of country-
specific output growth. The coefficient βU is the same as in the basic regression (A3.1) above
and measures the fraction of a typical country output shock that remains unshared, while the
coefficients βI , βD, βF , and βC provide a breakdown into the contribution of different channels
of risk sharing.
We refer to the first channel, captured by βI , as income smoothing. Gross national income
reflects all income flows to a country, whereas GDP measures the quantity of goods and services
produced in the country. The wedge between the two variables is net factor income flows and
βI measures to what extent these cross-country income flows buffer a country’s income against
fluctuations in its output.
The difference between gross national income and net national income is capital depreciation,
whereas the wedge between net national income and disposable net national income represents
international net transfers. The coefficients βD and βF therefore indicate to what extent capital
depreciation and international transfers help smooth disposable income after a shock to output.25
Finally, a country’s residents or its government may save or dissave after observing disposable
income. We refer to this channel as consumption smoothing, and we denote its contribution to
overall risk sharing with βC .
25We include these channels for the completeness of variance decomposition, but will skip them in our analysis
which is focused on the financial markets channels.
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At a practical level, the pattern of risk sharing (β= [βI , βD, βF , βC , βU ]) can easily be esti-




















































where the coefficients δkX and τXt capture country-specific and time fixed effects (for X =
I,D, F,C, U, respectively).26 Note that the last equation is just the basic risk sharing regression
(A3.1). Each of the channels can be estimated separately by least squares with the same results as
a system regression because the equations constitute a “seemingly unrelated regression system”
with identical regressors.
The set of regressions (A3.2) assumes that βX is time-invariant. In a next step, we augment
our setup (following Sørensen et al. (2007)) to allow the whole pattern of risk sharing to vary
over time and across countries. Specifically, we parameterize βX as a function of variables
that measure different aspects of financial integration for each country. We start with total
cross-border lending so that





where TBkt−1 measures total cross-border lending in country k at time t − 1 (relative to GDP)
and TBt−1 is the average across countries of TB
k
t−1 at time t − 1. The interaction terms are
lagged one period in order to be predetermined in period t. The pattern of risk sharing is




measures the amount of income smoothing obtained by country k in period t with total cross-
border lending TBkt−1. The parameter bI measures how much higher-than-average bank lending
increases the amount of income smoothing obtained. Technically, the first term in (A3.3) is
found as the coefficient to output while the second term is found as the coefficient to output





For completeness, we further decompose the consumption smoothing channel—which is pos-
itive when saving is pro-cyclical—into the contributions from government and private saving.
26The decomposition of shocks to output is cross-sectional, but Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) show that
the coefficients from the panel regressions are weighted averages of cross-sectional regressions when a time-fixed
effect is included.
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We do not model the behavior of governments, but because fluctuations in governments’ deficits
(negative saving) are very large, it is important to quantify their roles in consumption smooth-










. Because this expression is linear in saving, one can trivially break it
up into government and private saving components and, as the OLS-coefficient to GDP is linear
in the dependent variable, break up the amount of consumption smoothing into the parts that
result from government and private saving, respectively.
We perform a similar analysis using the sub-components of total bank lending—bank-to-bank
cross-border lending and bank-to-nonbank cross-border lending—and equity (E), all normalized
with GDP.
A3.2.2 Data
We use quarterly data for gross domestic product, gross national income, net national income,
net national disposable income, and consumption from Eurostat for the period 1999–2013. Our
group of countries is limited to 10 long-standing EMU-member countries due to data availability,
and we exclude Ireland and Luxembourg because of the particular structure of capital flows in
these financial hubs. As a control group, we use non-EMU countries that are members of the
EU.27 We calculate real per capita values of g̃dp, g̃ni, ñni, ñndi and c̃ by deflating with the
respective national harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) and using population data
published by Eurostat. Because quarterly data can be noisy, we study annual growth rates of
these variables by taking differences between quarter t and t − 4, so that ∆x = log (Xt/Xt−4)
for x =
[
g̃dp, g̃ni , ñni , ñndi, c̃
]
throughout the paper. Public saving is net saving of general
government provided by the OECD. We calculate total saving as the difference between net
national disposable income and consumption and private saving as the difference between total
saving and public saving.
Our measures of cross-border total lending (TB), interbank lending (bank-to-bank, B2B), and
direct lending (bank-to-non-bank, B2N) (from all reporting countries) for each of the countries
in the sample are from the locational banking statistics of the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS). We normalize the lending data by the GDP of the receiving country. Foreign portfolio
equity assets are from the dataset of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) extended till 2011. An
alternative to using the locational statistics might be to use the consolidated statistics available
at the BIS. However, we believe that to understand the role of direct and interbank integration
for risk sharing in the eurozone, it is important to account for the “double-decker” structure of
27The countries in the EMU sample are Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal and non-EMU Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK.
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the global banking system emphasized by Hale and Obstfeld (2014) and Bruno and Shin (2015).
So the locational banking statistics are preferable for our purpose.28
A3.2.3 Empirical results
Table A3.1 displays the results from estimating the channels decomposition (A3.2), for EMU and,
for a comparison, non-EMU countries. The first line presents results for the entire sample period
1999–2013. From column (5), βU is estimated at 0.81 for EMU countries, and our interpretation
is that 81 percent of shocks to output remain uninsured across these countries. From column (1),
βI is estimated at 0.09, implying that cross-country factor income flows contribute 9 percent to
cross-country risk sharing. In column (4), βC is estimated at 0.25, with the interpretation that
saving and dissaving smooth 25 percent of shocks. International transfers play a very limited
role over the entire sample period, see column (3). The depreciation coefficient βD is large at
negative 15 percent—as can be seen from the second and third rows, this is driven by the post
2008 data but because depreciation is mainly imputed, we do not explore this variable in detail.
The “non-EMU Europe” sample is not a focus here but the results show that both income
smoothing, see column (6), and consumption risk sharing, see column (9), are insignificant
during this period. Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Sørensen et al. (2007) found no income risk
sharing in the OECD outside of the EU before the EMU and the significant amount of income
risk sharing in the EMU following 1999 is presumably due to increased financial integration in
the euro area.
In the second and third lines, we split the sample by periods; namely, the first decade of
the euro (1999–2008) and the European sovereign debt crisis and its aftermath (2009–2013) and
focus on the EMU countries. A salient feature of the results is a clear drop in risk sharing after
2008. Before 2008, about 62 percent of idiosyncratic output risk was shared as the coefficient
for non-smoothed in column (5) is 38 percent, but after 2008 less than 20 percent of risk was
shared with 81 percent left unsmoothed. Turning to the channels that drive this freeze in risk
28To see why, consider the example of a U.S. bank lending to a German headquartered bank which then lends
the same amount to an Italian non-financial firm. In both the locational and the consolidated statistics, the loan
by the American to the German bank would count as an interbank liability of Germany to the United States
and the loan to the Italian firm as a direct (B2N) liability of Italy to Germany. If the American bank instead
lends to its German subsidiary which then arranges the loan to an Italian firm, the loans would still appear as
an interbank liability of Germany and a B2N liability of Italy in the locational data, whereas in the consolidated
statistics, the loan would only appear as a direct (B2N) liability of Italy to the United States. Hence, in this case
the double-decker structure of banking integration would be lost in the consolidated data, even though the loan is
intermediated through Germany by a legally independent subsidiary of a U.S. bank. If, as happens in our model
below, refinancing conditions for banks based in Germany worsen during a financial crisis, this will have knock-on
effects on lending to southern European countries. Looking at the consolidated statistics would therefore tend
to understimate the degree of commonality in cross-border lending into Germany and cross-border lending into
southern Europe. On the other hand, we acknowledge that locational statistics might provide a distorted picture
of banking integration for some obvious financial centers such as Luxembourg and the UK. These two countries
are not included in our sample.
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sharing, we find that the drop in consumption smoothing, see column (4), accounts for almost
20 percentage points of this decline. Again, we find the international transfer channel to be
negligible in both subperiods, while the depreciation channel accounts for most of the remaining
decline in risk sharing.29 There is a drop in income smoothing in column (1), but income
smoothing is imprecisely estimated for the individual subperiods.
In summary, the panel regressions in Table A3.1 reveal a clear drop in international risk
sharing among EMU countries after the crisis, associated in particular with a considerable decline
of consumption smoothing. This pattern is also revealed by the results obtained from the period-
by-period cross-sectional risk sharing regressions for income and consumption smoothing that
we report in Figure A3.2: consumption smoothing drops sharply during the crisis while income
smoothing remains stable at a low level.
In trying to understand these patterns, our analysis focuses on the possibility that direct
bank-to-nonbank flows affect risk sharing differently and through different channels than inter-
bank flows. We document the empirical facts here, which we will interpret in a more structural
way using the model in the next section. Specifically, we will argue that prior to 2008, the
longer-term trends in banking integration improved risk sharing outcomes, and that this hap-
pened mainly through direct cross-border lending. Conversely, during the crisis, financial market
seized and risk sharing collapsed, mainly through a collapse in consumption smoothing. We il-
lustrate these points in Tables A3.2 and A3.3.
Table A3.2 displays the amount of income and consumption smoothing and the fraction
of shocks left unsmoothed as a function of cross-border bank lending for the EMU countries
for the period prior to 2009 using time-varying coefficients, confer regression (A3.3). The key
innovation relative to earlier studies is that we look at the risk sharing implications of interna-
tional bank lending and, in particular, at the distinction between direct (bank-to-nonbank) and
indirect cross-border (interbank) lending. We display only the important coefficients that are
interpreted as income smoothing, consumption smoothing, and total fraction unsmoothed. For
the regressions with interaction terms, such as (A3.3), we show results only for the pre-crisis
subsample. Post-2008 results for these regressions are much weaker and we provide them in an
appendix. In regressions on simulated data from our model calibrated to the post-2008 period,
we verify that the regressions with interaction terms deliver much weaker results due to the
simultaneous occurrence of banking sector crises in several EMU countries.
29In the remaining empirical analysis as well as in our theoretical model, we abstain from examining these
channels further. As we see in the data, the fiscal channel is of very limited importance in our sample. As regards
the depreciation channel, its procyclicality during the crisis is to a large extent a mechanical function of past
capital investments.
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The regressions presented in the first three columns of Table A3.2 consider the role of total
banking positions (relative to GDP). The first result is that higher cross-border banking liabilities
relative to GDP are not associated with significantly higher risk sharing. The second block of
regressions in columns (4)-(6) provides similar results when we consider the role of bank-to-bank
liabilities. Because bank-to-bank positions are larger than bank-to-nonbank flows these results
are very similar to those obtained for the total lending. Columns (7)-(9) display results when
the risk sharing coefficient is allowed to vary with bank-to-nonbank liabilities. We observe a
significant positive impact of income smoothing with more direct banking integration, while the
impacts on the other risk sharing components are not significant, although the coefficient to
consumption smoothing is negative. This reflects that all coefficients measure risk sharing as
a fraction of GDP-shocks and if income is more smooth relative to GDP there is less of a role
for further smoothing. The last block of channels regressions, columns (10)-(12), considers B2B
and B2N lending in a single regression. Here, the role of cross-border liabilities is even more
significant for income smoothing and B2N lending significantly affects the total amount of shocks
not smoothed (βU ), although the very large effect on amount not smoothed is sensitive to the
inclusion of B2B-lending and therefore may be somewhat affected by multicollinearity. The role
of B2B lending remains insignificantly related to risk sharing when we control for direct B2N
lending so this effect is robustly estimated. Interestingly, cross-border bank liabilities impact risk
sharing primarily via the income smoothing channel, not via consumption smoothing, in line with
the findings in Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sørensen (2007) and Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-
Stewen (2011) for the United States. This suggests that the conventional interpretation of the
income and consumption smoothing channels as being associated with capital and credit markets,
respectively, needs elaboration and we will provide an interpretation using our quantitative-
theoretical model.
The quantitative impact of direct banking integration on risk sharing implied by our esti-
mates in Table A3.2 is considerable. In our pre-2008 sample, Italy has an average ratio of direct
cross-border lending to GDP of around 0.1, whereas for the Netherlands this average is 0.76. The
estimated coefficient on B2N interaction term in column (10) of Table A3.2 is 0.55. This implies
that a change from the level of direct banking integration in Italy to the level in the Netherlands
would increase income smoothing in Italy by 35 percentage points ((0.76− 0.1)× 0.55 = 0.35).
The upshot of the results in Table A3.2 is that the risk sharing benefits from cross-border
banking liabilities are mainly associated with direct B2N lending, at least during the pre-crisis
period. Once direct B2N lending is controlled for, interbank B2B lending does not seem to have
a positive impact on risk sharing and, if anything, is associated with lower risk sharing. Another
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key feature of the results for this period is that the impact of direct lending on risk sharing
mainly works through the income smoothing channel. This is very similar to what we would
expect the impact of equity diversification on risk sharing to be. To understand this pattern
better, Table A3.3 compares the impact of banking flows on risk sharing to that of equity.
The first three columns of Table A3.3 confirm the intuition that countries with higher equity
(portfolio) claims relative to GDP indeed experience more risk sharing and, specifically, more
income smoothing, as indicated by the coefficient to equity interacted with output in column
(2).30 When we add bank-to-bank liabilities into the regression in columns (4)-(6), the coefficient
to the equity interaction becomes larger but more imprecisely estimated and the impact of equity
on overall risk sharing is strongly positive, according to the second line of column (6). Bank-
to-bank liabilities correlate with a higher amount of shocks unsmoothed; i.e., with less risk
sharing. When we include both equity and direct cross-border bank-to-nonbank positions into
the risk sharing regressions, the equity interactions are insignificant as is the interaction with
B2N lending (except for the amount left unsmoothed). This happens because of collinearity
between equity assets and direct banking liabilities. We therefore run a fourth set of regressions,
in which we include the sum of equity claims and bank-to-nonbank liabilities. In this regression,
the combined term has a significant positive impact on income smoothing, see column (9),
last line and a positive (though insignificant) effect on overall risk sharing as witnessed by the
negative coefficient to the amount unsmoothed in column (11). We interpret these regressions as
evidence that there is an important common component driving the cross-sectional heterogeneity
in these two variables. We explore this issue with our DSGE model below.
The estimates in Table A3.3 imply economically important effects of banking and equity
market integration on risk sharing. Pre-2008 equity holdings as a fraction of GDP in Italy
averaged around 20 percent, whereas for the Netherlands the corresponding number was 60
percent. Taking the numbers for pre-2008 average B2N liabilities as a fraction of GDP from
our discussion of Table A3.2 above, we get that the sum of equity positions and B2N liabilities
was around 1.35 times GDP in the Netherlands and 0.4 times GDP in Italy. According to the
estimated coefficients in the last row of columns (10) and (12) of Table A3.3, a change of equity
and banking integration from the level of Italy to the level of the Netherlands would result in
an increase in income smoothing of 36 percentage points and an increase in overall risk sharing
of 26 percentage points ((1.35− 0.4)× 0.38 = 0.36 and (1.35− 0.4)× 0.28 = 0.26 ), respectively.
30Results for FDI claims or the sum of FDI and portfolio claims are qualitatively similar.
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A3.2.4 The collapse in risk sharing during the crisis
Our results so far suggest that direct banking integration was associated with a shift towards
more income smoothing while the drop in risk sharing during the crisis mainly happened through
a collapse of the consumption smoothing channel. In this subsection, we examine the sources of
this collapse in more detail.
In Table A3.4, we estimate the decomposition of risk sharing on two subgroups of countries:
the “southern” EMU countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that were hit hardest by
the crisis and and the remaining “northern” EMU countries in our sample. In addition to our
baseline channel decomposition, we decompose the consumption smoothing channel, βC , into
two separate components: private consumption smoothing and government saving. As before,
we do not display results for the channels of international transfers and depreciation.31
The results in Table A3.4 show that, before the crisis, the estimated value of 8 percent for
βI in column (1) implies that income smoothing was limited in the South. Quite differently
for the northern countries, the estimated value of βI is 24 percent, implying a high level of
income smoothing, consistent with high gross international equity positions. From the second
row in the table, income smoothing for the northern countries remained stable during the crisis,
as one would expect for risk sharing from ownership diversification, while it went to 0 (with
a negative point estimate) for the southern countries. Overall consumption smoothing in the
South was at 37 percent before 2009 as calculated from the sum of the coefficients in columns (2)
and (3), while the corresponding number for the North was 56 percent. However, consumption
smoothing dropped steeply in both groups after 2008, to a level of virtually zero in the South
and 26 percent in the North.
Zooming in on the composition of consumption smoothing in terms of private smoothing
and government saving, we find that private consumption smoothing dropped for both groups,
see columns (3) and (7), where the drop is from 12 percent to –4 percent for the South and
from 28 percent to 3 percent for the North (although these coefficient are all insignificant). For
the southern countries, the decline in risk sharing was exacerbated by a collapse of smoothing
through government saving, with the coefficients in column (2) implying that governments in the
South went from absorbing 25 percent of shocks to absorbing 5 percent, while the corresponding
drop in the North was an economically insignificant drop from 28 to 23 percent (cf. column
(6)). While the coefficients are not statistically significant due to the small sample, this pattern
31We regress the logarithm of one plus the ratio of the private (public) saving on the growth rate of GDP
allowing for time-fixed effects. As shown in Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini and Sørensen (2014), this method is based on
a linearization and delivers two coefficients that approximately add up to the estimated amount of consumption
smoothing and therefore provides a decomposition of consumption smoothing into the parts originating from
government and private saving.
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corroborates and extends (on a longer post-crisis sample) the findings of Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini
and Sørensen (2014), who argue that the southern EMU members had very little fiscal space in
the boom years prior to the crisis, and they had to curtail government expenditure very quickly
during the crisis because public saving could go no further negative. Fiscal consolidation resulted
in countercyclical increases in government saving, worsening the asymmetric impact of the crisis
on consumption in the southern EMU economies. Overall, the large decrease in overall risk
sharing after 2008 found in Table A3.1 is mechanically explained by the severe drop in risk
sharing in the southern economics (column (4)), while the drop in the northern economies is
only 8 percent according to the point estimates in column (8).
Comparing the temporal patterns in Figures A3.1 and A3.2, it is apparent that both inter-
bank positions and risk sharing collapsed rapidly during the crisis. This suggests that the two
phenomena might be linked. In our regressions for the crisis period reported in the appendix,
the link between cross-border bank positions and risk sharing is imprecisely estimated, though.
As discussed above, this is likely to the dominant aggregate variation in the data during the
crisis period. An additional reason could be that our data on interbank positions do not include
the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the European Central Bank (ECB), which at
least partially substituted for private interbank lending. This could have mitigated the drop in
consumption smoothing after 2008, at least in the short-run. While it would be interesting to
explore this issue empirically, to our knowledge, detailed country-by-country data on the volume
of emergency liquidity assistance from the ECB are not publicly available.32
From these considerations, it is not surprising that we are unable to identify significant cross-
sectional links between cross-border lending and risk sharing during the crisis using relatively
high-frequency (i.e., quarterly) data. In order to illustrate the relations between risk sharing and
banking integration during the crisis years with our data, we take a simple approach and focus
on longer-term changes in risk sharing and bank positions. To this end, we obtain estimates of
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32One may suspect that these emergency flows found their direct reflection in widening TARGET2-positions
within the eurozone and, therefore, that TARGET2 positions could be associated with better risk sharing. How-
ever, TARGET2 liabilities are at best a very indirect reflection of ELA flows. As shown by Whelan (2014) and
Whelan (2017) widening TARGET2 balances during 2008-2012 mainly reflected the capital flight that plagued
countries like Greece, Italy, and Portugal during the crisis. If residents of crisis-hit countries transfer funds from
their home accounts to core countries like Germany or if they buy German assets, this transfer automatically is
registered as a TARGET liability of the crisis country and as a TARGET2 credit for Germany. We would not
expect capital flight to be correlated with better but, if anything, with worse risk sharing, because it is endogenous
to crisis conditions and this is indeed what we find if we include a country’s TARGET2 liabilities as an interaction
with idiosyncratic GDP in our risk sharing regressions.
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where 1k is a country-dummy for country k and post2008 is a dummy indicating the crisis
period from 2009–2013. We estimate this regression for our entire sample 1999–2013. In this
specification, the coefficient γkU can be interpreted as the change in total risk sharing of country k
between the pre-2008 and post-2008 periods. A high (low) value of γkU will signal a large (small)
increase in the unsmoothed component; i.e., a drop (increase) in risk sharing for the respective
country. For each country in our sample, Figure A3.3 plots our estimates of γkU against the change
in the pre- and the post-2008 average of a country’s B2N and B2B positions respectively (with
each mean taken relative to the cross-country average position during the respective period).
The figure reveals that regressions that include interactions with banking integration are unlikely
to give statistically significant results because the decline in our measures of banking integration
are quite similar across countries, making it hard to identify effects. However, from the figure
we can still observe a negative cross-sectional relation between γkU and changes in the B2B
position, whereas there does not appear to be a link between changes in B2N and changes in the
unsmoothed component. These findings are tentative, due to the limitations of the data, but
they support our conjecture that the drop in interbank positions is an important factor behind
the decline in risk sharing after 2008.
A3.3 A Theoretical Model
We construct a model which provides an explicit interpretation of our results. The study of
risk sharing channels has been motivated by economic intuition in the literature, but here we
document how a model can explain the patterns—in particular, we highlight the interactions
between equity market integration and banking integration in the form of either bank-to-bank
or bank-to-real sector, which are less obvious to interpret without a model. The purpose of the
model is to study the effects of financial integration, rather than to determine the optimal extent
of financial integration, so we take equity and banking market integration as exogenous, and we
assume that the banking sector faces exogenous financing shocks.
The model has several layers of financial frictions that interact with equity and banking
market integration to generate the patterns we observe in the data. First, firms need to pre-
finance investment and wages. Second, to obtain finance, firms have a choice between bank
loans and other more expensive loans (which we do not model in detail). Third, firms cannot
substitute between loans provided by local banks and a global bank. Fourth, households have
a choice between borrowing from local or global banks and, fifth, local banks face frictions in
borrowing from the global bank in interbank markets. While these features of the model are
stylized and introduced in a deliberately ad hoc fashion, the model provides an interpretation
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of the channels of risk sharing identified from our empirical regressions. The regressions in the
previous section should not be interpreted in a causal way, but they provide statistics that we
will attempt match with the To the extent that we can successfully do that, the model will
provide a causal interpretation of our empirical results.
Agents and markets
Figure A3.4 provides a stylized outline of our model. There are two open economies, each
populated by a representative household H, a firm F, and a local bank LB. The (small) home
country represents one of the 10 EMU countries in our sample, while the (large) foreign country
represents the “rest of the EMU.” Additionally, there is a global bank, GB, which operates in
the two countries (EMU) and has access to wholesale funding B from the rest of the world.
The global bank lends to local banks through the EMU-wide interbank market (B2B) and it
lends directly to firms in each country (B2N). Local banks use funds obtained through the
interbank market to lend to households and firms in their country of residence only. Households
own shares in firms in both countries; i.e., equity markets are (partially) integrated. Firms are
subject to shocks to TFP, the global bank is subject to funding shocks, and local banks a subject
to “intermediation shocks.”




where Yt, θt, Kt−1, Nt, and α denote output, TFP, capital (at the end of the previous period),
labor, and capital intensity, respectively. Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment
and maximize the present discounted value of their dividends:
max







where Λfirmt:t+s is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) that the firm uses to discount its future
profits (at horizon s). It is a weighted average of the SDFs of the home and the foreign households
(as determined by the respective Euler equations).33 Dividends are defined as:






+ Lt − Lt−1(1 + r
l
t−1)− Ftι,
33In particular, Λfirmt:t+s = (1 − λ)Λt:t+s + λ (µΛt:t+s + µ
∗Λ∗t:t+s), where Λt:t+s is the household SDF, a *-
superscript denotes the foreign country, λ is the share of foreign equity in the country’s equity portfolio, and
µ is the relative country size (see more details on these parameters in the subsection introducing households).
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where Wt is wages, It is investment, Lt is total bank borrowing, r
l
t is the bank lending rate, Ft
denotes funds raised within the period from other domestic sources (about which we are not
specific), ι is the net interest rate (cost) on this borrowing, and φIt is a quadratic adjustment









. The law of motion for aggregate capital is
given by Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + It, and both capital and investment are produced out of the final
good.34
Firms need to borrow in order to finance their operating expenses; i.e., the wage bill and
investment. Firms can satisfy a fraction ϕ of their financing needs using one-period bank loans.
The rest of their financing needs has to be satisfied with within-period (i.e., short-term) finance
as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The identity for external finance is thus
Lt + Ft =WtNt + It,
where Lt = ϕ (WtNt + It) are one-period bank loans and Ft = (1− ϕ) (WtNt + It) are short-
term funds. Short-term funds are raised from an un-modeled non-bank financial sector which
we assume is competitive but inefficient so that non-bank intermediation costs ι are so high that
firms will always prefer to borrow from banks. Thus, a higher ϕ leads to overall lower cost of
funds for the firm and a larger share of firm finance coming from banks, so firms’ exposure to
banking sector shocks increases directly with ϕ.
Firms obtain bank loans from global and local banks and they cannot substitute one source
of bank credit for another in response to exogenous shocks. This reflects that global and local
banks have different business models. Large international banks engage mainly in arm’s-length
lending, while local banks engage mainly in relationship-lending.35 For tractability, we assume
that a fixed fraction τ of total loan demand is satisfied by loans from the global bank, while the
rest has to be financed locally: LGBt = τLt and L
LB
t = (1− τ)Lt. This setup implies that an
effective interest rate that firms pay on their total bank loans (Lt) is a weighted average of the
interest rates demanded by global (rl,GBt ) and local (r
l,LB




t + (1− τ) r
l,LB
t .
Direct banking integration manifests itself in an increase in τ and thus a shift of the composition





, for the model to
approximately match the amount of risk sharing achieved by this channel in the data (in pre-crisis times).
35The relationship-based business model arguably gives local banks a comparative advantage in lending to
relatively opaque borrowers such as SMEs, which constitute a large fraction of firms in the countries in our
sample—about 60 percent on average, measured by value added. Long-term relationships with local banks allow
firms to borrow even in circumstances in which arm’s-length lenders might not provide credit. However, during
a long-term relationship local banks acquire information about the firm which leads to the well-known hold-up
problem (Sharpe (1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1994)), which makes it difficult for the borrowing firm to move
away from the local bank. These considerations suggest that loans from global and local banks are imperfect
substitutes from the point of view of the borrowing firm, and the borrowing technology captures this imperfect
substitutability in reduced form.
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of loans from local banks to the global bank and a higher weight for the EMU-wide interest rate
in bank loans to firms (i.e, a lower role for the idiosyncratic fluctuations in domestic lending
rates). The opposite holds for indirect banking integration, which increases the supply of loans
from the local bank.
Banks In each country, there is a local (domestic) bank and local households own a constant
fraction of the global bank. Local banks fund themselves by borrowing from the global bank
while the global bank hasaccess to funds in a global money market (which we do not model).
This setup is meant to reflect the structure of the double-decker banking integration that was
characteristic for the eurozone in the years before the crisis, as documented by Bruno and Shin
(2015) and Hale and Obstfeld (2014). In particular, big French, German, and Dutch banks
borrowed in the U.S. money market, while southern European local banks borrowed short-term
from global northern European banks. Some authors, such as Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and
Perri (2013), allow for local banks (which only service one sector) and global banks (which service
a separate sector) in each country. Our assumptions, however, capture the particular structure
of lending in the eurozone and allow our model to predict how different types of international
bank lending affects channels of risk sharing.
The local bank provides loans to firms, LLBt , and to households, H
LB
t , and raises funds in the




The local bank is owned by domestic households and maximizes expected discounted profits.
Given the intratemporal nature of the problem, its objective can be reformulated as maximizing
















where rh,LBt is the interest rates on local bank loans to households. The last term, φ
LB
t , is a
quadratic “adjustment cost” in interbank markets, modeled as a function of the relative deviation








. This term reflects
the difficulty for banks to undertake short-term changes in their funding structure through
international interbank markets. In the presence of asymmetric shocks to loan demand and/or
supply, adjustment costs lead to different borrowing costs in the two countries. From the point of
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view of the households, this drives a wedge between their respective borrowing rates, and hence
their stochastic discount factors. This implies that their expected consumption growth paths
deviates which we measure as a decline in consumption smoothing. Additionally, this formulation
prevents unreasonable unit-root dynamics in interbank loans, known to be otherwise a feature
of this type of models (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)).
The global bank provides funds to firms, LGBt , and households, H
GB
t , in both countries and
additionally lends in the interbank market, Mt. It refinances itself through wholesale funding in










where an asterisk (*) indicates the foreign country. Its objective is to maximize total expected



























where rl,GBt and r
h,GB
t denote interest rates on global bank loans, extended to firms and house-
holds, respectively, rmt is the interbank lending rate, and r
b
t is the cost of financing in the global
interbank market. Because the global bank is owned in constant proportions by the home and
foreign households, total profits ΠGBt are disbursed to households in both countries based on
ownership shares µGB and µGB
∗
= 1− µGB.36
The global bank is exposed to lending conditions in the rest of the world through exogenous
fluctuations in the supply of funds, Bt, offered in the global money market. In particular, a
drop in the global supply of money market funds raises the interest rate rbt until demand equals
supply, which transmits to lending conditions to firms and households in both countries. The two
countries effectively share the consequences of this shock through the internal capital markets
of the global bank; i.e., through the change in the composition of LGBt , H
GB
t , and Mt between
countries.
Both global and local banks possess market power, as credit is extended to firms in a mo-
nopolistic competition environment. We do not explicitly model the microeconomic mechanism
behind it and refer the reader to any model in which a Dixit–Stiglitz framework is applied to
36These ownership shares are calculated as long-run shares of revenues that the global bank earns in a respective





the bank loan market; e.g., Gerali et al. (2010). The implication of market power is that banks
set mark-ups on their cost of funds when they extend credit to firms.37























MUGB and MULB denote firm-loan mark-ups set by global and local banks, respectively, with
the latter being larger because local banks have more market power for the reasons outlined
above, and lbst is a local banking shock which acts as a country-specific “wedge” between the
interbank rate and the household lending rate. This shock is mean-zero and idiosyncratic across
countries and shifts the respective loans supply schedules. In particular, a positive local banking
shock would result in local banks demanding higher interest rates as their cost of funds rises. Due
to the mark-up (MULB > 1), the effective spread for firms would rise and they would cut back
on production, employment, investment, and credit. The real effects of local banking shocks
are most pronounced in countries in which firms and households are particularly dependent on
credit from local banks (low B2N). As a result of the frictions, households in different countries
are not exposed to the same borrowing rates and therefore have diverging consumption growth
paths.
Households Households consume goods, produced in both countries, supply labor to firms,


















37Because firms are owned by the households, the effective friction from having to pre-finance the wage bill and
investment arises as a spread between the effective cost of external financing and the borrowing rate faced by the
households.
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where β is the discount factor, σ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ψ is the inverse Frisch
elasticity, and Ψ is the weight of labor disutility. Total labor, supplied by the household, is
denoted by Nt and is immobile across country borders, while Ct represents consumption of the
homogeneous tradeable good. We assume that international cross-ownership of firms is captured
by a parameter, λ, which measures an exogenously given degree of capital market integration
between the home and the foreign country. Specifically, (1 − λ) measures the exposure to the
home firms productive process, and µ = λY
λY+λ∗Y ∗ is the ratio of shares that the home household
owns in a world mutual fund. There will be home bias if the share λ is lower than the country’s
share of production.













where on the right-hand side total income is split between the total payroll, WtNt, dividend
payments from directly owning the home firm, (1 − λ)DIVt, dividend payments from holding the
diversified portfolio of firms, µ(λDIVt + λ
∗DIV∗t ) , and total profits from local and global banks,
ΠLBt−1+µ
GBΠGBt−1. The household can smooth consumption over time by taking loans from global





We assume that households, similarly to the firms, will satisfy a fixed fraction, κ, of their
total loan demand by taking a loan from the global bank, HGBt = κHt, and satisfy the rest
by loans from local banks, HLBt = (1− κ)Ht. The effective household borrowing rate, r
h
t ,





t + (1− κ) r
h,LB
t . The parameter κ measures the integration of consumer retail loan
markets and increases with direct cross-border lending and decreases with indirect cross-border
lending. A higher value of κ implies that households are less exposed to domestic lending
conditions through a better access to an EMU-wide interest rate, which shields them from
idiosyncratic banking shocks and domestic interest rate variability due to frictions in interbank
loan markets.
Models without additional frictions are known to produce positive responses of employment
and output to interest rate shocks, as a negative shock to discount factors leads to a decrease in
discounted lifetime wealth. An optimizing household responds by expanding its labor supply to
compensate for an increase in the marginal cost of consumption, such that in equilibrium em-
ployment rises on impact, as does output, while wages plummet. To counteract this mechanism,
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we introduce real wage rigidities in a reduced form as proposed by Blanchard and Gaĺı (2007),
as follows:
logWt = γ logWt−1 + (1− γ) logMRSt,
where MRSt is the implied marginal rate of substitution, arising from optimal choice of labor




t , and γ is the persistence parameter, which can be
interpreted as an index of real rigidities. This rigidity in real wages prevents an over-reaction
of wages and employment and achieves empirically consistent negative responses of labor and
output to an interest rate shock.
Market clearing Goods markets in each country clear according to:
Yt = Ct + It + Γt +NXt,
where Γt is total net costs present in the model, which can be thought of as part of gross real




t = Bt−1(1 + r
b
t−1)−Bt;
i.e., the sum of net exports of the both countries has to be equal to the net capital flows to the
rest of the world, intermediated by the global bank.
Further definitions Bank-to-real sector cross-border banking flows is the sum of loans from




t , while bank-to-bank cross-




t . The current account of each country is therefore








= − (∆B2Bt +∆B2Nt), and CAt + CA
∗
t = −∆Bt.
Aggregate GDP in the model is denoted by Yt. The difference between the current account
and net exports is equal to net interest payments from abroad, so gross national income, GNI,
is defined as GNIt = Yt + CAt − NXt. Net national income, NNI, is defined as GNI net of
depreciation of capital stock, namely NNIt = GNIt − δtKt−1. Because of the absence of fiscal
transfers in our model, NNI coincides with net national disposable income, NNDI.
To reproduce the empirical results, we also introduce a proxy for cross-border ownership of







38In our model, Γt is composed of the within-period funding cost of the firm, Ftι, and all (second-order)
adjustment costs.
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approximation arises from the fact that the “home” country is much smaller than the “foreign”
country and scaling (through a constant and ultimately, parameter νE) reflects that cross-border
holding of equity is only a fraction of the foreign firm’s assets.
Mapping the data to the model
We calibrate our model to replicate the channels of risk sharing regressions as estimated in
Table A3.1.
Forcing variables There are three major sources of shocks in our setup: shocks to total factor
productivity, shocks to local banks, and shocks to the global bank. The TFP processes for home
and foreign countries are given by:
log θt = ρ
θ log θt−1 + σ
θηt,
log θ∗t = ρ













The stochastic process for the global banking shock has the same realization in every country
and is given by
logBt = (1− ρ
gbs) logB + ρgbs logBt−1 + σ
gbsηgbst .






∼ N (0, 1), and correspond, respectively, to idiosyncratic
TFP shocks, idiosyncratic local banking shocks, and common global banking shocks. Scaling
of the variance of the shocks hitting the foreign country results from the assumption that they
represent a linear combination of mutually uncorrelated shocks to individual countries.
Calibration We calibrate the baseline model at the quarterly frequency using the parameter
values displayed in Table A3.5. The business cycle properties of the calibrated model are given
in Table A3.7. In particular, we present the standard deviations relative to standard deviation
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of GDP (except for net exports, which is a standard deviation of net exports-to-lagged-GDP
ratio in percentage points) and correlation with domestic GDP of consumption, investment,
employment, net exports, and GDP (absolute standard deviation in percentage points). All
statistics are obtained from applying the HP-filter to variables in logarithms.
The size of each “home” economy is normalized to one, while the size of the “foreign” country
is normalized to nine, the number of countries in the sample minus one, because it represents the
“rest of the EMU.” Regarding the parameters which are common for all countries, some of them
are standard in the literature and have been accordingly chosen. Households are net borrowers
and their discount factor β is set to 0.99, to match the steady-state quarterly interest rate
relevant to the households of 1 percent. The household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is
one, such that its instantaneous utility function is logarithmic with respect to the consumption
bundle. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity ψ in the utility function is set to 2, while the scale
parameter Ψ is calibrated separately for each country.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas with the capital intensity parameter α equal to
0.35, approximately corresponding to long-term share of capital in production in advanced
economies. We set the capital depreciation steady-state value δ to 0.025, and the investment
adjustment cost parameter φI to 4 to match the relative volatility of HP-filtered investment
with respect to GDP in the baseline. The cost of alternative sources of finance to firms (ι) is
set to 4 percent, which is twice as large as the steady-state consumer loans rate, to ensure that
bank credit is preferred to internal funds in normal times. The index of real wage rigidities, γ,
is set to 0.80, which is consistent with Blanchard and Gaĺı (2007) and allows us to match the
relative standard deviation of hours worked. We choose mark-ups of 3.5 and 2 for the loans
extended to firms by local (MULB) and global banks (MUGB), respectively. These values are
in line with the estimates in Gerali et al. (2010), while we choose a smaller mark-up for loans
from the global bank as those are usually applied to credit extended to larger firms and are not
subject to the same discretionary price setting as loans to small and medium-sized firms.
The heterogeneity across simulations (for the 10 EMU countries in the sample) comes from
choosing the degrees of capital market integration (EQ), direct banking integration (B2N) and
interbank integration (B2B)—all steady-state values in proportion to GDP—from the data, as
showed in Table A3.6. These variables implicitly pin down the following deep model parameters.
EQ determines λ from the long-run relation EQ = E
Y
≈ νE × λ, where νE is a scaling constant,
whose value is set to 0.60, to ensure that the calibrated values of λ fall in range (0, 1) for
all countries. (B2N, B2B) in turn determine the deep model parameters (τ, κ, ϕ). In the
model, we define B2N as a sum of loans from the global bank to firms and households, B2N =
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LGB + HGB, and B2B as interbank loans or the sum of loans from local banks to firms and
households, B2B = M = LLB +HLB. Given these definitions, we follow the rule according to
which an increase in B2N results in a rise in global bank loans to firms (LGB) and households
(HGB) in equal proportions without further increasing respective loans from the local bank
(LLB and HLB), while an increase in B2B results in a rise in local bank loans to firms (LLB)
and households (HLB) in equal proportions without further increasing respective loans from the
global bank (LGB and HGB). In doing this, we choose values for τ = 0.40 and κ = 0.15 for
the EMU as a whole. The value of parameter τ has been chosen based on the data from the
BIS Total Credit Database, which reveals that the average share of home bank credit to total
credit available to firms in the countries in our sample is approximately equal to 0.60 = 1−0.40.
The value of the parameter κ has been chosen to guarantee that all deep model parameters for
all countries are between zero and one and all steady-state values of endogenous variables are
positive.39
We assume the variance and persistence of TFP shocks are σθ = 0.0077 and ρθ = 0.95. The
persistence parameter is standard in the literature, while the standard deviation has been set
to match the standard deviation of model generated HP-filtered GDP to that of the data (1.43
percent). To further match the volatility of the net exports-to-lagged-GDP ratio (1.13 percent
in the data), we assume small but non-negligible innovations to local and global banking shocks
in the baseline, equal to 0.0022 (both σlbs and σgbs). The persistence of the global banking
shock is assumed the same as of the TFP process; i.e., ρgbs = 0.95. We set the autocorrelation
coefficient for the local banking shock (an interest rate) to 0.40 in order to achieve a similar
response of consumption to GDP on impact as the response of the same ratio resulting from the
global banking shock (a response three times that of GDP).
The only difference between crisis and normal times is that we assume that the standard
deviation of banking shocks is higher in crisis times. In particular, we calibrate it such that the
fall in consumption smoothing in crisis times relative to normal times is the same as we observe
in the data; i.e., from 0.50 to 0.31. This is achieved by increasing both σlbs and σgbs from 0.0022
in normal times to 0.015 in crisis times.
39These are strict restrictions, which do not leave us with many degrees of freedom in choosing this parameter;
in fact, there is no guarantee for such a value of κ to exist.
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A3.4 Model results
A3.4.1 Understanding the risk sharing mechanisms
Before we move on to study our model’s quantitative implications, we present a stylized version
in order to build intuition on how the different forms of financial integration—equity market inte-
gration, direct, and interbank integration—map into our decomposition of risk sharing channels.



























where INC denotes household income and is defined as follows:




t ) + BANKINCt, (A3.5)





Equation A3.4 states that, for a given expected path of discount rates, rht+j−1, fluctuations
in income over time will map into fluctuations in the consumption-income ratio as the consumer
tries to smooth consumption over time. This is the classical permanent income result that is
familiar from this type of model and it provides a natural starting point for our discussion of
risk sharing channels. Note that variation in the discount rate faced by the household, rht+j , will
lead the household to adjust consumption given income. This feature of the permanent-income
model is also sometimes referred to as consumption-tilting.
In our model, local banking shocks—which we assume rise dramatically in crisis times—translate
into countercyclical variation in the interest rate faced by consumers. This induces households to
make consumption less smooth than it would otherwise be. Specifically, the less direct banking
integration there is in consumer lending (i.e., the lower κ), the more households will be exposed
to the variation in interest rates offered by the local bank. In the absence of direct cross-border











in the household’s Euler equation, combine the latter with the household’s life-time budget constraint
and assume log-utility (σ = 1). The argument holds also for a more general case with a CRRA utility and higher
order approximations. A more general case would imply a time-varying propensity to consume out of total wealth
(e.g., due to precautionary saving and income/substitution effects), which is constant (1 − β) in the simple case
presented here.
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lending, households can smooth consumption only by borrowing from local banks which makes
consumption smoothing sensitive to local banking sector shocks, as we observed during the crisis.
Importantly, direct banking integration also affects income, very much as equity market
integration does. To see why, note that both direct banking integration for firms and equity
integration impact current and future income on the right hand side of (A3.4). However, while
both equity and direct banking integration affect income, they do so in different ways.
Increased equity market integration provides risk sharing by decoupling a country’s current
and future income from its output by diversifying dividend income internationally. For given
fluctuations in output, this leads to income movements that are less correlated with local output.
In our metric, this shows up as income smoothing.
Income smoothing, however, can also happen through direct banking integration. Differ-
ently from equity integration, in our model this occurs because banking integration affects the
stochastic structure of dividend and labor income. To see this, note that both dividend and
labor income are functions of the effective interest rate at which the firm can refinance itself
which we can write as the weighted average of the lending rate of the global and local banks,
rlt = τ × r
l,GB
t + (1− τ)× r
l,LB
t , where τ is the parameter measuring direct banking integration
for firms. Specifically, the asymmetric response of output, labor income, and dividends to a
local banking shock will be muted by direct banking integration, because it insulates the firm
from variation in local lending rates. Thus, income is effectively smoothed by shielding firm’s
activities from variation in the lending rate of the local banks.
In the model, direct banking integration also affects income smoothing after an idiosyncratic
productivity shock. Holding the amount of credit by local banks constant, an increase in direct
banking integration, τ , also amounts to an increase in the total amount of bank credit available
to firms (an increase in ϕ). If the share of firms’ expenses that can be prefinanced through
loans increases, the conditional correlation between labor and dividend income increases as well.
Because labor and dividends now co-move more strongly in the same direction, there is a stronger
idiosyncratic movement in output. For a given level of equity diversification, this implies that a
larger share of the variance of country-specific GDP movements gets smoothed via cross-border
dividend income flows. We expect this mechanism to be particularly important in tranquil times,
when TFP shocks drive the variation in the data.
Thus, during tranquil times, the risk sharing benefits of equity and direct banking market
seem to reinforce each other, which hints at a potentially important complementarity between
equity market and direct banking integration. It is interesting to observe that, in our data,
equity and direct banking integration are highly correlated in the cross-section, with a correlation
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coefficient of 0.67. Making direct banking and equity market integration endogenous is clearly
beyond the scope of this paper but one can speculate that endogenizing them would generate a
positive correlation between the two forms of integration. This complementarity could then also
help explain our findings in Table A3.3, where equity and direct cross-border lending appear
collinear but, jointly, have a very strong impact on income smoothing.
Finally, consider the role of interbank integration for risk sharing. Interbank integration
allows the local bank to elastically accommodate fluctuations in credit demand by households
and firms. In our model, such fluctuations in credit demand arise as a consequence of TFP
shocks and because interbank integration allows local banks to access the EMU-wide interbank
rate in response to such shocks, it has risk sharing benefits similar to those resulting from direct
banking integration in tranquil times, when TFP shocks dominate the data. However, interbank
integration will not be able to shield firms and households from the fallout of local banking
sector instability itself. Thus, the risk sharing benefits from direct as opposed to interbank
integration are particularly relevant in times of crisis: because direct banking integration insures
firms against fluctuations in borrowing rates, income reacts less to the local banking crisis, and
because it insulates households from countercyclical fluctuations in local bank’s lending rates,
consumption smoothing also drops less.
A3.4.2 Quantitative results from the model
The model is solved by log-linearizing around the deterministic steady-state and we examine its
fit by repeating the empirical regressions using simulated data. We first run the channels decom-
position that corresponds to the empirical results reported in Table A3.1 on model-generated
data calibrated to tranquil times (the benchmark) and crisis times. The results are presented
in Table A3.8, which reports the model-generated estimates of income smoothing, consumption
smoothing, and fraction not smoothed. Results for the tranquil times calibration are displayed
in the row labeled 1999–2008 while results for the crisis calibration are displayed in the row la-
beled 2009–2013. According to columns (1)-(3) in that order, 10 percent of shocks are smoothed
by international income flows, 50 percent are smoothed via procyclical saving, and 41 percent
are unsmoothed in tranquil times. This pattern of risk sharing is very similar to the empirical
estimates found for the EMU prior to the crisis where the corresponding percentages are 14,
50, and 38, as reported in Table A3.1. During crisis times, income smoothing is 8 percent,
consumption smoothing is 31 percent, leaving 62 percent of shocks unsmoothed. The results
are also quite similar to the empirical results found for the 2009–2013 period, where the corre-
sponding percentages are 3, 31, and 81. The model clearly captures the drops in both income
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and consumption smoothing, although income smoothing in the model is higher, although not
significant, during the crisis period. Consumption smoothing is at 31 percent, as in the data,
while the amount unsmoothed is larger in the data than in the model, but not significantly so.
Overall, the model does a good job of replicating the channels of risk sharing and the decline in
the recession.
In Table A3.9, we display regressions on model-generated data allowing for interactions with
international bank-to-bank lending and bank-to-nonbank lending. The results match those of
the corresponding empirical regressions well. The main terms in the top line of the table show
results that are stable and very similar to those of the top line of the empirical Table A3.2.
According to Table A3.9, column (1), total banking integration in the second line is associated
with more income smoothing with a coefficient of 13 percent which is close to the empirical
value of 9 percent in Table A3.2. The economic interpretation of this coefficient (and similarly
for the other interactions) is that an increase in total banking assets of a magnitude similar
to the value of GDP, will increase income smoothing by 13 percentage points. The coefficient
is negative 15 percent for consumption risk sharing, which is also similar to the corresponding
empirical coefficient, while the net effect on risk sharing in column (3) is negative at –3 percent,
and clearly insignificant as it is in the empirical table.
Columns (4)-(6) focus on bank-to-bank lending, captured by the estimated interaction terms
in the third line. The pattern is very similar to that found for total bank lending which reflects
the that B2B lending flows are larger than B2N lending flows. The third block of results in
columns (7)-(9) shows that bank-to-nonbank lending is associated with significantly more income
smoothing and, as in the data, the point estimate on consumption smoothing is negative (albeit
the coefficients are numerically larger in the model-based regressions). This partly reflects that
the coefficients sum to unity (when depreciation is included) so when income is smoothed more,
there is less scope for smoothing of consumption.41 In columns (10)-(12) of Table A3.9, we
include interactions for both bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank lending. While we are not able
to quantitatively match all the coefficients of the empirical regressions—the effect on overall risk
sharing in column (12) is much smaller than the empirical counterpart in Table A3.2—the main
qualitative message is similar to that of the empirical regressions: a robust positive effect of
bank-to-nonbank lending on income smoothing and a negative effect on consumption smoothing
in both the empirical and the model-based regressions. The results for bank-to-bank integration
41This finding of a negative coefficient to direct banking integration on consumption smoothing mirrors the
findings in Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011), who also document a shift from consumption smoothing
towards income smoothing following state-level banking deregulation in the United States. While they do not
find that consumption risk sharing increases overall, they argue that it becomes more resilient against aggregate
downturns—exactly because of the shift towards more income smoothing.
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are fairly robust to the inclusion of bank-to-nonbank integration (and therefore similar to those
of the previous block of regressions), while this is less so in the data. Overall, the data cannot
fully separate the effects of B2B- and B2N-lending on total amount smoothed; however, the role
of bank-to-nonbank lending on income smoothing appears to be a robust feature of model and
data.
In Table A3.10, an interaction for equity market integration is added. From column (1),
second row, income risk sharing is increasing in equity holdings—a coefficient of 88 percent—with
high statistical significance: cross-ownership of assets is a key vehicle for income smoothing as
in the bare-bones Arrow-Debreu model, and as is apparent from the results in the second row,
income risk sharing robustly substitutes for consumption smoothing when foreign equity holdings
are high. In columns (4)-(6), we add B2B lending, but we find no significant impact of B2B
lending on risk sharing when equity interaction is included. In columns (7)-(9), we find that B2N
lending has a positive impact on income smoothing (off-set by consumption smoothing), but the
coefficient is no longer significant because B2N lending is correlated with equity risk sharing.
This correlation implies that the coefficient to equity market interaction declines to 67 percent,
although it is still highly significant. In columns (10)-(12), we use as an interaction the sum of
equity and B2N lending, and drop the individual interactions for these variables. We obtain a
coefficient to this interaction that is very similar to the corresponding coefficient in the empirical
regressions, but the coefficient is less significant than the one on equity interaction alone. Our
interpretation is that both B2N- and equity market integration matter separately, but due to
noise in the data, the sum comes through more significantly in the empirical regressions.
For the crisis period, we re-estimated the regressions in Tables A3.13 and A3.14. The results
are in the appendix (Tables A3.15 and A3.16) and the coefficients to the interaction terms are
insignificant. In our model, this can be explained by the large global liquidity shock which
implies that the common variability in interbank positions dominates in the data. This makes it
hard to identify the cross-sectional link between banking positions and risk sharing. Hence, the
model also allows us to understand why our empirical regressions find insignificant interaction
terms for the crisis period.
Global or local banking shocks? In our model, risk sharing declines during financial crises
because of shocks to local and global banks. However, our results in Table A3.4 and Figure A3.3
suggest that the decline in risk sharing was heterogeneous across countries. We therefore further
explore the role of global versus local banking shocks. We re-run a version of our model, in which
we assume that during the crisis the volatility of global banking sector shocks increased and
local banking sector volatility increased in the South but not in the North. We run the model
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equivalent of the empirical regression in Table A3.4, except that we do not model the government
sector, for the two subgroups of countries. The results are displayed in Table A3.11. The first
row displays the pre-crisis results and from columns (1) (South) and (4) (North), the model
captures that income smoothing was important in the North (15 percent) while insignificant
(2 percent) in the South, which line up well with the empirical results (although income risk
sharing in Table A3.4 is slightly larger). In the model, income risk sharing in the crisis, see
the second row of Table A3.11, increased in the North and remained insignificant in the South
with a negative point estimate. All of these features were found in the empirical estimations. In
columns (2) and (4), the corresponding results for consumption smoothing are displayed. The
amount of consumption smoothing in the model is somewhat larger than the estimated amount
of risk sharing from private saving in the empirical table and the model somewhat misses the
sharp drop in consumption smoothing in southern Europe but nonetheless it partly captures
the declining consumption smoothing that was observed in both the North and the South.
Considering the host of upheavals that took place during the Great Recession and their impacts
on consumer finances and psychology, which we do not model, the model may well capture the
decline in consumption smoothing that was due to declining inter-EMU bank lending. From
columns (3) and (6), which display the amount of risk not shared, we observe that the model
overall matches the large decline in risk sharing in the South at the same time as risk sharing
in the North changed little.
Are equity market and banking integration complements? Having ascertained that
the model captures the main features of the data, we can use the model to estimate the sensi-
tivity of the model economy to different forms of financial integration. How would the pattern
of risk sharing change if foreign equity holdings and/or direct banking integration changed? In
Table A3.12, we show results for the four potential combination or high/low equity market in-
tegration and high/low direct banking integration. The results reveal that banking integration
and equity integration are complements in their impact on income smoothing: at a low level of
equity market integration, increasing direct banking integration increases risk sharing through
the income smoothing channel by 3 percentage points—compare columns (1) (low B2N) and (4)
(high B2N) in the row labeled “Low” for equity market integration). However, at a high level of
equity market integration, the same change in direct banking integration increases income risk
sharing by 10 percentage points (compare columns (1) and (4) in the row labeled “High” for
equity market integration). Equity market integration is intuitively important for risk sharing,
but banking market integration is also important because it can facilitate smoothing of labor
income, which typically infeasible through equity markets, and banking and equity-market inte-
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gration may reinforce each other—a potentially important finding that has not been previously
identified. Our interpretation of this finding is that direct banking integration increases the pro-
cyclicality in dividends, as we further explain in the next paragraph, increasing the important
of equity market integration.
In Figure A3.5, we plot the model-generated impulse responses of GDP, consumption, divi-
dends, and GNI to an idiosyncratic TFP shock. The time dimension of our data is too short to
estimate impulse responses from the data, but the impulse response functions from the model
help us understand its properties better. We plot the impulse response functions for three
regimes: (1) the baseline specification, in which a hypothetical country is calibrated to a sample-
average country in terms for all parameters, including direct and indirect banking integration;
(2) a case with high direct banking integration (high B2N), in which we increase this country’s
B2N measure to the upper range value of 0.76; and (3) a case with high interbank integration
(high B2B), in which we increase this country’s B2B measure to the upper range value of 2.76.
The foreign country (rest of the EMU) is kept the same across all scenarios.
The figure shows that the response of GDP to TFP shocks is very similar in all scenarios.
However, the consumption responses to a domestic TFP shock varies: high B2N integration and
high B2B integration lead to more muted consumption responses in line with our findings that
banking integration has risk sharing benefits. In tranquil times (when TFP shocks dominate)
B2N and B2B integration are qualitatively similar in their impact on risk sharing and the
impulse responses of dividends show why this is the case: moving from baseline levels to high
banking integration makes dividends considerably more volatile. This happens because banking
integration in our model essentially reflects a shift from (expensive) within-period short-term
finance to bank loans with a one-period maturity. Because the firm finances current wages
and investment with loans (and with loan repayments from the last period pre-determined),
its dividends become more volatile and more procyclical with banking integration. For a given
level of equity integration, higher (idiosyncratic) volatility of dividends implies more risk sharing
through the income-smoothing channel. This is exactly the pattern we see from the response of
GNI, which is less sensitive to TFP shocks when banking integration is high.
In Figure A3.6, we show the responses of GDP, consumption, dividends, and GNI to a
negative local banking shock. Again, we report results for the baseline, high B2N, and high
B2B scenarios. Now, the high B2N and B2B cases differ considerably. First, the impact of the
local banking sector shock on output is mitigated with high B2N, while it is amplified (relative
to the baseline case) with high B2B. The same ranking is apparent for the overall impact on
consumption, with high B2N providing better consumption smoothing than both the baseline
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and, in particular, the high B2B scenario. The responses of dividends and GNI elucidate why
direct banking integration provides better risk sharing against the local banking sector shock:
direct banking integration leads to a dampening of the countercyclical response of dividends
while interbank integration amplifies it.
Recall from Table A3.4 that overall risk sharing among northern eurozone countries was
more stable during the crisis because the drop in consumption smoothing was partially offset
by an increase in income smoothing. As we show in Table A3.11, our model can encompass this
feature of the data if we assume that banking sector shocks in the North were predominantly
global while in the South they also contained an important local component. The differential
patterns of risk sharing in the North and in the South can be understood as a direct implication
of the complementarity of direct banking integration and equity market integration. In the
model, a banking sector shock (global or local) leads to a countercyclical response of domestic
dividend payments. If the banking sector shock is local, income smoothing decreases with
equity diversification: the countercyclical increase in dividends is shared with the rest of EMU
in proportion to the country’s equity market integration and if the banking shock is local, there
is no concomitant increase in capital income in the rest of the EMU. So, the country affected
by the local banking sector shock not only has lower consumption smoothing due to a hike in
domestic interest rates, it also obtains little income smoothing. If, however, the banking sector
shock is global, dividends also rise in the rest of the EMU and the country benefits from this
via better income smoothing. The negative effect of the global banking shock for consumption
smoothing is thus partially offset because of equity market integration.
A3.5 Conclusion
EMU was a major step towards deeper financial integration in Europe. However, integration
did not proceed in the way many observers had expected: international diversification of equity
portfolios remained limited and did not increase more than in other parts of the world while bond
market integration mainly involved sovereign bond markets and large corporations. We show
that in Europe’s bank-based financial system, the nature of banking integration is of first-order
importance for understanding the patterns and channels of risk sharing during the euro’s first
decade as well as for understanding how well various channels of risk sharing performed during
the eurozone crisis. While EMU was associated with the creation of an integrated interbank
market, as witnessed by an explosion in cross-border interbank flows, direct banking integration
(in terms of bank-to-real sector flows or cross-border consolidation of banks) remained limited.
We find that direct banking integration has significant risk sharing benefits—mainly via its
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impact on income smoothing—while indirect integration does not. Interbank flows were highly
procyclical during the global financial and European sovereign debt crises and we show that the
collapse in interbank markets contributed to the breakdown in risk sharing, mainly by making
it harder for households to smooth consumption. The uneven nature of banking integration in
the eurozone contributed significantly to the freeze in risk sharing after 2008.
To understand these patterns, we put forward a stylized DSGE model with incomplete equity
market integration and with financial frictions affecting both firms and banks. In the model,
firms have to pre-finance wage payments and investment using either longer-term bank loans or
more costly short-term finance from other sources. Because current wage payments and invest-
ments are financed from fresh loans while the repayment of past loans is pre-determined, banking
integration increases the volatility and procyclicality of firm profits (dividends) in response to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Hence, for any given level of international equity portfolio
diversification, we see a bigger relative role for income smoothing. This explains why banking
integration leads to more income smoothing in tranquil times, such as the period before 2008,
when small idiosyncratic shocks arguably prevailed.
We argue that, during the crisis period after 2008, the eurozone was hit by country-specific
banking shocks that lead to a breakdown in interbank markets. In our model, shocks to the
interbank markets hit local banks who pass on increased cost of funding to households and firms.
The higher domestic interest rates make consumption smoothing more expensive for households
and this feature of our model drives the breakdown in risk sharing during a crisis, consistent
with the data.
Our DSGE model is the first to target the channels of risk sharing identified by Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and thereby to underpin their economic interpretation. Furthermore,
our framework captures an interaction between capital (equity) market and banking integration
that has not been discussed previously. Specifically, our model, and our empirical findings,
suggest that both capital market union and banking union are important and that they are
complements. Thus, for further integration of the eurozone to be successful, both unions need
to be completed. At the same time, the model and the data illustrate that the risk sharing
benefits from banking integration are only robust to national banking-sector shocks if banking
integration is sufficiently deep; i.e., focused on direct cross-border lending from banks to the real
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Table A3.1. Basic Risk Sharing
EMU10 non–EMU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
βI βD βF βC βU βI βD βF βC βU
1999− 2013 ∆g̃dpkt 0.09
∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 1.02∗∗∗
(2.55) (−3.41) (1.82) (5.52) (7.47) (−1.35) (−1.97) (2.02) (−0.01) (32.43)
1999− 2008 ∆g̃dpkt 0.14
∗ −0.01 −0.01 0.50∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.03 −0.01 1.04∗∗∗
(1.84) (−0.30) (−0.34) (4.97) (3.61) (−2.63) (−2.54) (1.49) (−0.19) (55.71)
2009− 2013 ∆g̃dpkt 0.03 −0.15
∗∗∗ 0.00 0.31∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.06∗ 0.05 0.96∗∗∗
(0.30) (−6.75) (0.03) (4.03) (5.44) (0.44) (−0.37) (1.83) (0.34) (8.29)







x = g̃dp − g̃ni, g̃ni − ñni, ñni − ñndi, ñndi − c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being X = I, D, F , C, and
U , respectively. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the sample-wide






. dkXt contains time and country fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and t-statistics are in parentheses.
EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal.
Non-EMU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK.
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Table A3.2. Risk Sharing and Cross-Border Bank Lending, 1999–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt 0.15
∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(2.21) (5.88) (3.85) (1.86) (5.29) (4.39) (1.66) (6.26) (3.79) (1.66) (6.79) (6.40)
T̃Bkt−1
GDPkt−1




×∆g̃dpkt 0.07 −0.16 0.11 −0.04 −0.14 0.26
∗




∗ −0.12 −0.54 0.55∗∗ 0.11 −0.98∗∗∗
(1.68) (−0.37) (−1.64) (2.40) (0.30) (−3.62)






Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñndi− c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being







. βkX(t) is defined as β
k






t contains country specific bank lending variables listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains time and
country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and time, and t-statistics are in parentheses. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported.
EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal. Time period is 1999Q1-2008Q4.
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Table A3.3. Risk Sharing, Cross-Border Bank Lending and Equity Holdings, 1999–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt 0.13
∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗




∗ −0.59 −0.25 1.13 −0.25 −1.11∗∗∗ 0.54 −0.57 0.07
(1.88) (−1.17) (−0.62) (1.52) (−0.24) (−2.88) (0.93) (−0.93) (0.15)
B̃2Bkt−1
GDPkt−1
























Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñndi− c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being
X = I, C, and U , respectively. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the sample-wide aggregate, indicated with a *-superscript.










and SPriv are public and private saving, respectively and SPublic + SPriv = S = NNDI −C. d
k
Xt contains country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by country.
EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal. Time period is 1999Q1-2008Q4.
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Table A3.4. Risk Sharing and Saving Components
South North
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
βI βC βU βI βC βU
public private public private
1999− 2008 ∆g̃dpkt 0.08
∗∗ 0.25 0.12 0.54∗∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.28 0.33∗∗∗
(2.37) (0.80) (0.34) (4.59) (1.89) (2.34) (0.97) (3.09)
2009− 2013 ∆g̃dpkt −0.05 0.05 −0.04 1.19
∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.23 0.03 0.41∗∗∗
(−0.47) (0.75) (−0.23) (9.84) (4.11) (1.60) (0.11) (3.11)







x = g̃dp − g̃ni, ñndi − c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being X = I, C, and U , respectively. The lower-case
letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the sample-wide aggregate, indicated with a *-
superscript. βC is decomposed into contributions from public and private saving by performing similar










, where SPublic and SPriv are public and private
saving, respectively and SPublic + SPriv = S = NNDI −C. d
k
Xt contains country and time fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by country.
Southern countries are Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Northern countries are Belgium, Germany,
Finland, France, Netherlands, and Austria.
Table A3.5. Model Calibration I: Common Parameters
Parameter Description Value
β Households’ discount factor 0.99
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity 2
σ Households’ risk aversion 1
γ Index of real wage rigidities 0.80
α Capital intensity in firms production function 0.35
φI Investment adjustment cost parameter 4
δ Capital depreciation in steady-state 0.025
ι Cost of alternative sources of funds to firms 0.04
νE Scaling parameter for cross-border equity holdings 0.60
φLB Local bank adjustment cost in interbank markets 0.015
MULB Mark-up on credit from local banks 3.5
MUGB Mark-up on credit from global banks 2.0
ρθ TFP shocks autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρgbs Global banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρlbs Local banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.40
σθ Standard deviation of TFP shocks (same in baseline and crisis) 0.0077
σgbs Standard deviation of global banking shock: baseline (crisis) 0.0022 (0.015)
σlbs Standard deviation of local banking shock: baseline (crisis) 0.0022 (0.015)
NOTES: Country-specific calibration parameters are presented in Table A3.6.
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Table A3.6. Model Calibration II: Country-Specific Parameters
Raw values Deep parameters
GDP B2B B2N Equity τ κ ϕ λ
Austria 1.00 0.92 0.21 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.30 0.27
Belgium 1.00 2.76 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.10 0.80 0.77
Finland 1.00 0.57 0.31 0.21 0.58 0.27 0.28 0.35
France 1.00 1.14 0.26 0.17 0.36 0.13 0.37 0.28
Germany 1.00 0.89 0.23 0.23 0.39 0.15 0.30 0.38
Greece 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.02 0.72 0.40 0.33 0.03
Italy 1.00 0.72 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.08 0.20 0.32
Netherlands 1.00 2.23 0.76 0.59 0.46 0.19 0.85 0.98
Portugal 1.00 2.04 0.35 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.60 0.15
Spain 1.00 0.75 0.17 0.10 0.36 0.13 0.24 0.17
EMU 10.00 1.25 0.33 0.22 0.40 0.15 0.43 0.37















NOTES: GDP is unity for all countries. B2N, B2B and Equity (raw values) are relative to GDP and
constructed from the empirical data as pre-2008, within-country, averages. The EMU values for these
parameters are constructed as averages. τ and κ (deep model parameters) are derived from raw values of
B2N and B2B, as well as the following rule for calibrating B2N and B2B: an increase in B2N results in a
rise in global bank loans to firms and households in equal proportions without further increasing respective
loans from the local bank, while an increase in B2B results in a rise in local bank loans to firms and
households in equal proportions without further increasing respective loans from the global bank. EMU
values for these parameters have been calibrated. Given these parameters, ϕ (deep model parameter)
is derived from steady-state restrictions as ϕ = L
WN+I . λ (deep model parameter) is derived from raw
values of Equity using the approximation: Equity ≈ νE × λ. The EMU values for these parameters are
constructed as averages. All parameters for the foreign country are derived from the values of individual
countries, such that the total EMU value (e.g., the average) stays the same for each home-foreign country





×Xj , where Xc is one of: B2Bc, B2Nc, τc, and κc; c is a country index. For
equity, we assume Equity∗c = Equity
EMU .
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Table A3.7. Business Cycle Statistics
Model Data
St.Dev. Corr. St.Dev. Corr.
GDP 1.43∗ 1.43∗
Consumption 0.50 0.88 0.63 0.75
Investment 2.62 0.58 2.82 0.81
Employment 0.63 0.85 0.62 0.72
Net exports 1.13 0.39 1.13 –0.24
NOTES: The table reports theoretical and empirical standard deviations (“St.Dev.”) and correlations
(“Corr.”) of the variables. The theoretical moments are shown for an hypothetical country, for which all
variables are set to average values; i.e., Equity: 0.22; B2B: 1.25; B2N: 0.33. The same values are used
for the foreign country. The empirical moments are averages across 10 countries in our sample: Belgium,
Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal. All statistics are
obtained from applying the HP-filter to variables in logarithms. Standard deviations are the ratio of
the standard deviation to the standard deviation of GDP (except for net exports, which is the standard
deviation of net exports-to-GDP ratio in percentage points).














Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñni− c̃, c̃ for I, C and U , respectively. The results for the depreciation
channel are not reported. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the






. dkXt contains time and country fixed effects. t-statistics
are in parentheses and are calculated as the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation of the estimated
coefficients across 1000 model simulations. EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain,
France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal.
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Table A3.9. Risk Sharing and Cross-Border Bank Lending: Model, Pre-Crisis Simulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt
0.10∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗









0.14∗∗∗ –0.16∗∗∗ –0.03 0.08∗ –0.09 –0.01




1.16∗∗∗ –1.34∗∗∗ –0.22 0.73 –0.83 –0.16
(2.77) (–2.77) (–1.03) (1.50) (–1.42) (–0.56)
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360






















t for I, C






. βkX(t) is defined






t contains country specific bank lending variables and/or cross-border equity holdings, as listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains
time and country fixed effects. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated as the ratio of the mean to the
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients across 1000 model simulations. EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands,
Austria, and Portugal. The calibration assumes tranquil times and simulations have been done for 40 quarters, corresponding to pre-crisis period in the data
(1999Q1–2008Q4).
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Table A3.10. Risk Sharing, Cross-Border Bank Lending and Equity Holdings: Model, Pre-Crisis Simulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt
0.12∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗




0.88∗∗∗ –1.02∗∗∗ –0.14 0.82∗∗∗ –1.11∗∗∗ 0.03 0.67∗∗∗ –0.88∗∗∗ –0.02




0.03 –0.01 –0.03 0.03 –0.01 –0.03















N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360






















t for I, C






. βkX(t) is defined






t contains country specific bank lending variables and/or cross-border equity holdings, as listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains
time and country fixed effects. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated as the ratio of the mean to the
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients across 1000 model simulations. EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands,




Table A3.11. Basic Risk Sharing, North vs. South and Global vs. Local Banking Shocks: Model
South North
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βI βC βU βI βC βU
1999–2008 ∆g̃dpkt
0.02 0.60∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.90) (33.92) (13.50) (3.42) (9.48) (16.71)
2009–2013 ∆g̃dpkt
–0.12 0.41∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.36∗ 0.17 0.39∗∗∗
(–0.52) (2.00) (2.06) (1.71) (0.68) (9.18)





Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñni− c̃, c̃ for I, C and U , respectively. The results for the depreciation
channel are not reported. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the






. dkXt contains time and country fixed effects. t-statistics
are in parentheses and are calculated as the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation of the estimated
coefficients across 1000 model simulations.
Pre-crisis calibration for southern and northern countries is identical. Crisis times assume an increase in
the volatility (standard deviations) of local and global banking shocks for the southern countries from
0.0022 to 0.03 and increase in volatility of (only) global banking shocks for the northern countries from
0.0022 to 0.03.
Southern countries are Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Northern countries are Belgium, Germany,
Finland, France, Netherlands, and Austria.
Table A3.12. Risk Sharing under Different Scenarios: Model, Pre-Crisis Simulations
B2N integrarion
Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βI βC βU βI βC βU
Equity
integration
Low 0.01 0.60 0.42 0.04 0.59 0.38
High 0.16 0.37 0.45 0.26 0.29 0.40







with x = g̃dp − g̃ni, ñni − c̃, c̃ for I, C and U , respectively. The results for the depreciation channel
are not reported. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the sample-wide






. dkXt contains time and country fixed effects. All countries are assumed
to be identical in the equity and B2N calibration. Low capital integration refers to a scenario in which
equity is set to a value 50 percent below the mean, while high capital integration is set to a value 100
percent above the mean. Low direct banking integration refers to a scenario in which B2N is set to a
value 50 percent below the mean, while high real banking integration is set to a value 100 percent above
the mean. The calibration assumes tranquil times and the simulations have been performed using 1000
model simulations, each spanning 1000 quarters.
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Euro Area World ex Euro Area



















NOTES : The figure plots cross-border lending by foreign banks to 19 eurozone economies (“Euro
Area”) and a sample of 118 other advanced and developing countries (“World ex Euro Area”).
The black solid line shows total lending, the red dashed line shows lending by foreign banks
to domestic banks, and the blue dotted line shows lending by foreign banks to the domestic
non-bank sector (including governments). All values are in trillion euros. The source is the BIS
locational banking statistics database.
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Income smoothing Consumption smoothing
NOTES : The figure plots the degree of income smoothing (βI(t), green dot-dashed line) and consumption
smoothing (βC(t), red long-dashed line). The coefficients βI(t) and βC(t) are estimated from cross-












t + τt + ϵ
k
t
for each quarter from t = 1999Q1 . . . 2013Q4, where ˜ denotes idiosyncratic component of growth in
gross domestic product, gdp, gross national income, gni, net national disposable income, nndi, and
consumption, c. The coefficient βI yields the fraction of output risk shared via net income flows (∆g̃dpkt −
∆g̃nikt ) and represents income smoothing via cross-border ownership. Coefficient βC yields the amount
of output risk captured by savings (∆ñndikt − ∆c̃
k
t ) and corresponds to consumption smoothing via
borrowing and lending. The estimates of βI(t) and βC(t) have been smoothed using the trend component
of the HP-filter with smoothing parameter of 250.
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Change in avg. B2B−to−GDP ratio Change in avg. B2N−to−GDP ratio

























NOTES : The figure displays on the y-axis the post-2008 minus the pre-2008 coefficient to con-
sumption growth in a regression on GDP growth, controlling for time fixed effects, interpreted as
the amount of GDP shocks not smoothed (the fraction of risk not shared) estimated country-by-
country—see the main text for the exact implementation of the regressions. On the x-axis in the
left panel, we display the change post-2008 minus the pre-2008 average international interbank
liabilities by country. On the x-axis in the right panel, we display the change post-2008 minus
the pre-2008 average internationaldirect non-bank sector banking liabilities by country.
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NOTES : The figure outlines the structure of our model. GB refers to global banks. The circle
to the left is the domestic economy while the larger circle to the right is the rest of the eurozone.
Apart from size, the foreign and the domestic economies are symmetric. LB denotes local banks,
H denotes households, and F denotes firms. L denotes loans from the banks indicated by the
superscript, while H with LB and GB superscript denote loans to households from local and
global banks, respectively. The arrows from firms to households indicate dividend flows and
the arrows from households to firms indicate labor supply. The shocks to the economies are
indicated in the red boxes framed by broken lines and take the form of global funding shocks B
to the global bank, productivity shocks θ to the firms, and intermediation shocks LBS to local
banks.
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Baseline High B2N High B2B
NOTES : The figure plots the model impulse response functions for GDP, Consumption, GNI,
and firm dividends to a domestic TFP shock. Three scenarios are presented: (1) Baseline, in
which all variables are set to average values: dashed red line with (*); (2) High B2N, in which
direct bank-to-nonbank lending is set to the upper range value of 0.76: solid green line with (*);
and (3) High B2B, in which interbank lending is set to the upper range value of 2.76: dotted
blue line with (*). The foreign country is calibrated from the baseline values in all scenarios.
Baseline values are: for Equity: 0.22; B2B: 1.25; B2N: 0.33. All impulse responses are percentage
deviations from steady state. Number of quarters following the shock is on the x-axes.
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Baseline High B2N High B2B
NOTES : The figure plots the model impulse response functions for GDP, Consumption, GNI,
and firm dividends to a domestic local banking shock. Three scenarios are presented: (1)
Baseline, in which all variables are set to average values: dashed red line with (*); (2) High
B2N, in which direct bank-to-nonbank lending is set to the upper range value of 0.76: solid
green line with (*); and (3) High B2B, in which interbank lending is set to the upper range
value of 2.76: dotted blue line with (*). The foreign country is calibrated from the baseline
values in all scenarios. Baseline values are: for Equity: 0.22; B2B: 1.25; B2N: 0.33. All impulse
responses are percentage deviations from steady state. Number of quarters following the shock
is on the x-axes.
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Baseline High B2N High B2B
NOTES : The figure plots the model impulse response functions for GDP, Consumption, GNI,
and firm dividends to a global banking shock. Three scenarios are presented: (1) Baseline, in
which all variables are set to average values: dashed red line with (*); (2) High B2N, in which
direct bank-to-nonbank lending is set to the upper range value of 0.76: solid green line with (*);
and (3) High B2B, in which interbank lending is set to the upper range value of 2.76: dotted
blue line with (*). The foreign country is calibrated from the baseline values in all scenarios.
Baseline values are: for Equity: 0.22; B2B: 1.25; B2N: 0.33. All impulse responses are percentage
deviations from steady state. Number of quarters following the shock is on the x-axes.
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Appendix
See Tables A3.13, A3.14, A3.15 and A3.16.
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Table A3.13. Risk Sharing and Cross-Border Bank Lending, 2009–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt 0.06 0.27
∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.05 0.28∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.06 0.28∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.06 0.28∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.92) (2.37) (6.49) (0.79) (2.47) (6.18) (0.71) (2.37) (5.88) (0.93) (2.13) (6.04)
T̃Bkt−1
GDPkt−1




×∆g̃dpkt 0.11 −0.15 0.02 0.10 −0.16 0.05
(0.66) (−0.62) (0.12) (0.55) (−0.57) (0.36)
B̃2Nkt−1
GDPkt−1
×∆g̃dpkt 0.36 −0.31 −0.21 0.12 0.06 −0.27
(0.92) (−0.59) (−0.78) (0.39) (0.11) (−1.01)






Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñndi− c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being







. βkX(t) is defined as β
k






t contains country specific bank lending variables listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains time and
country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and time, and t-statistics are in parentheses. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported.
EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal. Time period is 2009Q1-2013Q4.
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Table A3.14. Risk Sharing, Cross-Border Bank Lending and Equity Holdings, 2009–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt 0.24
∗∗∗ 0.11 0.69∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.22 0.66∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.09 0.70∗∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗




∗∗∗ −0.64 −1.39∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.48 −1.84∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ −0.52 −1.58∗∗∗
(3.93) (−1.29) (−3.09) (6.78) (0.94) (−3.53) (4.44) (−0.90) (−3.06)
B̃2Bkt−1
GDPkt−1













×∆g̃dpkt 0.59 −0.18 −0.58
∗
(1.48) (−0.43) (−1.85)






Xt with x = g̃dp− g̃ni, ñndi− c̃, c̃ for the subscript on β being
X = I, C, and U , respectively. The lower-case letters with a tilde denote logarithmic deviations from the sample-wide aggregate, indicated with a *-superscript.










and SPriv are public and private saving, respectively and SPublic + SPriv = S = NNDI −C. d
k
Xt contains country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by country.
EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal. Time period is 2009Q1-2013Q4.
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Table A3.15. Risk Sharing and Cross-Border Bank Lending: Model, Crisis Simulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt
0.05 0.39∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.05 0.38∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.06 0.36∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.06 0.38∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗









0.12 –0.32 0.18 0.02 –0.19 0.19




1.18 –2.68 1.35 1.33 –1.72 0.01
(0.59) (–1.14) (1.16) (0.52) (–0.54) (0.01)
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200






















t for I, C,






. βkX(t) is defined






t contains country specific bank lending variables and/or cross-border equity holdings, as listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains
time and country fixed effects. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated as a ratio of the mean to the
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients across 1000 model simulations. EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands,




Table A3.16. Risk Sharing, Cross-Border Bank Lending and Equity Holdings: Model, Crisis Simulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU βI βC βU
∆g̃dpkt
0.11 0.31∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.12 0.30∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.08 0.34∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.00 0.43∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗




0.95 –1.85 0.74 1.39 –1.79 0.04 0.36 –1.16 0.78




–0.11 –0.02 0.17 –0.00 –0.14 0.16















N 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200






















t for I, C






. βkX(t) is defined






t contains country specific bank lending variables and/or cross-border equity holdings, as listed in the first column. d
k
Xt contains
time and country fixed effects. Standalone coefficients cX are not reported. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated as a ratio of the mean to the
standard deviation of the estimated coefficients across 1000 model simulations. EMU10: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Netherlands,
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